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This project lies at the intersection of Asian American studies, critical refugee studies, 
environmental injustice and racism, and engages community-level interventions into 
restoration policy and practice in Southeast Louisiana.  
 
Over the last 15 years, coastal land loss and vulnerability to disaster has been at the center 
of how government officials, residents, and everyone in between talk about coastal 
Louisiana’s future. Significantly, where residents are often told these environmental ills 
are ‘natural’ and thus difficult to apprehend, their origins are quite clear. Land subsidence 
(or sinking), which is typical of the marshland that forms Louisiana’s coast, is spurred on 
by federally supported oil extraction, natural gas exploration, and shipping canals, which 
all cut up and hasten the dissolution of the already subsiding and porous coast. Damming, 
leveeing, and other infrastructure management along the Mississippi River make residents 
even more vulnerable to climate-change-induced flooding and storms.  
 
All of these decision-maker-produced ills make the daily lives of folks who rely on the 
health of the Gulf and the coast not just difficult, but increasingly impossible. This is 
particularly the case for Vietnamese/Americans, who decision-makers continue to racialize 
as refugees well equipped at surviving upheaval. As a result of this refugee racialization, 
Vietnamese/Americans are at once rendered more ‘resilient’ to the above disasters and 
erased from mitigation and support efforts as resilient refugees, or exemplary survivors of 
disaster who, in addition to their particular aptitude for assimilating U.S. culture and values 
into their families and communities, are adept at incorporating disaster policy and coastal 
regulatory practices into their daily lives. In spite of this, as perpetual refugees, they may 
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INTRODUCTION: DISASTER, RISK MITIGATION, & VIETNAMESE 
/AMERICAN LOUISIANA 
 
When I moved to New Orleans for fieldwork in July 2015, I did so with the intention to 
study Vietnamese/American racialization in the city by focusing on how community 
members produced, distributed, and consumed Vietnamese/American food in the context 
of disaster. Prior to this, I had conducted a month of preliminary fieldwork in July 2014, 
which had given me time to connect with Vietnamese/American leaders in the food 
growing and provisioning industries. During preliminary fieldwork, I conducted one-on-
one interviews with Vietnamese/American and other chefs in New Orleans, spent time in 
the New Orleans Special collection and the archives at Tulane University, and met with 
other leaders in the area’s food community, including the director of the Southern Food 
and Beverage Museum and the author of a book on New Orleans Vietnamese food.  
 
Most importantly, I used that first research month to establish relationships with the staff 
of two very different Vietnamese/American non-profits. The first was GROW, an urban 
farm in Versailles, the neighborhood where Vietnamese refugees had been resettled by 
Catholic Charities of New Orleans in 1975 and that had since become a major 
Vietnamese/American community hub. The second was Fisheries Support Services 
(FSS), a non-profit that supported Southeast Louisiana’s commercial fisherfolk and their 
families in every Louisiana fishery: pelagic longline (tuna and swordfish), shrimp, 
oysters, crab, finfish (primarily redfish), and crawfish. I had spent two days with Sue Ha, 
FSS’s executive director—the first in her office, where we spoke about the problems 
facing commercial fisherfolk in the region, and the second in the Birdfoot Delta, where I 




In the year between preliminary and long-term fieldwork, I maintained connections to 
GROW and FSS; through the course of writing my preliminary exams, however, I 
decided to focus on community farming, effectively relegating commercial fishing to a 
small, almost anecdotal place in my dissertation imaginary. It would add an interesting 
story or two to help me illustrate the breadth of Vietnamese/Americans’ contribution to 
Southeast Louisiana’s food culture. Given this, and because Sue had stopped responding 
to my phone calls and emails in the lead-up to my moving to New Orleans, GROW was 
my primary research site for the first nine months of fieldwork. Two to four times a 
week, I woke up at 5:00 am to bus an hour from my home in Mid-City New Orleans to 
the farm’s primary growing site in Versailles, Village de l’Est. While GROW’s farmers 
typically got to the site around 7 am, I had to leave my house so early because of how 
difficult it was to get to GROW—a single bus runs from the nature reserve at the city’s 
easternmost edge to New Orleans’ center every 25 minutes, stopping almost every block 
as it creeps across the city. Versailles is named after Versailles Arms, the apartment 
complex where refugees of U.S. military engagement in Việt Nam were resettled by the 
Catholic Church beginning in 1975. While I will explore this in more depth in chapter 
one, it is important to note here that for over forty decades, Vietnamese/Americans have 
been kept spatially and culturally removed from New Orleans proper; although there is a 
great deal of transit from Versailles to New Orleans, traffic is far less likely to move in 




Figure 1. This map indicates the primary neighborhoods in Orleans Parish and Jefferson Parish according 
to The Data Center, which aggregates statistical data about and for South Louisiana. The primary New 
Orleans Metro area lies between Lake Pontchartrain to its north and the Mississippi River to the south; it 
is bifurcated from New Orleans East, Village de l’Est, Viaviant/Venetian Isles, and the Lower Ninth Ward 
by the Industrial Canal. The neighborhood of Versailles is in Village de l’Est, which I also identify and 
New Orleans East, as the folks I work with call it, and lies directly south of “De” in “Village De l’est,” 
and represents the last major neighborhood west of the Bayou Sauvage National Wildlife Refuge, indicated 
in green (The Data Center 2019).  
 
During my nine-month tenure at GROW, I worked alongside the neighborhood’s youth 
and elders to cultivate okra, salad greens, Japanese eggplant, Vietnamese herbs, squash, 
and other restaurant and home pantry staples on the farm’s primary growing plot at the 
center of Versailles. I also attended weekly farm meetings with staff members to 
understand how the farm worked, and its role in Vietnamese/American life following 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (2005), Gustav and Ike (2008), and the BP oil catastrophe 
(2010). In addition to these primary duties, I delivered produce to restaurants in New 
Orleans proper, worked at GROW’s booth at one of five weekly farmer’s markets in the 
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Mid-City neighborhood, participated in projects to restore the health of the 
neighborhood’s soil, and contributed to community outreach and organizing work, from 
creating illustrations for a now-defunct community cookbook and helping youth test 
recipes to working at the farm’s annual fundraiser and Tết celebration, where donors 
received tours of the farm and learned about how GROW engaged the community.  
 
Together, this work helped me understand the cadence of the neighborhood and its role in 
the lives of community members. This includes how ongoing poor infrastructure issues 
like leaky water mains, sparse social services like language-accessible healthcare, and 
spatial and community-based exclusion affected them. Learning how to cultivate 
vegetables and herbs that are both in demand by local non-Vietnamese/American 
restaurants and at the Vietnamese/American corner store gave me a sense of how food 
flowed through the community, governmental, and other place-based networks of power 
across the New Orleans metro area. It also helped me understand how disaster, changes in 
soil and groundwater health, and other basic ecosystem-level experiences the folks with 
whom I worked.  
 
At the farm, decision-maker-produced environmental and ecosystem-level violences 
showed up in everything we did. Every day was an upward battle in terms of growing. 
The spring of 2016 was so uncharacteristically rainy that it raised the water table across 
the state, making the entire growing plot, which was in a particularly low-lying area of 
Versailles, a fecund swamp in which the roots of half of what we planted rotted. We were 
set upon by swarms of gnats and mosquitoes with each step, and struggled to move water 
away from our yield, as the entire neighborhood was a squelching, muddy mess, and the 
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algae-filled water canals that crisscrossed the neighborhood were almost overflowing. In 
the lead-up to the June 1st start date of hurricane season, I helped staff prepare disaster 
kits, replacing batteries in camping lanterns, buying fresh gallon jugs of water, and 
making sure there was enough shelf-stable food for everyone to eat for at least a week at 
the office.  
 
With this burgeoning yet patchy ecosystem-level knowledge, I also began to see how the 
farm was invariably wedded to larger experiences of disaster—the co-op had been 
founded in the wake of the BP oil catastrophe in 2010—that in turn, kept leading me back 
to fishing. GROW was founded following BP to give out-of-work Vietnamese/American 
fisherfolk a source of income. The elders I worked alongside on the farm had either been 
forced out of shrimping because they went underwater on their boats while waiting for 
compensation for lost income, or saw BP as the last straw in a long string of state and 
federal ecosystem-, community-, and race-specific violences against their industry, and 
left. Growing lettuces and herbs, as they had their whole lives on a personal or semi-
professional scale, felt more stable than commercial fishing.  
 
As it became increasingly clear that fishing writ large—and shrimping in particular—was 
the center of almost every story community members told me about disaster and the 
community itself, I reached out to Sue again, imploring her to give me an interview about 
the connections between the farm and the fisherfolk with whom she worked. After 
several more months of silence, she called me out of the blue, saying: “I didn’t want to 
talk to you until I could pay you. We need a good writer and someone who can talk to the 
state. Be my shadow and help me with our coastal outreach and education” (Ha 2015). 
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Within 72 hours, I was an official part of the only organization in Southeast Louisiana 
devoted to the economic and communal health of Louisiana’s oyster, shrimp, finfish, 
pelagic (tuna and swordfish), and crab fisheries. When Sue brought me on board, I 
committed to a second year of fieldwork and wrapped up my tenure on the farm, where I 
had developed a foundational understanding of the community’s heterogenous histories, 
needs, and visions for the future in light of coastal change, restoration, and policy. With 
an enlivened commitment to commercial fishing, I made Sue’s work—our work—my 
primary research with her full support. Since March 2016, I have been Fisheries Support 
Services’ Coastal Project Coordinator.  
 
FSS is unique as an institution; my peers Sarah, Jane, and Missy—three women of color 
who respectively identify as Vietnamese/American, Cambodian and 
Vietnamese/American, and African American—are all either part of fishing families or 
are partnered with commercial fishermen. These three do the real, imperative and 
grounded work of providing almost 3,000 boat owners, deckhands, and their families 
with ESL, business, and citizenship training; help fisherfolk file their taxes and get boat 
and equipment loans; interpret phone calls to doctors’ offices and meetings with agencies 
like the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA); translate 
fisherfolks’ public comments from Vietnamese and Khmer to English for the state; help 
our clients start new businesses, buy homes, and bring relatives to Louisiana from Việt 
Nam, and do everything else it takes to keep their clients’ families and businesses stable 




As staff members are overwhelmingly part of the Vietnamese/American community and 
have direct personal relationships to commercial fishing, and given that almost every 
commercial shrimper in Southeast Louisiana is a client, FSS truly functions as a 
community-based organization. Collectively, Sue, Sarah, Jane, and Missy have cultivated 
a space that understands itself as a part of—even central to—the  long-term work of 
fostering, sustaining, and creating Vietnamese/American community in Southeast 
Louisiana. This commitment to commercial fisherfolk writ large and the 
Vietnamese/American community has forced Sue to reimagine what a community-based 
organization looks like by situating FSS at the intersection of knowledges produced by 
community members, parish-level organizations, state and federal decision-makers, 
academics and universities, and intimates, including elders, youth, and ancestors.  
*** 
Moving my field to commercial fishing drastically changed the size and reach of what 
constituted my fieldwork. Whereas GROW operates in the greater New Orleans metro 
area and on the West Bank (in Orleans and north Jefferson parishes, respectively), which 
is directly south of and across the Mississippi from New Orleans, FSS’s work spans six 
parishes: Orleans, St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, Lafourche, and Terrebonne (see 




Figure 2. The parishes of Louisiana. The Southeast region of Louisiana, indicated in green and purple 
above, includes six parishes in FSS’s service area: Terrebonne, Lafourche, Jefferson, Plaquemines, St. 
Bernard, and Orleans (USDC Eastern District of Louisiana 2016). 
 
FSS’s offices are based in Gretna, a city on the West Bank in northern Jefferson Parish, 
making our services as centrally accessible as possible to residents from areas as wide-
ranging as Versailles in New Orleans East and Dulac in southern Terrebonne Parish. 
During the 16 months I worked with FSS in Louisiana, the work I did expanded my 
fieldsite even more—many of our meetings brought me to areas of the Southeast I would 
have never traveled to had FSS’s partners or state decision-makers not been located there. 





Figure 3. I created this map in Google Maps to indicate my primary and secondary fieldsites.  
 
The sites highlighted in red are primary field sites—areas that I traveled to on a regular 
basis because FSS clients’ work was situated there (this is highlighted by the myriad of 
locations in the greater New Orleans metro area and throughout the Birdfoot Delta) or 
because they were central to my engagement in client advocacy. These primary sites 
include Baton Rouge, Louisiana’s capitol indicated by the northwestern-most pin, where 
Sue and I regularly attended CPRA, USACE, and other governmental meetings,met with 
state agency members from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA), the National Fish and Wildlife Federation (NFWF), Louisiana Department of 
Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF), the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), 
and so on, and attended conferences and symposia on coastal issues. Following the 
Mississippi south from Baton Rouge, the next cluster of red pins represents the greater 
New Orleans metro area (suburbs Kenner and Metairie, Versailles to the southeast of 
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Lake Pontchartrain, and Gretna and Belle Chasse immediately south of New Orleans). 
Because of how the map was generated, Versailles, the red pin to the southeast of Lake 
Pontchartrain and just above Lake Borgne, it is not indicated by a place name. Given its 
centrality to the experiences and lives of the folks with whom I work, I wanted to be sure 
to point out where it is located in relation to my other field sites. 
 
Traveling further south down the river, the remainder of the primary sites indicated on 
the Birdfoot Delta indicate shrimping docks, commercial fishing-dependent small towns 
where FSS clients live, and areas the industry depends on for its well-being. They are, 
from north to south: Myrtle Grove, Pointe A La Hache, Port Sulphur, Empire, Buras, 
Triumph, Boothville, Venice, and Pilottown. Pointe A La Hatch is just a few miles north 
of where CPRA is planning to build the Mid-Barataria Bay Sediment Diversion structure. 
The last six are major dock sites. To the immediate west of the delta and almost due north 
of Grand Isle is a red pin that marks Barataria Bay, many of FSS’s clients’ primary 
shrimping grounds and the sediment diversion’s area of impact. The other two red pins to 
the west of the delta—Houma and Galiano—are major fishing hubs as well and each 
represents a significant number of FSS clients’ residences. The areas marked in blue are 
secondary fieldsites, largely representing places I attended coalitional meetings or public 







Where my research substantively diverges from other approaches to ethnography is that 
mine is not an institutional ethnography (Smith 2006), but rather one that centers and was 
almost entirely facilitated by my work with an institution: FSS. My institution-based 
ethnography, then, uplifts the knowledge I gained from working at FSS and conducting 
ethnographic research and participant-observation in conversation with FSS’s clients, in 
spaces of governance like official conferences and at Coastal Protection and Restoration 
Authority and other institutional meetings, in community-based spaces, which for me, 
mostly meant the community-based coalitions I helped form during my time with FSS, 
and in my work with GROW. Given that my work is firmly institution-based, during my 
research tenure, I overwhelmingly conducted research very informally; my time in our 
office, conversations at the dock and on the boat, attending meetings on behalf of FSS, 
and attending conferences allowed me to see how state decision-making, environmental 
management, and Vietnamese/American commercial fishing function both on their own 
terms and in relation. 
 
This participant observation-centric approach showed me that while I had initially 
planned on looking at food as a nexus point between Vietnamese/American refugeeism, 
racialization, and disaster, the site where these things most clearly cohere is commercial 
fishing. When I came to commercial fishing, I also realized that political ecology, or the 
study of ecosystems as spaces that are not neutral, but full of heterogeneous decisions, 
erasures, and ideals that, when unpacked, are deeply political, was imperative to my 
analysis. In my case, this ecosystem is layered—it scales from the rather small 
ecosystems produced by the work of a shrimping boat on the Gulf, all of the more-than-
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human species fisherfolk come into relationship with, from shrimp to tides, the larger 
ecosystem that encompasses the cities of Baton Rouge and New Orleans, the Birdfoot 
Delta, the Louisiana coastline, and state and federal waters fisherfolk depend on. 
Studying commercial fishing and its connection to ecosystems also taught me that my 
work hinges on naming and making plain the overwhelmingly opaque political and 
economic decisions that go into crafting, managing, and harming these ecosystems. 
Through the process of working with commercial fisherfolk, engaging in critical refugee 
scholarship and political ecology, and thinking from a feminist ethnographic standpoint I 
found that four key concepts were central to this work: restoration, risk, resilience, and 
refugeeism, all of which I gloss below and in much more depth in the chapters that 
follow.  
 
As I worked through the complex and fraught ways restoration, risk, resilience, and 
refugeeism traveled in my fieldsite, I learned how my own subject-position situated me 
within and outside of structures of power and their functioning. While learning the 
language of the state gave me the tools to see how that language was imposed on and was 
used to manage the folks ethical whom I work, I also found myself reinforcing and 
sometimes redeploying that language in ways that were harmful to Vietnamese/American 
fisherfolk. Throughout, I name these moments to acknowledge the gaps in my own 
knowledge, my assumptions, and the ways I have failed to fully comprehend the 
experiences of a community I am not a part of but care deeply for. In this tracing work, 
which required me to conduct three formal follow-up interviews with 
Vietnamese/American fisherfolk in the spring of 2018, a fifth critical concept emerged: 
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response. These five concepts inevitably function very differently for different players in 
my fieldsite. This text endeavors to show not just how, but why, each is significant to 
developing a critical understanding of the political economy of Vietnamese/American 
commercial fishing, decision-making in Southeast Louisiana, and most critically, what 
happens in the interstices between both.  
*** 
Throughout my fieldwork, I have sought to ground my research in a feminist knowledge 
production and praxis that seeks to be responsible to those people and communities 
whose stories I rely on. In their essay Gens: A Feminist Manifesto, Laura Bear, Karen 
Ho, Anna Tsing, and Sylvia Yanagisako explain that: “Feminism challenges the 
discursive representations of the ‘the economic’ as a domain… Instead of taking 
capitalism a priori, as an already determinant structure, logic, and trajectory, we ask how 
its social relations are generated out of divergent life projects…we are concerned with the 
unstable, contingent networks of capitalism that surround us” (Bear et al. 2015). The 
precepts of this theoretical approach—to think analytic domains beyond fixity such that 
we acknowledge their cultural production, historical links, and contingency—is, to my 
mind, imperative to rethinking the practice and praxis of ethnography. To this end, as an 
ethnographer, I endeavor to foreground the needs and knowledge of the people with 
whom I work as much as possible by taking up the calls of critical transnational and 
women of color feminisms (Alexander and Mohanty 2010; McKittrick 2006; Melamed 
2011; Mohanty 2003; Mohanty and Carty 2018) that center and interrogate the absence 




Methodologically, scholars in this lineage have focused on storytelling and collective 
approaches to knowledge production, from co-authorship to creative writing (Sangtin 
Writers 2006; Swarr and Nagar 2010), that refuses top-down single stories (Adichie 
2009). Similarly, both in the doing and writing of ethnography, I amplify and unpack the 
stories of the folks with whom I work as a potent tool for resisting neoliberal power 
structures that foreclose Vietnamese/American presents and futures. This has meant that I 
seek to collaborate with coastal partners to create sites of public engagement that center 
their expertise and labor, and support my interlocutors in their endeavors to redistribute 
governmental resources. This work has been made possible given my position as FSS’s 
Coastal Project Coordinator, which allows me to work with decision-makers and 
community leaders to ensure that commercial fisherfolks’ needs are voiced at the local, 
state, and federal levels and ideally, integrated into Southeast Louisiana-specific projects, 
namely the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority's coastal master plan, which I 
expand on below.  
 
In this capacity, I keep abreast of changes to coastal regulations and policy, and work 
with coalitions of community-based organizations to advocate for FSS’s clients and other 
coastal residents needs. This includes writing and delivering public comments to 
Louisiana agencies and the Army Corps of Engineers on fisherfolks’ behalf, co-leading 
meetings that advocate the needs of coastal residents and small business owners to state 
and federal representatives, and working to foster local and national networks that help 
FSS share institutional and communal knowledge to change the decision-making process 
that impact Southeast Louisiana’s coastal ecosystems, residents, and more-than-human 
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marine life. I am also the organization’s grant-writer and work to educate funders and 
other philanthropic organizations about the above issues.  
 
At the same time, in the decade I have been doing ethnographic research, it has been very 
clear to me that there is no ethnographic endeavor that is not exploitative. Ethnography is 
beneficial overwhelmingly to the researcher who publishes a monograph, accessible 
mostly to other academics who do not serve the communities being written about and as 
such, has no vested interest in engaging or shifting the experiences of those communities. 
My experience has shown me that while service might be a part of the work of 
ethnography, it is not a primary—or even tertiary—outcome of ethnographic practices or 
texts. While I voiced this often during my fieldwork tenure, the knowledge of 
ethnography and observation’s extractivism does not exempt me from reproducing this 
problematic. As Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang make plain:  
 
Inquiry as invasion is a result of the imperative to produce settler colonial 
knowledge and to produce it for the academy. This invasion imperative is 
often disguised in universalist terms of producing “objective knowledge” 
for “the public.” It is a thin disguise, as most research rhetoric waxes the 
poetics of empire: to discover, to chart new terrain, to seek new frontiers, to 
explore, and so on. The academy’s unrelenting need to produce “original 
research” is what makes the inquiry an invading structure, not an event 
(Tuck and Yang 2014:813). 
 
Here, I claim neither that my work is objective—I am writing from a place of deliberate 
and definitive allegiance with Vietnamese/American residents of Southeast Louisiana and 
members of the region’s commercial fishing industry—nor that it is original. Rather, my 
goal throughout my research has been to intervene in the violences I see as fundamental 
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to the work of governance and coastal management in Southeast Louisiana by uplifting 
the knowledges of the folks with whom I work.  
 
I am very aware, too, that while Sue authorized my research within the structure of FSS, 
as Tuck and Yang point out: “Human subject protocols establish that individuals must be 
protected, but not communities. Individuals are empowered to give away the 
community’s stories.” (Tuck and Yang 2014). This is significant, as Sue has functioned 
as an intermediary between myself and commercial fisherfolk both in name—when folks 
heard that I worked for her, they were significantly more likely to speak with me than if I 
had approached them as an independent researcher—and materially. Sue or my peer Jane 
were present at over 90% of my interviews, whether formal, semi-formal, or via casual 
conversation. This is, first, because although I have studied the Vietnamese language for 
several years, I am not even conversationally fluent and I needed translation support to 
fully engage many fisherfolk who either do not speak English fluently and so did not feel 
they could adequately communicate the intricacies and nuance of their knowledge to me 
in a shared language. Just as often, this happened because even if they were fluent in 
English, speaking to Sue or Jane, who many think of as family, in their first language 
allowed them much more comfort.  
*** 
While I acknowledge the myriad, layered, and impossible-to-articulate violences inherent 
in the observational and ethnographic work I do, it is our political imperative as 
ethnographers to center the experiential knowledge of the human and more-than-human 
communities with whom we work as much as possible. For me, the opportunity to do so 
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has largely emerged from my position with FSS, which has allowed me to directly 
understand and serve Vietnamese/American fisherfolks’ needs. It is fundamentally my 
job to articulate, make visible, and uplift the experiences of Vietnamese/American 
residents of Southeast Louisiana among decision-makers. 
 
At the same time, given my access to arenas of storytelling and knowledge production 
that FSS’s clients were firmly excluded from—state and CPRA-level decision-making, 
the time to read 200-page reports and parse them with experts, and the ability to move 
with a different kind of legibility given my job and my scholarship—meant that it became 
very important to me to position myself as a conduit between our clients and the 
community, and decision-makers both during my fieldwork and in the two years that 
have followed it. Being able to see how decisions are made is both extraordinary and 
vexing, particularly when you know that people you love are deliberately and decisively 
excluded from said decisions. It also vested me with a great deal of knowledge and 
allowed me the opportunity to do my best to both advocate for FSS’s clients and to create 
and give them some tools for addressing the harm I saw happening.  
 
This work, however, made it difficult for me to not exhibit concern or frustration during 
these conversations; so many of the Vietnamese/American fisherfolk with whom I work 
spent a great deal of time trying to convince me that they were in fact not experts—had 
never gotten a degree and as such, couldn’t claim definitive knowledge of the ecosystems 
and places I felt they were truly experts of. This tension was most apparent in our 
conversations about environmentalism and policy, which the folks I talked to felt were 
beyond the purview of what they were meant to know. Fisherfolks’ rejection of their own 
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knowledge was, frankly, the most galvanizing element of my research: where I, a 
culturally legible expert, felt so incompetent in the face of the vast knowledges the folks 
who whom I work hold, they had been told they were inexpert so many times (see 
chapter three) that they felt as though there was no possibility of their impacting the 
decisions made for them. Rather than not knowing about the coast, then, 
Vietnamese/American residents of Southeast Louisiana felt that their knowledge was not 
valuable to decision-makers who stand so firmly in their expertise that they feel 
empowered to foreclose the expertise of others. This is the problematic I seek to identify 
and apprehend in this text.  
 
This leads me to my key questions: what, I ask, are the real effects of the disjuncture 
between the power decision-makers hold to make decisions about the coast and the ways 
that Vietnamese/American fisherfolk know and live with the coast? What, further, does 
this mean for the people with whom I work as they live in a present already imagined 
through the terra nullius of a risk-averse and resilience-centric future? 
*** 
My work is located within critical refugee studies, Asian American studies, scholarship 
on governance, disaster, and environmental justice, and pays close attention to place-
based knowledge production through a feminist lens. Relying on my interlocutors’ 
ecosystem- and community-level knowledge to parse the complex problem they have 
outlined thus far, I offer the following interventions, which emerged in collaboration with 
Vietnamese/American fisherfolk and the larger community in Southeast Louisiana. First, 
I examine how state management frameworks and CPRA’s approach to coastal 
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restoration rely on neoliberal understandings of resource and value. I then consider how 
risk-mitigation has become a prominent way to do this work, and has resulted in an 
institutional approach to environmentalism that evacuates coastal Louisiana of risk, 
which I argue also indexes fisherfolk. Third, I look at how this risk-mitigating restoration 
imaginary assumes and mandates Vietnamese/American resilience in the face of ongoing 
coastal management in service to oil capital. Finally, I interrogate how refugeeism has 




My time with FSS showed me that the entire present and future of the coast is bound up 
in environmental decision-making processes that take state and private needs into account 
long before they consider coastal residents and small business owners whose income 
relies on the coast. As ‘front-line’ communities, the folks FSS works with are most 
vulnerable to the ecosystem-level harms outlined above; more than this, they are 
vulnerable to the state and federal decision-making meant to mitigate these effects.  
 
Over the last 15 years, coastal land loss and vulnerability to disaster has been at the 
center of how government officials, residents, and everyone in between talk about 
Louisiana’s future. Significantly, where residents are often told these environmental ills 
are ‘natural,’ their origins are quite clear. Land subsidence (or sinking), which is typical 
of the marshland that forms Louisiana’s coast, is spurred on by federally supported oil 
extraction, natural gas exploration, and shipping canals, which all cut up and hasten the 
dissolution of the already subsiding and porous coast (Houck 2015; Maldonado 2018). 
 
20 
Damming, leveeing, and other infrastructure management along the Mississippi River 
make residents even more vulnerable to climate-change-induced flooding and storms. Big 
Agriculture’s reliance on monocropping and herbicides in the Midwest bring nitrogen 
and phosphorus runoff from large farms and slaughterhouses down the river to produce 
an annual massive dead zone (or region of water void of oxygen) off Louisiana’s coast 
that, in 2019, is projected to grow to 8,776 square miles (National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration 2019). All of these decision-maker-produced ills make the 
daily lives of folks who rely on the health of the Gulf and the coast not just difficult, but 
increasingly impossible.  
 
On top of these harms, every coastal resident and small business owner in the region face 
significant day-to-day barriers to supporting their families and businesses. A lack of 
formal education and business skills hinders commercial fisherfolk and other coastal 
residents from gaining access to technical and fiscal knowledge and prohibits them from 
filing important paperwork and procuring licenses, which keeps them at arm’s length 
from full participation in the industry. In addition to these limitations, 
Vietnamese/American fisherfolk encounter significant language barriers as non-native 






Figure 4. The areas in orange indicate land lost between 1937 and 2000 (Anderson 2015).  
 
As folks whose livelihoods are wholly reliant on the health of the coast’s ecosystems, 
commercial fisherfolk have long pointed out the vulnerabilities they experience due to 
coastal change, particularly land loss, shifts in water salinity and health, sea level rise, 
and decision-maker-produced disaster. However, it took the international attention 
garnered by Hurricane Katrina’s devastation in 2005 for state officials to take coastal 
land loss and coastal ecosystem change seriously. That this shift was precipitated by 
community harm or expertise but institutional pressure highlights that Louisiana, like so 
many codified spaces of decision-making, operates as an “official landscape,” which 
“writes the land in a bureaucratic, externalizing, and extraction-driven manner that is 
often pitilessly instrumental” (Nixon 2011:17). This has been particularly clear in the 





CPRA, THE MASTER PLAN, & SEDIMENT DIVERSIONS 
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In 2006, Louisiana passed Act 8, which created an agency to address the long-term 
disaster of coastal land loss and hurricane damage: the Coastal Protection and Restoration 
Authority (CPRA). Since 2007, CPRA has been developing its 50-year plan—The Master 
Plan for a Sustainable Coast—a suite of coastal projects that are revised every five years. 
During this time, many of CPRA’s approaches to building coastal land, including marsh 
creation and barrier island fortification, have demonstrably benefitted coastal peoples. 
Although the master plan has presented a net benefit, much of the projects are designed 
and executed to support the infrastructure of coastal industry, particularly private oil and 
gas companies who use the coast to extract, refine, transport, and export their products 
overseas, over human and more-than-human communities who live and work on the 
coast.  
 
Upon passing the plan’s third revision in 2017, CPRA moved to implement two major 
river sediment diversion projects that will use the Mississippi River to deliver sediment 
into two key fishing marshes, Barataria Bay and Breton Sound. While these projects were 
conceived to build land along the coast, commercial fisherfolk know that long before the 
marsh is restored (a portentously failed prospect in the face of increasing hurricane events 
and ongoing sea level rise (Smith 2018)), the diversions will inundate the Bay’s saline 
ecosystems with fresh water, which will kill oysters and push shrimp too far into the Gulf 
for small boats to access. This is because the Mid-Barataria Bay Sediment Diversion 
(MBSD), which will be implemented as early as 2022, is currently designed to introduce 
fresh water into Barataria at a projected rate of 75,000 cfs, which would fill 51 Olympic 
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Figure 5. A map of MBSD’s origin point and outfall area (Times-Picayune 2013). 
 
The ramifications of CPRA’s approach to the MBSD are enormous for Barataria-reliant 
folks. For Indigenous communities and other residents for whom trapping on-land 
mammals and recreational fishing as key elements of their practices and diets, the fresh 
water will make more-than-human species they rely on either scarce or nonexistent. It 
will also increase the possibility of flood events around the mouth of the Mississippi in 
the Birdfoot Delta, whose residents overwhelmingly live below the poverty line and do 
not have the resources to either stilt their homes (raising them up 14 feet or more to avoid 
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currently predicted flood levels from storm events (LA SAFE 2019)) or move further 
inland. Importantly, as the delta is home to many Indigenous, Black, Cajun, Latinx and 
Chicanx, and Southeast Asian/American communities who have lived there for 
generations, leaving is neither desirable nor viable.  
 
In the realm of commercial fishing, an inundation of fresh water would harm oysters first; 
the state of Louisiana leases areas immediately adjacent to the coastline for oysters, 
which oysterfolk seed (or ‘plant’), and harvest in designated areas. Oysters are saltwater 
species that rely on a high degree of salinity in the brackish (a mix of fresh and salt 
water) that comes together in Louisiana’s marshes and will be immediately asphyxiated 
when the diversion opens. What’s more, the state has not opened new areas for oyster 
leases since the 1980s, fixing oyster beds in place directly adjacent to the diversion site 
(see Figure 6 below). Given this, oyster leaseholders, ‘cooners’ (or the folks who harvest 
oysters), and oyster processing plants will immediately and definitively be out of work 
the minute the diversion opens. This is not speculation; the federal government and 
Louisiana has been using freshwater diversions, spillways, and floodways to manage the 
river for decades, and their negative impact on oysters is well documented (Louisiana 
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries 2019c; National Fishermen 2019; Roberts 2019). 
Other fisheries like crab and finfish will similarly be impacted, as both of these more-





Figure 6. A screenshot of an up-to-date map of oyster leases, indicated in blue, in Barataria Bay (to the 
west of the Mississippi River and Birdfoot Delta, which takes up the bottom right portion of the map) and 
Breton Sound (to the west of the delta) courtesy of Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries 
(2019a).  
 
While FSS works with commercial fisherfolk in all of Louisiana’s fisheries, in this text, I 
specifically focus on the impacts of MBSD on the shrimp fishery. This is because I have 
expressly endeavored to work with the Vietnamese/American community in Southeast 
Louisiana, whose economic, social, and cultural foundation was built through 
commercial shrimping; today, over 40% of Louisiana’s commercial shrimpers are 
Vietnamese/American (Louisiana Sea Grant 2015) and shrimping and, to a lesser extent, 
oystering, has operated as the community’s “bank” (Ha 2018) since the late 1970s. This 
is for several reasons. First, shrimping was an accessible trade—it did not require 
refugees to learn English, and permitting and licensing was handled by boat owners, 
allowing deckhands to work without having to navigate complex paperwork. It also gave 
them access to a regular income—for folks to pick up even if they had no skills in the 
fisheries, which many did coming in. Second, as many more members of the second 
wave of Vietnamese refugees (early- to mid-80s) were shrimpers or had ancestral ties to 
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the industry, it was a logical fishery to build out a Vietnamese/American presence in. 
Importantly, over two-thirds of the Vietnamese/American fisherfolk I work with are 
small-scale shrimpers whose income is much more tenuous given their reliance on state 
versus federal waters (see below for a more detailed description of this). While there is a 
Vietnamese/American presence in oystering, the only job folks have access to is 
harvesting, or cooning. This is because, as I explained earlier, no new oyster leases have 
been made available for purchase by the state for almost forty years. Oystering is an 
historically Black industry. However, a 1980s boom in oyster leases coincided with 
Croatian immigration to Southeast Louisiana, and the Croatian/American community 
continues to hold the majority of the oyster leases in the state.   
 
Significantly, many of these things were true for Cambodian refugees to Louisiana and 
are true for today’s Cambodian/American community; in addition to English and 
Vietnamese, Khmer is the third language of commercial shrimping in the state. All of the 
commercial fishers in Southeast Louisiana are FSS’s clients and I have been lucky to 
work with Cambodian/American, white, Vietnamese/American, Chicanx, and Black 
fisherfolk. Although there is a great deal of overlap between Cambodian/American and 
Vietnamese/American experiences in shrimping, so much, from life in Southeast Asia 
leading up to refugeeism to resettlement and access to resources in Southeast Louisiana, 
is critically different. Given this, my long-standing work with Vietnamese/Americans, 
and my intention to focus on Vietnamese/American experiences in Southeast Louisiana, I 
chose not to make this a study of the diversion’s impact on Southeast Asian/Americans in 
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the industry more broadly, but to keep my focus specific to its effects on 
Vietnamese/American fisherfolk and their community.  
 
The aggregate of Vietnamese/American shrimping knowledge is clear about the 
diversion: it will drastically change the industry, and will put the region’s most 
vulnerable, lowest-producing small business owners and workers out of business for 
good. It will do this to folks who only speak Vietnamese and cannot immediately pick up 
another trade; to elderly couples who are five years away from having enough savings to 
retire; to families who rely on a single boat to support ten people in Louisiana, other parts 
of the U.S., and in Việt Nam. In other words, it will totally foreclose 
Vietnamese/American life in Southeast Louisiana. In light of all of this, 
Vietnamese/American reliance on commercial shrimping makes Vietnamese/Americans 
differently vulnerable to decision-maker-produced disasters like levee failures and oil 
‘spills,’ the decision-maker-produced climate change that precipitates these disasters, and 





Figure 7. A screenshot of an up-to-date map of the shrimp line, which indicates how far those who shrimp 
state waters can go into the Gulf to catch shrimp. The 3-mile line identifies how far state mandate of waters 
extends into the Gulf. Image courtesy of Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (2019b).  
 
The folks with whom I work are terrified about the MBSD; the majority of 
Vietnamese/American commercial shrimpers own or work on small boats that can only 
shrimp in state waters, which extend a mere 3 miles off of the coast of Louisiana (see 
Figure 7, above). There are two primary shrimp species in Louisiana: brown and white 
shrimp. Brown shrimp rely on the state’s brackish marsh to gestate and spend the 
majority of their lifecycle closer inland than white shrimp, who are better suited to life in 
dense saltwater. Both species of shrimp rely on Barataria Bay to reach the subadult stage 




Figure 8. Illustration of the lifecycle of Gulf shrimp in Barataria Bay by Ken Varden, Published in 
Louisiana Sea Grant College Program’s Shrimping in Louisiana (Louisiana Sea Grant 1999:2). 
 
Shrimpers have told me that when the diversion comes, the brown shrimp might die out 
entirely, foreclosing 50% of their income. While white shrimp will likely weather an 
MBSD opening much better, they will be forced to travel further and further out into the 
Gulf, where small boats cannot go. In the landscape of my work, then, MBSD promises 
to be a catastrophe unlike anything Louisiana’s fisherfolk have ever experienced. This is 
particularly devastating, as many of them acutely suffered after Hurricanes Katrina and 
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Rita (2005), hurricanes Ike and Gustav (2008), and many considered leaving or did leave 
the business entirely following the BP oil catastrophe of 2010. As Sue Ha, executive 
director of FSS told me the first day we met: “The diversions are gonna be a bigger 
disaster [for commercial fishing] than [the BP oil catastrophe]. And that kept us off the 
water for a whole year” (Ha 2015). Here, the most important result of 
Vietnamese/American fisherfolks’ reliance on state waters is that as the MBSD 
introduces fresh water into Barataria Bay, they will be left without an income source.  
 
Together, I argue that these modes and means of extraction—not just of the land, water, 
crude oil, or gas, but of Vietnamese/American and other communities’ lives and 
livelihoods—are a slow violence, or “attritional violence that is typically not viewed as 
violence by all” (Nixon 2011:4) that is “enacted slowly over time” (Nixon 2011). Nixon 
positions slow violence in opposition to those things we deem spectacular—the flood, the 
fire, the attack—and as such, travel as our primary cultural understanding of violence. 
Where the spectacular is often consumed as an explicit event—for New Orleans, 
Louisiana, and federal agencies, for example, the official narrative of Hurricane Katrina 
has explicit beginning and end dates—I use this text to trace first, how disaster is, in fact, 
an ongoing prospect that shifts from spectacular to slow violence, and second, that for 
Vietnamese/American commercial fisherfolk and community members, disasters like 
Katrina and the BP oil catastrophe are just two of a myriad of slow violences. As 
violences like the ongoingness of disaster, refugeeism as a multi-generational 
Vietnamese/American racialization, resilience, and environmental racism come together 
in the place-contingent community life of Vietnamese/American residents of Southeast 
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Louisiana, slow violence shifts from a set of ongoing external harms to part and parcel of 
folks’ everyday experiences of doing life in the delta.  
 
Rather than identifying them as contributing factors to the slow violence 
Vietnamese/Americans experience in Southeast Louisiana, I believe each of these things, 
disaster, racialization, resilience, and environmental racism is its own slow violence. By 
parsing and reading the heterogeneous and varied harms that thread their way through 
and between these officially mandated violences, I am able to untangle the often opaque 
official landscape of each in Southeast Louisiana. 
*** 
Significantly, the harms I articulate above emerge at the level of the state—where official 
narratives prevail—but the heterogenous, richly textured knowledges of how this harm 
will affect coastal ecosystems and lives emerge from an entirely different site of 
knowledge production: coastal communities. Rob Nixon juxtaposes the official 
landscape, which I defined above, with what he calls vernacular landscapes, which are 
“shaped by the affective, historically textured maps that communities have devised over 
generations, maps replete with names and routes, maps alive to significant ecological and 
surface geological features” (Nixon 2011). This highlights the density and breadth of 
knowledges the folks with whom I work possess; understanding the threats to their 
livelihoods at not just the level of the day-to-day, but as this knowledge extends back 
over generations, across space and time, and in conversation with so many other sites of 
knowing ecosystems and place, I assert that Vietnamese/American fisherfolk are the true 




Three years prior to Nixon’s meditation on official versus vernacular landscapes, Dianne 
E. Rocheleau positioned her work with heads of NGOs and state agencies focused on 
agriculture, forestry and rural development in Nairobi as “local knowledge,” which 
includes “the experience and memories of colonial occupation that inform[s] a critical 
political perspective” (Rocheleau 2008). Here, I take Nixon’s apprehension of official 
landscapes seriously, but read them through Rocheleau’s “local knowledge,” which in 
this case, is knowledge that emerges at the level of Vietnamese/American community-
making through commercial shrimping, to situate my interrogation of the official at the 
level of the local. In the ‘local’ of Southeast Louisiana, the political undercurrents of 
official knowledges can both be unpacked and understood as heterogeneous in their 
adherence to (post)colonial logics of resource extraction and governance. To this end, I 
follow the folks with whom I work in using “community-based” and “place-based” 
knowledges to more clearly articulate the collectivity from which their affective, 
historically textured experiences have geologically and ecologically contest institutional 
landscapes.  
 
STATE OF THE COAST 2018 & LOUISIANA’S OFFICIAL LANDSCAPE 
Every two years since 2010, CPRA, the Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana (CRCL), 
a ‘big green’ environmental organization nestled under the umbrella of Louisiana’s 
branch of the Sierra Club, and the Water Institute of the Gulf come together to host the 
State of the Coast (SOC) Conference. At SOC, government officials, coastal scientists, 
policymakers, NGOs, and private industry representatives, specifically oil and gas, come 
together and address coastal vulnerability to storms, land loss, and state restoration 
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projects. The conference is held in New Orleans’ Ernest N. Morial Convention Center, a 
venue that takes up five city blocks alongside the bend in the Mississippi that bifurcates 
the Central Business District. In the SOC section of the convention center, large screens 
alternately showed the day’s agenda and the conference’s logo: a lifelike brown pelican 
stood sentinel in front of Louisiana’s boot which was a dense, marshy blue. She looked 
toward the Birdfoot Delta at the southeastern-most edge of the state where grey and white 
marsh grasses grew, likely because of a restoration project. To the right of the image, the 
words ‘State of the Coast’ were in alternating black and pumpkin orange, and across the 
bottom of the image, black text read: ‘preparing for a changing future.’ 
 
Figure 9. The State of the Coast logo (CRCL 2018). 
 
Adjacent to an escalator that led a floor up to the meeting rooms where panels were held 
was a large open space full of graduate and institutional poster presentations. This led to 
two banquet halls. While the first was set aside for lunch and official speeches, the 
second looked like its own coastal infrastructure convention; tables and displays were 
packed into an area the size of a basketball court. The organizations present were 
bifurcated between organizations sharing coastal knowledge—those like Healthy Gulf, 
which acts as an ecosystem-level (humans and more-than-human communities included) 
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watchdog, and co-sponsor the Water Institute of the Gulf, whose focus is Gulf-wide 
water health—and private businesses. These businesses overwhelming made concrete, 
sandbag alternatives, and other infrastructure subcontracted by CPRA for coastal 
restoration. This space felt more like an industry showcase than a scientific or 
organization-based engagement with restoration, a feeling that, for me, extended into 
every panel and roundtable I attended.  
*** 
Coming on the heels of the state legislature’s passage of CPRA’s third master plan in 
2017, the 2018 SOC overwhelmingly focused on the MBSD. I have attended two SOCs 
(2016 and 2018) in my capacity as FSS’s Coastal Project Coordinator. During the most 
recent conference in 2018, I felt very much like the odd one in the room; not attached to 
the work of governance and policy, I was one of a handful of folks who represented the 
interests of coastal residents. This was ironic, given the 2017 master plan’s insistence that 
“While coastal Louisiana provides the state, region, and nation with important natural 
resources, here the greatest assets are not oil and gas, fisheries, or sugar cane, but the 
people” (Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority 2017). Whereas SOC hosted 
hundreds of state and private decision-makers and scientists, not one shrimper, Southeast 
Louisiana community leader, Native elder, or other community-based service providers 
present at the conference’s regular sessions, which organizers felt were too technical for 
community members. This was underwritten by the cost of attending SOC; for non-
students, it cost $495 to attend all three days. My attendance fee had thankfully been 
covered by one of FSS’s funders, but both in 2016 and 2018, I heard many of FSS’s 




The conference did offer a half day of programming, ‘Restoration on the Half Shell’, on 
the last day of the conference to make coastal restoration discursively and financially (the 
cost to attend was $25) accessible to residents. However, institutional perception of 
residents’ and community-based organizations’ inexpertise—effectively, their distance 
from the realm of ‘the technical’ (Bullard 2001)—kept them out of rooms where the 
dense work of crafting the future of the coast was being done. And yet, coast-reliant 
people will inevitably be impacted first, more comprehensively, and for longer by coastal 
restoration plans. That these people, who I believe are the primary stakeholders in coastal 
decision-making, were not sitting next to me—only an oblique ‘expert’ myself, given my 
proximity to community needs—in the ‘technical’ primary space of the conference made 
it abundantly clear to me that while presenters constantly invoked community needs as 
the center of their decision-making process, the preponderance of oil representatives, 
restoration-centric business owners, and policymakers in the room told another story 
entirely: that of the official landscape. As I show below, the official landscape has 
become the primary environmentalism shaping the present and future of Louisiana’s 
coastline. 
 
SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA’S OFFICIAL ENVIRONMENTALISM 
On the second day of SOC 2018, Jonathan, a scholar who has been engaging in 
conversations about coastal restoration for over three decades told me that throughout the 
1970s and 80s, there was a robust grassroots movement for coastal restoration led by 
coastal residents, scholars like himself, and experts in coastal science. This movement 
uplifted the effects of coastal land loss on coastal residents, more-than-human coastal 
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communities like shrimp and marsh grass, and the coast’s future writ large. While the 
movement gained traction with some local support organizations, governmental decision-
makers did not take coastal residents’ call for restoration—specifically a plan to restore 
the coast over time—seriously. As Katrina came and restoration became the legal 
obligation of CPRA, Jonathan told me “the scientists who advocated for the master plan 
and put in the work to make the case for the need for restoration are totally left out of the 
master plan now” (Smith 2018b). He suggested that this is in large part because the 
concerns of activists and scholars who forced the issue of restoration were highly critical 
of the effects of oil and gas extraction, shipping and other industries, and environmental 
racism and sacrifice on the coast’s ecologies. For Louisiana, a restoration that took these 
critiques seriously would stand in the way of some of the state’s primary sources of state 
capital: oil and gas, shipping, and tourism revenue. 
  
This is because, under CPRA, restoration has become the purview of the state, private 
industry, and ‘big green’ NGOs like CRCL. Significantly, each of these stakeholders 
come to restoration from heterogeneous and sometimes contested subject positions. For 
CRCL, whose work is as diverse as creating an oyster shell recycling program that 
collects discarded oyster shells from Louisiana restaurants to build storm buffers for 
coastal communities to publishing white papers that underwrite how imperative the 
MBSD is to the state’s future, restoration means building land such that it protects the 
culture and communities of the state. In their view, restoration is trying to understand 
what has been lost and thinking about what kind of ecosystem support will produce the 
best-case scenario for the future. However, their programming still emerges from an 
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official and institutional environmentalism that bifurcates people and more-than-human 
species, often in ways that focus on the former without making explicit connections to 
how the loss of marine fish or flora communities is inextricably linked to the loss of 
human communities along the coast. Macarena Gómez-Barris reflects on this approach to 
restoration, which she calls conservation, arguing that it “has deeper roots in a liberal 
imaginary about land and biodiversity that sees nonhuman life as its principal site of 
advocacy” (Gómez-Barris 2017). This is clear in CRCL’s unmitigated support for MBSD 
as it is designed (rather than support that, for example, carries caveats that the design 
considers fisherfolks’ and other coastal residents’ knowledges and concerns). 
 
For the state, restoration is truly good business—as former governor Bobby Jindal (2008-
2016) explained, oil is imperative to the future economic health of Louisiana. His 
campaign to fortify the state’s relationship with oil and gas companies relied on a 
narrative that it was a job-creation mechanism for Louisiana’s blue-collar workers. This 
storytelling has been folded into the fabric of present Louisiana governance under 
Governor John Bel Edwards, and congruently, under the Obama and 45th president’s 
administrations, creating ongoing pathways for private oil and gas companies to continue 
their presence in the Gulf. Concurrently, to avoid costly litigation, private industry, which 
includes shipping and oil and gas, have become even more invested in Louisiana in a 
symbiotic, if sometimes difficult, extraction-contingent relationship. Gómez-Barris calls 
this state/private oil capital-contingent relationship “Extractive capitalism [which] 
violently reorganizes territories as well as continually perpetuates dramatic social and 
economic inequalities” (Gómez-Barris 2017). This mode of extraction, she argues, 
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operates “within the logics of colonial seeking that depict land and territory as an 
extractive zone: as if it is there for the taking, to be owned” (Gómez-Barris 2017). This 
framework of extraction, which I frame as a governance-centric epistemology of 
extractive capitalism, is helpful in formulating a clear understanding of CPRA’s approach 
to restoration: rather than seeing from the perspective of the people who inculcated the 
movement for coastal restoration, CPRA’s environmentalism “sees like the state” (Scott 
1998) and uses restoration to clear a path for more oil extraction without developing a 
parallel plan to preserve Louisiana’s coastal people and the more-than-human species 
they rely on.  
 
OFFICIAL ENVIRONMENTALISM  
Rob Nixon suggests that “Many politicians—and indeed many voters—routinely treat 
environmental action as critical yet not urgent. And so generation after generation of two- 
or four-year cycle politicians add to the pileup of deferrable actions deferred. With rare 
exceptions, in the domain of slow violence ‘yes, not now, not yet’ becomes the modus 
operandi” (Nixon 2011:9). The master plan, as a long-term project that purports to 
identify and tackle coastal environmental ills, is one such exception. However, it still, 
follows the same logics of capital-centric slow violence, which, “occurs gradually and out 
of sight, a violence of delayed destruction, that is dispersed across time and space;” in 
this way, it is “an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all” 
(Nixon 2011:2). In a different conversation, Jonathan emphasized to me that: “the oil and 
gas industries are the biggest boosters of NGOs and the state for coastal restoration. It is 
much easier to drop half a million than give billions to rebuild the coast [in the wake of 
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oil-produced disaster]. BP was the biggest godsend for coastal restoration” (Smith 2018a) 
because it meant that oil revenue would be tied into the project of restoring the coast. In 
this way, Louisiana’s approach to restoration lies firmly in an oil extraction future, where 
land is built to maintain oil presence. In this same future, oil makes the ecosystems being 
restored even more sick, a problem private oil companies fix by throwing money at it, 
reaffirming their ongoing financial and spatial stronghold along the coast. Whereas Nixon 
argues that the arena of the political often puts off ‘doing’ environment as a mode of 
doing business as usual, I have observed that for Louisiana, engaging in coastal land loss 
by making it the purview of the state is the best way for decision-makers to secure the 
state’s investments in oil and gas. Jonathan affirmed this, saying: “The genius of 
Louisiana is getting someone else to pay for its problem” (Smith 2018a). Rather than 
understanding oil and gas as major contributors to coastal crisis, then, CPRA and other 
actors like current governor John Bel Edwards reposition what environmentalism is 
meant to be in service to: capital accumulation on a landscape itself underwritten by oil 
companies.  
 
THE TEMPORALITY OF RESTORATION 
The temporality of restoration is imperative to my larger intervention into CPRA’s 
approach to managing the coast as a space for producing capital rather than as a lived 
ecosystem fisherfolk, residents, and more-than-human communities rely on to survive 
and ideally, thrive. Michelle Garvey glosses the impetus and temporality of what she 
calls “conventional restoration,” which “is the intentional, sustained attempt by humans 
to compensate for damaging influences (usually pollution, development, and...invasive 
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species) on an ecosystem, and manage it for desired qualities” (Garvey 2014:64). This is 
traditionally a backward-looking project, where restorationists seek to return an 
ecosystem to some ‘pristine’ idealized former state in the near or distant past that is more 
often imagined than real. CPRA in many ways follows this approach to coastal 
restoration; in protecting the coast from storms and coastal land loss, a good portion of 
the master plan sets in motion again, returning to an imagined prior state when the coast 
was healthy and ecosystems hosted oil extraction well. How, they ask, can we remake the 
coast to a time when it functioned best for oil and gas infrastructure? How, more, can we 
use the edict of restoration to shape a future that allows for more oil and gas extraction? 
Significantly, as Garvey highlights, “so long as a single interpretation of “former 
condition” is avoided, and so long as ‘former condition’ implies ‘state of function’ rather 
than a replica of a single moment in a site’s constantly evolving ecological history, then 
restoration can avoid hearkening to a mythological original nature, and invite a plurality 
of interpretations of what an environment could embody” (Garvey 2014:76). To my 
mind, this is the most important element of Garvey’s ‘conventional’ restoration: the 
imaginary, pristine past allows CPRA, who as we know, are now the primary arbiters of 
Louisiana environmentalism, to imagine a pristine future without being criticized for 
creating a teleology of restoration.  
 
Rather, since their restoration approaches are overwhelmingly traditional, particularly in 
terms of the MBSD, CPRA scientists and representatives can produce their own 
interpretation of restoration based on their own science and to their own ends. While this 
is the restoration of the official landscape, I do want to highlight that Garvey offers an 
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alternative, saying that “while ‘restore’ commonly implies a return to an original, the 
term is said to bely the essence of this field, which does not aim to arrest change or 
recreate a replica of its historic past, as if an original ecology ever existed” (Garvey 
2014:64). As people who have historically been harmed by European and ongoing settler 
colonialism, U.S. imperialism, and the violences of environmental and social 
management practices, Vietnamese/American commercial fisherfolk, Indigenous elders, 
and all coast-dependent communities understand that since the beginning of ecosystems 
management (see chapter three were I date this to the beginning of outsider, European 
settlement in the Americas), no prior perfect state exists.  
 
For them, there is no ‘good’ ‘ecostate’ to return to; there are, however, good practices, 
ancestral knowledges, and ways to be in right relationship to the ecosystem on which 
they depend and of which they are apart. As Garvey says, because “ecologies are always 
in flux, [more just] restorative processes aim to redirect an ecological system using the 
past as a guide—in order to set it in motion again—so that it acts as it did before the 
novel introduction(s) (Jordan, Sunflower, 21-22), that is, when a multitude of place-
specific actors depended upon one another to flourish in an intricate, dynamic and diverse 
system” (Garvey 2014:64). This better restoration does not produce a past-predicated 
future so much as a somewhat opaque by still idealized future that hopes from a present 
where ecosystems are deeply harmed and need care. In the realm of CPRA’s official 
environmentalism, this care is not within the purview of MBSD’s conventional past-
looking future-making approach to restoration. As I will show in the next section, the 
myriad ways CPRA manages the future into existence refuse the needs and knowledges 
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of those folks who they claim to be restoring the coast for in favor of making a ‘better’ 
future for the state.  
 
BEST PRACTICES 
In our conversation at State of the Coast, Jonathan explained that when CPRA says it is 
using the best science to produce and execute the master plan, “they’re relying on certain 
relationships versus ensuring only the best science is used” (Smith 2018b). This implies 
that rather than making sure the plans they are pushing through are based on 
heterogeneous social, marine biological, soil, and political science, which is implied by 
“good science,” CPRA seek out science that confirms the plans they decided to carry out 
prior to scientific vetting because this science serves state extractive capital (Gómez-
Barris 2017) interests. Jonathan closed our conversation, saying: “[CPRA’s] anti-
academic stance makes it so the ‘right’ narrative gets out there” (Smith 2018b). By 
subsuming environmentalism under the banner of the state, Louisiana uses CPRA to 
reinvent what environmentalism and restoration are now and can be in the future.  
 
Bringing these scholars into conversation, I apprehend and highlight these entanglements 
and the incongruencies between the stories power tells and the lives knowledges of the 
folks with whom I work, putting “silenced narratives, erased peoples, and disavowed 
violences into conversation” (Hu Pegues 2013:21) such that subsequent chapters are 






ENVIRONMENTALISM AND THE ANTHROPOCENE 
In Southeast Louisiana, the official landscape subsumes the community-based one in its 
instrumental drive to extract—to make singular the multiplicity of lives, needs, and 
knowledges of the human and more-than-human communities who rely on the space and 
place governed by official narratives. My work takes as a given that there is no such thing 
as a ‘natural’ disaster, and that the events that precipitate, produce, and fuel disaster lie at 
the intersection of decision-making about resources, the climate, nationalism, global 
relations, and the value of some lives and not others. This emerges from a long lineage of 
work both uplifting and grappling with biopower (Foucault 1990) as it is mapped onto 
vulnerable communities (Agamben 1998; Arendt 1970; Povinelli 2016; Puar 2007, 2017), 
and how those communities are put and come into relation with ecosystems who are also 
being managed and harmed (Brulle and Pellow 2006; Byrd 2011; Choy 2011; Dhillon 
and Estes 2016; D. Haraway 2006; Tsing 2017; Park and Pellow 2011; David Naguib 
Pellow 2002, 2007). This relationship is overwhelmingly amplified in current scholarship 
on the Anthropocene, our current environmental epoch (although many others have 
forwarded different names and conceptualizations of this period and what is to coming 
(Haraway 2016; Lassila 2015; Moore 2017)). Most environmental scholars date the 
anthropocene to the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in the late 1700s, at which 
point European colonial enterprises had been firmly established as the dominant mode for 
producing capital through resource extraction. This in turn required local and Indigenous 
enslavement, exploitation, and erasure on their own land. These logics carried through 
many generations of power mobilizing extractive processes to find coal, oil, and other 
‘resources’ in a Western European settler expansion that colonized and displaced 
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thousands of Indigenous communities, residents of color, and more-than-human species 
from spaces deemed valuable for extraction.  
 
In the Anthropocene, decision-makers have irrevocably altered Earth’s hydrologic, 
atmospheric, geologic, biospheric, and other processes to extract and produce as much 
capital as possible, and these changes overwhelmingly harm the most underserved, over-
exploited, and ostracized communities globally. In The Great Derangement, Amitav 
Ghosh argues that “The Anthropocene has reversed the temporal order of modernity; 
those at the margins are now the first to experience the future that awaits us all; it is they 
who confront most directly what Thoreau called ‘vast, titanic, inhumane nature” (Ghosh 
2017). This follows Donna Haraway’s musings that “Perhaps the outrage meriting a 
name like Anthropocene is about the destruction of places and times of refuge for people 
and other critters” (Haraway 2015:160). Rather than seeing a space like Southeast 
Louisiana as a complex ecosystem whose co-participants range from human First Nations 
communities to mangrove trees and healthy plankton, Louisiana, and I argue, CPRA, 
understand the coast as a space that is valuable overwhelmingly within, as I have argued 
above, an epistemology of extractive capitalism.  
 
This is executed, as Farrier cites, by abstracting humanity in favor of capital 
accumulation: “Andreas Malm and Alf Hornberg suggest that ‘the Anthropocene’ treats 
humanity as an abstraction, concealing the fact that carbon economies are constructed 
upon uneven social relations and distribution of resources (Malm and Hornborg 2014)” 
(Farrier 2016:3). In his two-part essay The Capitalocene, Jason W. Moore points to the 
fact that the extraction of fossil fuels requires thinking nature as a resource rather than in 
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relation to human and more-than-human communities, reducing “the mosaic of human 
activity in the web of life…[to] an abstract humanity as homogenous acting unit” (Moore 
2017:23). The extraction of oil for capital is the hallmark industrial act underwriting what 
we call the Anthropocene; oil and gas have always been resources that help governing 
bodies obscure the fact of other life in its constant, unrelenting oil frontierism.  
 
The persistence of these (neo)colonial and extractive logics in Southeast Louisiana’s 
environmentalism was made particularly clear to me on the first day of State of the Coast, 
when a rather high-up CPRA official suggest that to ensure the MBSD is built the way 
they intend, CPRA will fight to amend, modify, or entirely circumvent three federal 
environmental laws that specifically apply to sea life. These are the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act (MMPA) of 1972, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act (MSA) of 1976, and Interjurisdictional Fisheries Act (IJFA) of 1986. 
Together, these acts represent the most comprehensive federal laws determining the 
state’s relationship with more-than-human species in U.S. oceans; the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act is intended “to  provide an ecosystem approach to wildlife management to 
prevent marine mammal populations from falling below sustainable levels and to take 
measure to replenish those species that have fallen below their optimum sustainable 
populations” (National Marine Sanctuary Foundation 2018). MSA is “the primary law 
governing marine fisheries management in U.S. federal waters” (NOAA Fisheries West 
Coast Region 2018). Finally, projects executed under the IJFA “are carried out to gather 
information and conduct activities that support management of U.S. multi-jurisdictional 
fisheries” (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 2012). Effectively, IJFA 
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regulates how much catch a boat can have on board and monitors the impacts of 
commercial fishing on marine species.    
 
That CPRA would rather modify or reject federal laws than ensure fish species can 
maintain health, habitat, and migration patterns shows that while the state is aware of the 
very real effects of the diversion on marine life, these effects will not prevent CPRA from 
carrying out its plan.This, Stefano Harney and Fred Moten explain, is the very function of 
policy: “Policy is the form that opportunism takes…as the embrace of the radically extra-
economic, political character of command today. It is a demonstration of the will to 
contingency...to make contingent all around you...Policy is correction, forcing itself with 
mechanical violence upon the incorrect, the uncorrected, the ones who do not know to 
seek their own correction” (Harney and Moten 2013:77-78). Raquel Pinderhughes 
highlights that this is a problem of racialization, where Indigenous and other folks of 
color’s environmental concerns are often conceptualized as “community, labor, 
economic, health, and civil rights issues rather than as ‘environmental’ issues” 
(Pinderhughes 1996:239). This is clear in CPRA’s elision of coastal communities’ needs 
under the banner of environmentalism: to solve the climate-change-induced problems of 
disaster and coastal erosion in the Anthropocene present, MBSD reinforces the very 
processes that produced these environmental ills in the first place: extractivism in service 
to capital accumulation. With this framing of policy in mind, it becomes clear that the 
master plan has subsumed the environmentalism of Southeast Louisiana’s residents who 
are the true experts of the coast’s landscape, dividing people from place through, as I 
address in the next section, risk and resilience models that make ecosystems the purview 
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of the state, and coastal people neoliberal subjects who exist in the liminal no-place and 
no-ecosystem of resilience.  
 
RISK  
I attended three or four panels each day of the three-day-long 2018 SOC. While I have 
heard risk and resilience invoked at every level of Louisiana decision-making for years, 
at this conference, they were used with higher frequency than in the past and in my 
observation, had become inextricably linked to the coast as a space of restoration. In 
scientific presentation after CPRA roundtable, ‘risk mitigation’ was invoked as the 




Figure 10. This map, used in the 2017 Master Plan for a Sustainable Coast, represents predicted land loss 
in various future scenarios. The caption reads: “Shown here is land change 50 years from now under the 
Low, Medium, and High Environmental Scenarios if we take no additional action. Red indicates areas 
predicted to be lost, and green indicates areas where land would be created” (Coastal Protection and 
Restoration Authority 2017:75).  
 
Aimee Bahng explains that risk mitigation is central to the institutional management of 
the future. In the economic realm Bahng discusses in her text, for decision-makers, “The 
future exists as absolute uncertainty, which capitalism attempts to contain through the 
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calculation of risk...markets work ‘to colonize the future’ wherein the future becomes 
terra nullius, emptied of its true uncertainty filled with securitized risk, and sanctified by 
a positivist accounting of projection”  (Bahng 2018:12, emphasis original). Nuancing 
Bahng, I suggest that the terra nullius CPRA endeavors to create is not just void of risk—
it is evacuated of people and more-than-human species who are perceived to present a 
risk: those communities who are made other through racist, classed, able-centric, homo- 
trans- and queer-phobic, xenophobic, and anti-refugee and anti-immigrant official 
landscapes on and through with governance operates. It is also void of those more-than-
human communities these institutionally othered and subjugated communities rely on, 
like oysters and shrimp. In other words, those communities who do not ‘fit’ into the 
grand narrative of a ‘good’ future crafted under the auspices of and in parallel to a risk-
free one.  
 
I find the notion of a terra nullius particularly useful, as so often fisherfolk have told me 
they feel like they either do not matter to state and federal decision-makers or like 
decision-makers do not even know they exist. Gómez-Barris offers another way of 
understanding this concept, arguing that conservation projects are conceived by those in 
power such that “whiteness reduces land to a representation of terra nullius…[it] 
symbolically appropriates land as patterns of racialization that reproduces material 
inequities” (Gómez-Barris 2017:85). Reading her terra nullius alongside Bahng’s, it 
becomes evident that by mitigating risk through restoration, CPRA seeks to actively 
produce a different kind of future for itself, one that does not include Indigenous folks or 
communities of color. If the future does not include Vietnamese/American fisherfolk, 
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then destroying their industry through state-designed environmentalism and restoration is 
not a problem; it is a calculus: some must be sacrificed in service to the greater good of 
many, and that some are coastal residents, coast-reliant communities, and fisheries-
dependent people, groups among whom Vietnamese/American fisherfolk occupy the 
nexus. This is a form of environmental sacrifice, which David Pellow defines as “the 
disproportionate impact of environmental hazards on people of color [which is] a form of 
violent control over bodies, space, and knowledge systems” and as such “state violence” 
(Pellow 2016:13). In this text, I argue that the most opaque  
and efficient state approach of managing Vietnamese/American futures is resilience.  
 
RESILIENCE 
At State of the Coast, resilience always followed closely behind risk: to mitigate risk, the 
place and people of Southeast Louisiana must ‘build’ resilience, a term that has gained 
significant purchase in the economic, political, and social sciences over the last several 
decades (Brand and Jax 2007; Colten, Hay, and Giancarlo 2012; Evans 2011; 
VanLandingham 2017). In their critique of how resilience has been applied to place and 
people, Danny MacKinnon and Kate Derickson identify that “the concept of ‘resilience’ 
has migrated from the natural and physical sciences into the social sciences and public 
policy as the indentification of global threats such as economic crisis, climate change and 
international terrorism has focused attention on the responsive capacities of places and 
social systems” (MacKinnon and Derickson 2013:253). Further, “the concept 
of  resilience has become ‘a pervasive idiom of global governance’…[The importation of 
naturalistic concepts and metaphors to the social sciences] requires recognition of  the 
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ecological dominance of capitalism in terms of its capacity to imprint its developmental 
logic on associated social relations, institutions and spaces” (MacKinnon and Derickson 
2013:254). As the work of systems—biological, political, and otherwise—Resilience 
indexes how systems maintain and reproduce themselves in light of shifting material, 
political, economic, and social conditions under the violence of management. It does this 
by identifying and assessing risk, which in this case travels in two ways: as communities 
are at risk and as they represent risk for institutional knowledges. Where the majority of 
community resilience discourses uplift the former, I use this text to unpack how CPRA 
and other decision-makers discursively mobilize the former while materially focusing in 
the later as they push the MBSD through at any cost.  
 
This is critical to an understanding of the work of resilience in Southeast Louisiana; while 
the expectation for human communities to build resilience emerges from the natural 
sciences, in being applied to underserved communities, resilience actually bifurcates 
communities from the ecosystems and places they rely on. By crafting an official and 
institutional environmentalism that rhetorically includes but materially excludes them, 
CPRA tells vulnerable coastal residents that they are less vulnerable than the land they 
live and rely on. Following the notion of governmental subsumption in the face of risk, 
Lauren Berlant explains: 
at some crisis times like this one, politics is defined by a collectively held 
sense that a glitch has appeared in the reproduction of life. A glitch is an 
interruption within a transmission, a troubled transmission. A glitch is also 
the revelation of an infrastructural failure. The repair or replacement of 
broken infrastructure is...necessary for the form of any sociality to extend 




Rather than repair emerging from a space of altruism or a logic of collectivism, I argue 
that for the state, it appears in the biopolitical management of communities who stand in 
the way of risk reduction. For CPRA and other decision-makers, this management is 
accomplished through resilience. Alongside Berlant, I find Nixon’s “attritional 
catastrophes” a useful framework for thinking the slow, compounding violence of 
Vietnamese/American resilience in ongoing decision-maker-produced environmental 
disaster. Attritional catastrophes “are marked above all by displacements—temporal, 
geographical, rhetorical, and technological displacements that simplify violence and 
underestimate, in advance and retrospect, the human and environmental costs. Such 
displacements smooth the way for amnesia, as places are rendered irretrievable to those 
who once inhabited them, places that ordinarily pass unmourned in corporate media” 
(Nixon 2011:7). As Ghosh describes above, the way vulnerable communities have also 
become front-lines communities not passive, but one knowingly produced by decision-
makers. Pushing vulnerable people into spaces of toxicity, where oceans subsume land, 
where water is tainted and all species are ill, is a longstanding colonial and later, 
neoliberal practice. Doing so by reaffirming their ability to survive said toxicity, 
subsumption, and illness under the auspice of resilience is, to follow David Pellow and 
others, an act of environmental sacrifice. This sacrifice—a central tenet of environmental 
racism and as we remember, state violence—is key to CPRA’s collusion in securing 
Louisiana’s long-term oil revenue.  
 
While Bahng shows how risk mitigation regimes work to evacuate the future of risk—
including coast-dependent people—she tells us that no matter how much structures of 
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power seeks to contain uncertainty through the calculation of risk, risk can never be 
entirely foreclosed (Bahng 2018:12). And this is the utility of resilience: if addressing 
risk is the way the marketplace—and in this case, the state—manages the present through 
a future-looking gaze, then resilience becomes not simply an attribute of those people 
who stand in the way of institutional goals (state fiscal security built on oil capital), but a 
requirement for them to survive as ‘others’ in official landscapes that have already 
nullified their attachment to place and their lives in the impossible to achieve terra 
nullius of a risk-free future. 
 
ISLE DE JEAN CHARLES, DISPLACEMENT, & ERASURE FROM PLACE  
This is particularly clear for the tribe of Isle de Jean Charles (IDJC), an island off of 
coastal central South Louisiana. After Andrew Jackson forced First Nations peoples 
across the Southeastern U.S. to join the Trail of Tears under 1830 Indian Removal Act, 
members of the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw, Chata, Atakapaw, Chickasaw, and United 
Houma Nations fled to the coast, making a place in exile on Isle de Jean Charles. Since 
1955, they have lost 98% of their land. Policy-induced disaster and other effects of 
resource and space management exacerbate residents’ vulnerability; a regular rain easily 
floods the highway, cutting IdJC off from both the mainland and imperative resources; a 
hurricane compounds this isolation five-fold, then both eats away at the island’s meager 
landmass and forces a complete rebuilding. After the state of Louisiana left the island out 
of its levee system in a 2015 fortification project, tribal elders applied to U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) National Disaster Resilience Competition, 
asking for support. In 2016, HUD awarded the tribe $52 million to resettle on the 
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mainland. This funding was a part of the state’s broader effort to address coastal change, 
the Louisiana Strategic Adaptations for Future Environments Program (LA SAFE) 
program, which helps coastal communities identify both their vulnerabilities and 
potential solutions to them.  
 
While lauded by many as the silver bullet to the problem of “America’s First Climate 
Refugees” (Davenport and Robertson 2016), HUD’s recognition of Isle de Jean Charles’ 
situation shifted its residents’ lived experience from one of making due and surviving 
state-sanctioned vulnerability to being ‘mediated’ through federally mandated 
resettlement. Rather than choosing their own site of resettlement and its design, as was 
mandated in the funding agreement, the state of Louisiana has taken over all elements of 
the process. This includes changing the site, the proposed layout of the community, and 
most damning of all, telling the tribe that it is illegal for them to plan a community 
exclusively for Native people. This last was a weaponization of laws designed to make 
red-lining and property-based racial covenants illegal. The bitter irony of Louisiana using 
racism and the politics of land ownership against the region’s First Nations tribe 
members pushed Isle de Jean Charles’ chief, Albert Naquin, to effectively tell the state 
that he and his community would not go along with their plan.  
 
This reinvestment in the dispossession of Indigenous people in coastal restoration and 
risk mitigation—you can occupy place, but it cannot ever be your place—is telling in the 
broader conversation about how Louisiana governance and CPRA’s paradigms of 
environmentalism and restoration conceive of about the people who occupy the regions 
they claim to be fixing. Given their particular histories of violence and erasure from 
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Louisiana as Indigenous people, the experience of Isle de Jean Charles’ residents sets a 
dangerous precedent for all coastal communities who are currently or will be in the 
immediate path of decision-maker-produced disaster and approaches to disaster 
mitigation.  
 
As Gómez-Barris argues, “conservation initiatives usually perceive Native peoples as an 
obstacle to, rather an imperative for, preservation...the system of forest management and 
conservation...functions within a colonial paradigm that privileges outsiders, erases 
Native peoples, and imagines saving the planet...[by privileging] a colonial viewpoint 
that contributes to the dispossession of Indigenous peoples” (Gómez-Barris 2017:85). In 
this case, even though the conservation was discursively meant to preserve the tribe’s 
relationship to the place of coastal Louisiana, it in fact represents yet another 
displacement in the 300 year arc of dispossessions they have experienced on their 
sovereign land. And this brings me to the third critical piece of coastal communities’ 
terra nullius future: refugeeism.  
 
One of the utilities of the New York Times, HUD, and other spaces of record calling Isle 
de Jean Charles’ tribal members “climate refugees” is that it is a particularly temporal 
narrative of displacement. As ‘climate’ has only been a part of broader popular 
discussions about the Wests future for forty years, the original harms of settler 
colonialism, dispossession, environmental racism, and structural sacrifice (leaving them 
out of the levees) are evacuated from the storytelling about how the tribe has been made 
‘refugees’ on their sovereign land. Here, it is useful to briefly trace the way ‘refugee’ has 
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traveled as a socio-legal category to move forward in understanding the problematic of 
‘climate refugee.’  
 
REFUGEE 
The category “refugee” is a 20th century European invention. The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), founded in 1950 to confront the diasporas created 
throughout WWII, was instrumental in establishing refugeeism as the legal category 
through which those undergoing forced displacement were to be understood. At the 1951 
United Nations Convention Relation to the Status of Refugees, the UNHCR confirmed 
that a refugee is: “a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country”. Importantly, in defining 
refugeeism, the convention turned “refugee” into an internationally legible, socio-legal 
category based on a post-WWII, European diaspora. Although the UNHCR has updated 
its definition to more inclusively address what “persecution” means, the 1951 language is 
the socio-legal definition used across international forums to identify who is allowed, 
expected, or forced to claim refugeeism today. 
 
As ‘refugees,’ then, members of the Isle de Jean Charles tribe have become unmoored 
from place and time. As people trying to survive in a place that has been made impossible 
for them to nurture back to health by transparent, explicit decision-making about 
infrastructure, ecosystem, and value—of people, of more-than-human communities and 
of course, of resources like oil and gas—Isle de Jean Charles’ tribal members have been 
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discursively and materially evacuated from the place(s) they have more right to claim 
than anyone. In the risk-mitigating terra nullius future of the state, those who ‘become’ 
(or rather, are made into) refugees by proxy of deliberate governmental attempts to 
reduce its own version or risk, are in effect rendered resilient: you can survive anything 
so we don’t have to worry about you. You can survive anything, so I doesn’t matter where 
you think you belong to, only where we think you belong. And because you can survive 
anything, we do not have to worry about you anymore. 
*** 
Below, I shift to an examination of Asian/American racialization and refugeeism to 
understand how the concepts I have discussed above, from official environmentalism to 
risk mitigation and resilience, specifically impact Vietnamese/American commercial 
fisherfolk in Southeast Louisiana. 
 
VIETNAMESE/AMERICAN REFUGEEISM, ASIAN/AMERICAN 
RACIALIZATION, & PLACE 
“The Palestinian poet Mourid Barghouti writes that if you want to dispossess a people, 
the simplest way to do it is to tell their story and to start with, "secondly." Start the story 
with the arrows of the Native Americans, and not with the arrival of the British, and you 
have an entirely different story. Start the story with the failure of the African state, and 
not with the colonial creation of the African state, and you have an entirely different 
story...that is how you create a single story, show a people as one thing, as only one 
thing, over and over again, and that is what they become.” 
- Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, The Danger of a Single Story (2009) 
 
As Adichie shows above, the way single stories are crafted for a community strips them 
of complexity, possibility and, by extension, humanity. These stories do not appear from 
nowhere, nor are they a given; rather, they are produced by folks in power—decision-
makers and the people who benefit by aligning with them, from corporations to 
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residents—for ‘others’ to either contemporaneously or retroactively reinforce decision-
makers’ regionalized, racial, ethnic, and all other identity-based dominances.  
 
For Vietnamese/American folks with whom I work, refugeeism from Việt Nam to 
Southeast Louisiana is the persistent imaginary through which their daily lives, 
livelihoods, presents, and futures are framed by decision-makers. By this I do not mean 
that Vietnamese/Americans are called “refugees” in popular discourse; rather, my 
contention is that the frameworks used to regulate Vietnamese/American life in Southeast 
Louisiana persistently cling to the trauma and attendant ‘abilities’ Vietnamese refugees 
were storied to have gained in passage and resettlement. This is usefully illustrated by 
Tulane professor Mark VanLandingham, who has won awards for his public health 
scholarship on Vietnamese refugee trauma, health metrics, and adaptation in New 
Orleans. In a New York Times opinion piece emerging from his most recent study of how 
Vietnamese/Americans rebuilt so quickly after Hurricane Katrina (2005), 
VanLandingham tells us that:  
 
A sense of collective perseverance, forged in the experiences of fleeing 
North Vietnam in 1954 and South Vietnam in 1975; an insular outlook of 
self-sufficiency, rooted in experience with an untrustworthy government; 
and a comfort with hierarchy, drawn from Confucian ideals (as well as from 
the Roman Catholic Church, to which many Vietnamese in New Orleans 
belong) — all these things contributed to the community’s ability to rebuild 
with grit, self-reliance and efficiency (VanLandingham 2015). 
 
Instead of a compelling story about community success, I read VanLandingham’s claims 
here as a succinct and damning summary of the refugeeism-predicated single story 
Vietnamese/Americans live under in Southeast Louisiana, where disaster, environmental 
harm, and an ever-changing sociopolitical landscape make their grit not just a thing of the 
 
59 
past, but an ongoing boon to decision-makers who do not have to take those they have 
rendered collectively resilient into account.  
 
Significantly, many of the folks I work with welcome being called perseverant and self-
sufficient. For them, this language indexes their survival through externally designed and 
executed war, refugeeism, and resettlement—is a survival they are proud of. Inversely, 
VanLandingham crafts a teleology of Vietnamese/American grit, self-reliance, and 
efficiency—or resilience—reinforcing that these are innate attributes of Vietnamese 
refugees and Vietnamese/Americans rather than ‘skills’ they were forced to develop out 
of extreme violence and vulnerability. The narrative and material gap between 
VanLandingham’s single story and Vietnamese/Americans’ experience of refugeeism and 
rebuilding following Katrina—a relationship I will explore in much more depth in 
chapter two—in many ways follows the distinction between Nixon’s official and my 
community-based landscapes. VanLandingham’s externalizing and instrumental story of 
refugee grit is undeniably official in its reliance on racializing tropes that ensure 
Asian/Americans—and particularly refugees—remain alien and other to full citizenship. 
As Colleen Lye explains, Asian/Americans are “racial, racialized, but lacking the 
certainty of a racial formation” (Lye 2008:1733). Iyko Day highlights this complexity, 
explaining that “the racialization of Asian Americans and Asian Canadians has unfolded 
as a parallel evolution of yellow peril to model minority—from immigrant restriction and 
segregation, the wartime internment of Japanese civilians, to the 1960s-era liberalization 
of immigration policy” (Day 2016:23). Building on Jodi Byrd’s understanding of settler, 
arrivant (originally forwarded by Caribbean poet Edward Brathwait) and enslaved and 
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Lorenzo Veracini’s alien migrant, Day offers a critical reformulation of Asian 
racialization in North America:  
...highly differentiated populations of African slaves and Asian 
migrants historically represented alien rather than settler migrations. 
This shared status in no way implies an equivalence in the 
heterogenous racial experiences of African slaves and Asian 
migrants. Instead, it clarifies their historical relationship to North 
American land, which was as exclusive and excludable alien labor 
forces. Their unsovereign alien status was a precondition of their 
exploitation and intersects with the multiple economic logics that 
require and reproduce alien-ness in settler colonies. While African 
slaves represented a system of forced migration, unfree alien labor, 
and property—a form of biopolitical life that was ‘market 
alienable’—the later recruitment of indentured and ‘free’ Chinese 
labor incorporated provisionality, excludability, and deportability 
into the notion of alien-ness (Day 2016:24, emphasis mine).  
 
I follow Day’s complexification of the relation between Black and Asian/American 
communities as they continue to be racialized, excluded, and othered in the U.S. I am 
particularly interested in how Day brings this into direct conversation with the operation 
of settler colonialism and the ongoing seizure of Native land as a foundational logic of 
North America, arguing that “The heterogeneously racialized alien is a unique innovation 
of settler colonialism. Race is this an organizing principle of settler colonialism in North 
America” (Day 2016:24). Day further elucidates that “The governing logic of white 
supremacy embedded in a settler colonial mode of production relies on and reproduces 
the exploitability, disposability, and symbolic extraterritoriality of a surplus alien labor 
force...land and labor are constitutive features of heterogeneous processes of settler 
colonial racialization (Day 2016:24-5). This is clear in the experiences of IDJC’s 
residents, and in the fears fisherfolk have articulated in relation to the MBSD. This call to 
both recognize and read racialization, land, and labor together is imperative to seeing 
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Vietnamese refugeeism and Vietnamese/American racialization in Southeast Louisiana 
both as part of Asian and Asian/American racialization in the U.S. and as distinct to the 
places, decision-making, and institutional and communal histories through which it 
emerges.  
*** 
Following the end of the Cold War and the advent of Southeast Asian American studies, 
scholars of Southeast Asian/America began considering how refugeeism became and has 
remained a part of Southeast Asian/American identity across the last four decades 
(Kaplan and Grewal 2002; Lieu 2011; Manalansan IV 2003; Ngô, Nguyen, and Lam 
2012; Palumbo-Liu 1999; Schlund-Vials 2011; Schlund-Vials 2012; Um 2012). The 
debates in Southeast Asian/American critical diaspora studies trouble the American war 
in Việt Nam through the contested sites of subject formation, the state, and 
transnationalism. Yến Lê Espiritu suggests that one of the most important attributes of the 
Vietnamese refugee to U.S. Cold War politics is that in their flight, refugees reinforce 
and underwrite the U.S.’s anti-communist narrative (Espiritu 2005).  
 
The other side of this anti-communist formulation is clear in Feminist Southeast 
Asian/Americanist Mimi Thi Nguyen’s critique of U.S. logics of incorporation and 
exclusion post-resettlement. In thinking about how American empire has created a 
particular kind of “freedom” for Vietnamese/Americans, Nguyen forwards the notion that 
Vietnamese resettlement was viewed as the nation giving refugees “the gift of freedom, a 
world-shaping concept describing struggles aimed at freeing peoples from unenlightened 
forms of social organization through fields of power and violence” (Nguyen 2012:3, 
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italics original). Nguyen explains that in its interaction with Vietnamese refugees—who 
are, on the one hand, the direct result of American engagement in Việt Nam and on the 
other hand, a corporal and cultural reminder of U.S. military failure—the U.S. 
government has narrativized them as recipients of America’s magnanimous access to and 
subsequent gift of freedom, first through asylum and ultimately, as lucky heritors of 
citizenship. Because of this, Vietnamese refugees and Vietnamese Americans, have been 
told that they owe an unrepayable debt to the U.S. government for the greatest gift a 
nation can bestow upon its own citizens, let alone former citizens of other nations: their 
lives.  
 
As Tang and Patel explain:  
Refugees have historically been enlisted by U.S. policymakers to 
corroborate an American identity most needed at the moment — savior, 
defender of the free market and, today, permanent victim of global terrorism 
and enemy of Islam. Proof lies in this fact: once refugees outlive their 
narrative usefulness they become disposable. The one million migrants 
from Southeast Asia — who constituted the single largest wave of refugees 
in U.S. history — were quickly cast aside after resettlement (Tang and Patel 
2016).  
 
The rather transparent networks of power at play here actively situate 
Vietnamese/American citizenship as tenuous and above all, contingent upon being 
debtors under an unrepayable gift. According to Nguyen, Vietnamese/American 
citizenship is arguably an already failed contract. If birthright citizenship is contingent on 
the space and militarized borders of the U.S., then Vietnamese/American citizenship is 
contingent on transnational refugeeism, failed Vietnamese citizenship, American military 
intervention, fantastic storytelling about individuals’ worthiness and worth, and 
ultimately, U.S imperial failure. Here, we see that U.S. empire has shaped Vietnamese 
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refugeeism and subsequent citizenship both as an historic event and as a persistent, multi-
generational piece of Vietnamese/American subjecthood. 
 
For Nguyen, this ‘gift of freedom’ “emerges as a site at which modern governmentality 
and its politics of life (and death) unfolds as a universal history of the human, and the 
figuration of debt surfaces as those imperial remains that preclude the subject of freedom 
from being able to escape a colonial order of things” (Nguyen 2012:5). Yến Lê Espiritu 
reminds us that these ‘gift bearing’ refugees did not simply run toward the “door the 
United States allegedly opened,” but “moved very slowly, with much confusion, 
ambivalence, and even misgivings, uncertain about what they were walking toward or 
what they were walking from” (Espiritu 2014:10). Instead, “The messiness, contingency, 
and precarious nature of refugee life means that refugees, like all people, are beset by 
contradiction: neither damaged victims nor model minorities, they—their stories, actions, 
and inactions—simultaneously trouble and affirm regimes of power” (Espiritu 2014:10-
11). 
 
Because they were the first large group of Asian refugees to enter the U.S. following the 
Immigration Act of 1965, which lifted the ban on Asian immigration instantiated under 
the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the first wave (1975 - 78) of Vietnamese refugees to 
be resettled in the U.S. became objects of study for public health scholars, who used them 
to produce protocols based on about what refugees did, did not, and could not understand 
about their own experiences of flight, living in camps, coming to the U.S., and 
“acculturation” (Bankston III and Zhou 1997; Beiser 1988; Pham and Harris 2001; Zhou 
and Bankston 1998). These narratives became so foundational to the ways immigration 
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policy was drafted and social services were allocated that they became the basis by which 
members of the second wave (1979 - 83) experienced flight, the liminality of 
international and U.S. refugee camps, and as they were resettled in Louisiana.  
*** 
It took four attempts for Chú Le, a Louisiana shrimper now in his 60s, to leave Việt Nam. 
After trying and failing to leave once a year from 1978 on, he tells me in 1980 “My daddy 
[got a fishing boat for me] and told me to go to South Việt Nam. He said don’t go [anywhere 
else]...I go to Nha Trang” and worked as a fisher for a few trips. After several weeks, he 
and a friend made attempt number four: “we [put] 14 people on [a 20 foot] boat. Six 
children on that boat—one girl less than one year old. And we left...We go six nights and 
five days and we see the Philippine islands” (Le 2018). They were fed and brought to a 
refugee camp on a small island by a local Filipinx fisherman whose job it was to transport 
fish between islands on his boat. They stayed in the camp for 30 days, after which they 
were brought to a larger island and a larger camp. Le suggests that this was a central site 
for processing refugees; the name he gave of the place was phonetic: ba-la-wan, which I 
could find no record of. The place he described most clearly aligns with the Philippine 
Refugee Processing Center (PRPC), which was opened in 1980 near Morong, Bataan. It 
was a site where refugees were given health screenings, administered shots, and taught 
about ‘American culture.’ This last included education on basic English phrases, cultural 
mores (of this, Le reflected: “you [learned to] say good morning and good evening; 
[things] like that”) and U.S. expectations of proper hygiene. For six months, Le and his 
companions were among the 3,000 Southeast Asian refugees in the camp. While there, “we 
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learn English, we learn for American life—how the Americans live,” which he was told 
was necessary prior to him being processed and allowed to seek refuge in the U.S. 
 
Le’s story highlights how, at the beginning of the second wave of Vietnamese refugeeism 
(1980-85), acculturation into not just linguistic, but class-based models of Americanness 
was imperative to refugees being deemed ‘worthy’ of the gift of freedom. This emerged 
directly out of public health scholarship, which was trauma-centered but never trauma-
informed. Interested in how refugeeism produced mental health conditions in their ‘new 
home,’ public health scholars enumerated the experiences of refugees, arriving at a single 
story of the always abject Vietnamese refugee (who was often compared to “never 
migrated Vietnamese nationals” who in turn represented a control population (Fu and 
VanLandingham 2012:414)).  
*** 
In Southeast Louisiana, resilience is imagined in one way, and lived in another. First, for 
decision-makers with the privilege to define resilience, resilience looks like performing 
perfect neoliberal citizenship (Ong 2003; Adams 2013; Grewal 2017) wherein, when 
faced with hardship, individuals pull themselves up by their bootstraps and carry on. In 
this case, resilience is autonomous—an active choice. This is resilience in the abstract; 
resilience as it is perfectly crafted in service to management regimes like CPRA’s coastal 
restoration. In the second lived experience, resilience is not chosen, but borne; for folks 
who are vested with resilience without their acquiescence and, as I will show, often 
without their knowledge, resilience looks like surviving in spite of constant decision-
maker-produced disaster deliberately and unevenly harming them. As a friend recently 
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suggested to me: being able to be [the kind of] flexible [that is] is borne out of a trauma 
response; things were horrifying and people kept moving because they had no choice but 
to. Terrible shit has happened to you but you can’t stop and react as every terrible new 
thing that has happened keeps piling up. To be characterized as resilient in that situation 
is insulting.   
 
CHAPTER SUMMARIES 
As I showed in my analysis of VanLandingham above, the official narrative of 
Vietnamese refugeeism is one of grit. In Southeast Louisiana, where decision-maker-
produced disaster, environmental change, and coastal land loss directly shape the lives 
and livelihoods of Vietnamese/Americans, grit is most often operationalized as resilience, 
the term I will be using as a primary analytic throughout. By erasing 
Vietnamese/Americans’ individual and communal experiences of surviving state-crafted 
violence (war, refugeeism, disaster, shrimping regulations, flooding), the official 
narrative fills the vacuum it produces with a story that suits those in power. As the 
official landscape underwriting the single story of Vietnamese refugeeism, resilience 
subsumes folks’ rich and personal experiences and their survival-in-spite-of external 
violence. It bifurcates them from space, subsumes their stories, then calls them ‘inexpert,’ 
a tactic of statecraft that Harney and Moten showed, is the basic function of policy.  
 
This text endeavors to erupt and apprehend the ways state- and CPRA-produced 
environmentalism, restoration, and racialization binarizes worthy and unworthy 
communities, places, and industries in ways that seek to mitigate risk at the expense of 
Southeast Louisiana’s most vulnerable people, including Vietnamese/American fisherfolk 
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and community members. Throughout, I work to acknowledge, unpack, and, 
idealistically, undo the institutionalized narratives about Vietnamese/American folks in 
Southeast Louisiana that have relegated them to an ongoing refugeeism-as-racialization, 
ceded them to a state-produced resilience where they are meant to not just survive 
anything that they are made to endure, but do so well and as models of resilience, and 
actively erased from the ecosystems and landscapes on which they rely. Finally, I lean on 
other modes of knowledge production—the story, visionary and speculative fiction, and 
by deploying what Anna Tsing calls a “patchy ethnography” wherein stories are compiled 
to make a pastiche to acknowledge both the gaps inherent in and congruences that emerge 
from community-centered storytelling (Tsing 2004)—to differently apprehend and make 
plain the experiences of the folks with whom I work. In spite of this intervention, I know 
that it is just one small step toward acknowledging how limited ethnographic work is as a 
tool of apprehending violence.  
 
To this end, chapter one, Vietnamese Refugeeism & Resettlement in Southeast Louisiana, 
traces a recent history (from 1954-on in Việt Nam, and 1975-on in the U.S.) of 
Vietnamese refugeeism to the U.S. and how they were, in the very way Catholic Charities 
of New Orleans undertook resettlement, immediately excluded from spatial and social 
inclusion in New Orleans and Southeast Louisiana. By reading official narratives against 
refugees’ lives experiences, I establish how the gift of freedom and attendant refugee debt 
(Nguyen 2012) has allowed New Orleans and Louisiana to both produce and maintain 
Vietnamese refugee exclusion and difference from New Orleans to the Birdfoot Delta. 
Significantly, as commercial fishing writ large and shrimping in particular became the 
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center of the community’s economic and social health, it also became a primary space 
where official and community-based landscapes collided. In this chapter, I situate 
commercial fishing as a fundamental space for producing knowledge otherwise, where 
the places of the boat, the dock, the family home, and the larger Vietnamese/American 
community. This knowledge emerges from the tensions between the official and the 
community-based, where othering and a lack of resources at once forced the community 
to live in spite of the state and, in their erasure, developed skill sets and ideas that were 
not just about how to navigate racial, economic, and cultural exclusion, but establishing 
expertise in spite of these exclusions. In the course of my fieldwork, I realized that while 
the official landscape coheres across heterogenous and contested understandings about 
space, its adherence to a single story about Vietnamese refugees— if having been refugee 
means one can both survive and flourish in all circumstances, then the U.S., state, or local 
governments are not responsible for their survival; the refugees themselves are—was and 
remains the original slow violence experienced by Vietnamese/Americans that has 
facilitated a myriad of overlapping and diverging slow violences that carry into the 
present.  
 
In light of, on the one hand, Vietnamese/American fisherfolks’ deep knowledge of the 
place and industry and, on the other hand, their experience of being dependent on both, I 
shift to an examination of how resilience has been deployed against the community over 
time in chapter two, Katrina, BP, & Refugee Resilience. This chapter asks how resilience 
is mapped onto refugeeism and used to further political goals that exclude 
Vietnamese/Americans. Here, I pay particular attention to narratives crafted about and by 
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Vietnamese/American fisherfolk in the Gulf over the last four decades. In this tracing, 
disaster, specifically Hurricane Katrina (2005) and the BP oil catastrophe (2010), 
emerges as a key site for parsing the ways risk-mitigation and resilience come together to 
concretize Vietnamese/Americans’ racialization and underwrite restoration policy that 
disenfranchises them. In a preliminary interview in Triumph, LA, Happy, a processing 
dock owner, explained that he had to rebuild his entire dock four times in less than five 
years. After asking his wife if they should give up and open a convenience store, she 
shook her head, replying “This is what we do. This is all we know” (Vuong 2014). While 
this is fundamentally true for Happy, it is also the direct result of official decision-making 
that has kept Vietnamese/Americans in an industry folks both love and feel trapped in 
given a lack of other pathways to economic security.  
 
If Vietnamese/Americans are solely responsible for the ways they weather hurricanes, 
rebuild their lives, and maintain their families’ financially security, then their failure is 
personal, not say, the direct result of refugee racialization or, most damningly, a 
burgeoning state-crafted environmentalism that is predicated on crafting a risk-mitigating 
terra nullius that renders coast-dependent people resilient. This chapter establishes the 
necessity of rethinking how resilience has been deployed by decision-makers to not 
uphold or support coast-dependent communities in the vulnerability their resilience is 
predicated on, but instead allows them to be evacuated from the spaces they depend on in 
service to extending oil and other capital gains for the state. 
 
Following this analysis, chapter three, Restoration & Sacrifice at the Mouth of the 
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Mississippi, takes up the problematic of risk-mitigation that has produced and reinforced 
Vietnamese/American refugee resilience and the ongoing colonial management strategies 
that underwrite restoration. To do this, I bring together textual analyses and ethnographic 
data gathered at agency meetings, public forums, conferences, and other pertinent sites 
that allow me to unspool the nuanced and tangled policies and processes that have gone 
into developing the master plan and MBSD and with them, the end of Louisiana’s 
commercial fishing industry. Significantly, this link between resource designation and 
restoration adds to and extends the other slow violences Vietnamese/American fisherfolk 
have experience in Southeast Louisiana, and extends them into a risk-mitigated future 
built on the environmental sacrifice of the community and the more-than-human species 
they rely on and build ecosystems with.  
 
My final chapter, Visionary Response & Imagining Otherwise in Vietnamese/American, 
uses first-hand ethnographic data and the archives of coastal organizations to trace how 
fisherfolk and community members respond to the edict of a terra nullius-predicated 
resilience. These responses include creating ongoing support networks between boats and 
families, building coalitions that help coastal residents understand the experiences and 
struggles of residents in other communities, and acting as stewards of the ecosystem they 
rely on in spite of the state’s insistence that they are not a part of the coast. As a method, 
Vietnamese/American visionary response has the ability to see gross power imbalances, 
the ways top-down logics foreclose Vietnamese/American life and evacuate the 
landscape of their livelihoods, and, following Aimee Bahng and adrienne maree brown, 
imagine an otherwise. Response does this from a grounded viewpoint that fundamentally 
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understands the impossibility of Vietnamese/Americans surviving by seeking inclusion in 
official, risk-mitigating state processes that exclude them as a given. Because of this, 
Vietnamese/American response sounds, looks, and knows in Vietnamese/American. 
 
*** 
In July 2017, at the end of my fieldwork, I attended a workshopping session in Buras 
where fisherfolk were asked what was most difficult for them to navigate as coastal 
business owners and residents. Almost everyone brought up the looming diversion and 
how concerned they were about finding work outside of the fisheries, which would 
inevitably require them to relocate. One man turned to me and said: “Vietnamese people 
are the value down here. If they wipe out the fisheries...what’s the point of building land 
when we can’t live here?” In one sentence, this shrimper defined my field, my questions, 
and my goal: to support Vietnamese/American fisherfolk in finding answers and ideally, 
make the question moot over time. The chapters that follow endeavor to do this, given 


















CHAPTER ONE: VIETNAMESE REFUGEEISM & RESETTLEMENT IN 
SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA 
 
Sue’s family evacuated South Việt Nam in 1979 when she was a toddler. The Has and 
several family friends fled in the middle of a downpour. After careful planning, they had 
no choice but to chance the wind and waves that the storm was kicking up—the coast was 
heavily surveilled at the time, and they knew there would not be another opportunity to 
leave.  
 
As the group ran across the beach toward her father’s boat, a family friend tasked with 
carrying Sue dropped her; she says her very first memory is of sitting in the wet and cold, 
crying as she watched them all grow smaller. Once on the boat, Sue’s mother immediately 
knew one of her most precious things was missing; refusing to leave without their daughter, 
Sue’s father sent the man who had left her behind to retrieve her, putting the whole boat at 
risk. In spite of this mistake, they were able to leave that night.  
 
After successfully entering international waters unharmed, Mr. Ha navigated the boat to 
the Malaysian Peninsula. By the time they saw land, they had run out of both food and fuel; 
thankful to see Malaysian Coast Guard officials, Sue’s father explained that they were 
fleeing Việt Nam and sought asylum. Saying that they were not accepting refugees at that 
time, Coast Guard officials refused them entry, telling the refugees they must return to Việt 
Nam. With no food or fuel and refusing to go back, Sue’s father purposefully sank the boat 
just offshore, in clear sight of the Coast Guard and, most importantly, in Malaysian federal 
waters. Under maritime law, he knew that the Malaysian government had to rescue 
everyone aboard a capsized boat, no matter their nationality or refugee status. This 
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ingenuity immediately put him in an extremely vulnerable position once on land, however; 
beaten and tortured, he bore the scars of saving his family his entire life.  
 
In Malaysia, their group sought safe passage to the U.S. and after months in a camp, 
eventually arrived in Louisiana. After being resettled in New Orleans East’s Versailles 
Arms apartments, her father quickly bought another boat by cobbling together small loans 
from new friends already working in the industry, a reflection of what it meant for people 
to support one another as refugees, whether they knew each other prior to resettlement or 
not. Her mother worked two and three shifts six days a week at the local seafood processing 
plant, and was paid based on the number of oyster sacks she filled. At home, Sue and her 
brothers learned English out of necessity, helping their mother at the grocery store and 
other places she struggled to make due in Vietnamese. Sue remembers that at the time, 
refugees with English proficiency would charge those who were not fluent to interpret for 
them in the same capacity; noting how unfair this was, she did the same for free, and 
learned the ins and outs of the local economy, basic healthcare, and other services her 
elders needed, but struggled to gain access to as Vietnamese speakers.  
 
Mr. Ha spent the rest of his life shrimping, eventually earning enough to support the whole 
family comfortably. Over the decades, he grew to be a leader in the community, both in 
terms of economically supporting burgeoning businesses and in counseling new boat 
owners and arrivals in the industry’s intricacies. Over the years, he taught Sue how to 
shrimp. This knowledge helped her keep the family books, learn about fishing regulations, 
taxes, and immigration law, which in turn eventually allowed her to offer the same services 
to her father’s friends. Sue went on to get a degree in business from a local university so 
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she could formally help her community. Upon his retirement, Mr. Ha left his boat to Sue’s 
husband, John. Until his death in January 2018,  Mr. Ha was a prominent supporter of the 
East’s small business owners. Her father is a central impetus for Sue’s lifelong engagement 
in the industry.  
 
The Has’ experience of fleeing Việt Nam at the tail end of what scholars call the first 
wave of Vietnamese refugeeism (1975-79) illustrates several important attributes of what 
became Southeast Louisiana’s Vietnamese/American community. First, the Has’ story 
exemplifies the necessity of building and leaning on community networks for survival in 
Louisiana. While this is often understood simply as a group mentality by sociologists, 
political scientists, and scholars of public health, as VanLandingham showed, in the case 
of Southeast Louisiana, it was a necessity borne of the very specific ways they were 
resettled in the state, as well as decision-makers’ orientation toward, on the one hand, 
their status as refugees of the U.S.’s failed war and as such, recipients of a national gift of 
freedom (Nguyen 2012), and on the other hand, the particular socio-political and 
environmental climate into which they were settled.  
 
Second, as I have suggested, while refugee flight from Việt Nam took a myriad of paths, 
it was never simple, safe, or guaranteed. Many families lost loved ones, almost all of 
them lost what material wealth they had in passage, and, in later, more tenuous voyages, 
boats heavy with families floated in the open ocean for days and weeks, forcing people to 
make difficult decisions to survive. A great deal of these boats were overtaken by pirates, 
and into the 1980s, capsizing was a regular occurrence. While it might be obvious that 
there is no simple refugee story, it is important to name and give weight to the severe 
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hardship folks undertook to leave a home that was no longer politically, economically, or 
corporeally safe. While Vietnamese refugees had heterogeneous experiences of 
resettlement, it was no happenstance that Southeast Louisiana became a site of 
resettlement; rather, deliberate networks of power and place-making were at work to 
create what became Versailles, the West Bank, and other communities throughout the 
Birdfoot Delta. At the same time, by nuancing how we think about official, community-
based, and historical narratives that have produced the place and space of 
Vietnamese/American commercial shrimping in 40 plus years of community presence in 
Louisiana, I hope to make it clear that trauma and its incessantly invoked partner ‘grit’ is 
not the only story of Vietnamese refugeeism, but should also not be understood solely 
through strictural definitions of trauma and grit.  
 
Finally, the Has’ post-arrival entry into commercial fishing typified others’; as a new 
family arrived, most ‘able-bodied’ men ended up on shrimping boats, working for 
community members as deckhands until they had the capital to purchase their own boats. 
Others worked as deckhands with family members, and still others took jobs outside of 
the industry. Mrs. Ha, like many refugee women, worked in fish processing, which 
included cleaning shrimp, shucking oysters, and preparing other fish species for sale. 
This industry has remained the purview of refugee and immigrant women during 
resettlement—according to Sue, the seafood processing labor force is overwhelmingly 
Honduran/American and Mexican/American today—as it is work that does not require 
English fluency and, as workers are paid by the pound of seafood they prepare, ensures a 
paycheck at the end of a shift rather than every two weeks or monthly. This diversity and 
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density of Vietnamese refugee engagement in commercial fishing highlights that from 
early in Vietnamese resettlement to Southeast Louisiana, commercial fishing was the 
industry that anchored the community’s economic, and by extension, social, stability. The 
Ha’s story also explicitly highlights how commercial fishing has been a part of 
Vietnamese/Americans’ lives long before Southeast Louisiana: were it not for his success 
as a shrimper, Sue’s father would not have a boat both large enough to evacuate his and 
others’ families and navigate dangerous open ocean, nor would he have had the 
knowledge needed to gain safety once his family was turned away as asylum seekers. He 
also, most importantly, would not have arrived in the state with the knowledge to start a 
business, which convinced established boat owners to lend him the money necessary to 
do so.   
 
THE GIFT OF FREEDOM IN LOUISIANA 
From 1975 on, Vietnamese/American residents of Louisiana have experienced a 
refugeeism of debt to the state and the nation for ‘saving’ stateless people from the effects 
of American military engagement in Việt Nam (Nguyen 2012). I use this chapter to ask 
how Vietnamese/Americanness in Southeast Louisiana is both mediated by an institutional 
refugee framing and how community-based knowledges like Sue’s story above exceed 
and grapple with them. I contend that a discourse racializing Vietnamese/Americans as 
refugee persists into the present because, on the one hand, its utility to local, state, federal, 
and private decision-makers (specifically as they maintain refugeeism as a central part of 
Vietnamese/American racialization and socio-legal (il)legibility over the last four 
decades), and, on the other hand, as it is reaffirmed through enduring displacement across 
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generations, shifts in resettlement, through disaster, and in the management of the spaces, 
neighborhoods, and coastal ecologies the community with whom I work rely on. This 
chapter allows me to establish the specific modes and means through which this 
happened.  
 
Situating myself in genealogies of Southeast Asian American critical refugee scholarship, 
I follow one of Yến Lê Espiritu’s central questions, “how and why the term ‘refugee’—
not as a legal classification but as an idea—continues to circumscribe American 
understanding of the Vietnamese” (Espiritu 2006a) across chapters one and two. To 
consider how refugeeism is not only a result of the American war in Việt Nam, but re-
emerges through regimes of neoliberalization and place-making in the present, I follow 
Espiritu’s call to critical refugee studies scholars that we “need to do more than critique; 
we need to be attentive to refugees as ‘intentionalized beings’ who possess and enact 
their own politics as they emerge out of the ruins of war and its aftermath” (Espiritu 
2014:14). As such, I argue that refugeeism is one of several slow violences (Nixon 2011) 
that shape the experiences of Vietnamese/American life and sacrifice in Southeast 
Louisiana. To do this, I use this chapter to examine the refugeeism-specific roots that 
underwrite the state’s current disaster- and environmentalism-predicated official 
landscape (which I engage in chapter two), and to consider how Louisiana’s 
understanding of Vietnamese refugee racialization has differently shaped the 
community’s relationship with commercial fishing, particularly shrimping, as a central 
element of Vietnamese/American community and economic stability. This chapter also 
lays the foundation of my ongoing interest in the relationship between risk-mitigation and 
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the imperative for Vietnamese/American resilience following disaster, questions I take up 
in the chapters that follow. 
 
POLITICS OF RESETTLEMENT 
In April of 1975, New Orleans decision-makers and the public were embroiled in a 
debate over whether or not to admit Vietnamese refugees after the fall of Sài Gòn. The 
possibility of hosting refugees divided the city’s residents between those who felt it was 
imperative for the U.S. to provide asylum and others who felt that New Orleans—then in 
an economic recession—could not take in more people who required social support. This 
concern was particularly held by many Black residents of New Orleans who, in addition 
to experiencing long-standing structural racism and generational poverty emerging from 
enslavement and Jim Crow logics of surveillance and management, were overwhelmingly 
enlisted and sent to the front lines of America’s wars in Korea and Việt Nam (Marable 
1984; Moskos Jr 1973; Tang 2011). Veterans of the U.S. war in Việt Nam historically 
received fewer and less comprehensive benefits than those legally designated them by the 
G.I. Bill (Mattila 1978), which “was deliberately designed to accommodate Jim Crow” 
(Kotz 2005). This methodically racist federal approach to “repaying” its soldiers was 
most insidious in economically depressed, historically Black New Orleans, and made 
residents’ unwillingness to accept refugees of the U.S. war in Việt Nam feel like a matter 
of survival.  
 
It also was underwritten by and reinforced ongoing xenophobia in the region, which was 
and is obscured by a multiculturalist narrative whereby all people are welcome in, and—
more importantly—swiftly integrated into, New Orleans and the region (Marler 2013; 
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Stanonis 2006; Thompson 2009). This storytelling of New Orleans as a melting pot was 
mobilized by liberal narratives about U.S. welcome, which both reified a fictive Southern 
racial binary—Black:white—to the exclusion of other communities of color in Louisiana, 
and at the same time, reinforced the injury of racial and immigration-contingent 
exclusion that had kept Indigenous, Black, Central and South American, and Caribbean 
Louisianian cycles of poverty and dispossession for generations. These overlapping and 
imbricated notions of rights, belonging, and access have and continue to shape the ways 
immigration, race, and class are mobilized and contested in Southeast Louisiana and were 
the overt and opaque undercurrents to how Vietnamese refugees were ultimately resettled 
in the city.  In this way, the official landscape into which Vietnamese refugees were 
resettled was discursively binarized in terms of immigration (citizen: refugee), race 
(Black: white), and socioeconomic status (under-resourced: adequately-resourced).  
*** 
The Catholic Church’s wealth and longstanding place in the politics of New Orleans 
allowed them to make city-level decisions analogous to politicians. In spite of residents 
voting against accepting refugees of U.S. engagement in Southeast Asia, then-
Archbishop Philip Hannan arranged the resettlement of particular “good” refugees he 
encountered while visiting a U.S. resettlement camp at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas (M. 
Nguyen 2015). Under Hannan’s guidance and through the church’s charitable foundation, 
Catholic Charities of New Orleans, the vast majority of the refugees settled in 1975 
identified as former residents of North Vietnamese Catholic Villages Phát Diệm and Bùi 
Chu who had fled the North and resettled in South Việt Nam following the end of French 
colonialism (1954) and the shifting political conditions this precipitated, including an 
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immediate increase in U.S. military presence. The families’ history of maintaining their 
Catholic faith in internal and transnational diaspora appealed to New Orleans’ Catholic 
leaders (Campanella 2006, 2019), and, as Marguerite Nguyen writes, “infus[ed] 
Vietnamese postcolonial history into the New Orleans landscape”  (M. Nguyen 
2015:117), which was still shaped by French colonial ideals and nostalgia managed 
Louisiana through a white, Western European racial imaginary.  
 
This storytelling about Vietnamese proximity to Frenchness was one case the church 
made for supporting Vietnamese families in a tertiary refugeeism from Phát Diệm and 
Bùi Chu. It also, significantly, flattened French Colonailism’s global effects, refusing to 
acknowledge the inherent differences between white Louisianian former French colonial 
space and the colonization of the Vietnamese by the French. In Louisiana, relationships 
to a French history and genealogy of governance re-emplaced decision-makers into 
positions of power. French colonialism in Việt Nam, on the other hand, removed 
Vietnamese people from positions of power and access to their own cultures, 
knowledges, and ancestry. These hetrogenous French/settler colonialisms were at once 
central to the formation of New Orleans’ Vietnamese community and haunted the 
political resettlement and daily lives of Vietnamese refugees during and long after 
resettlement, which I will take up again in chapter three.  
*** 
 
Once Catholic Charities decided to resettle Vietnamese refugees, they identified 
Versailles Arms Apartments, an existing Section 8 housing development in New Orleans 
East, as the refugees’ new home (Leong et al. 2007:775). As such, Versailles Arms’ 400-
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unit apartments was immediately the center of the early Vietnamese community in New 
Orleans, which was home to over 3,000 refugees by the end of 1976 (M. Nguyen 2013). 
According to Carl L. Bankston III, “The Versailles Arms apartments...offered ample 
room for new residents. The apartments were considered undesirable by most New 
Orleanians since they were provided with inadequate bus service…[due to the area’s 
economic hardship] the management of the apartment complex was eager to find 
residents” (Bankston 1998:81). This clearly outlines first, that Versailles Arms was in an 
economically depressed and structurally underserved area and second, that Catholic 
Charities was aware of the same when they chose it as a space of resettlement.  
 
Figure 11. A map of Versailles, which begins on Toulon Blvd. to the west, and ends to the east where 
“Saigon Dr.” Maris the nexus between two canals that come to a point. Chef Menteur Hwy is the 
southernmost edge of the neighborhood, and to the north, another neighborhood begins at the intersection 
of Lake Forest Blvd and Michoud Blvd which, in addition to Chef Menteur Highway, Dwyer Blvd., and 
Alcee Fortier Blvd., are the major thoroughfares of the neighborhood. Mary Queen of Việt Nam is on 
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Dwyer, and many businesses like restaurants and corner stores and services like a health clinic and VAYLA 
are clustered around Chef and Alcee Fortier.  
 
What’s more, while the apartment’s managers were eager to find residents, this did not 
mean Versailles Arms was unoccupied. Several community elders I spoke with suggested 
that prior to Vietnamese resettlement, Versailles Arms was an overwhelmingly Black 
complex; the families who lived there prior to resettlement were displaced by Vietnamese 
families being moved in. While refugees did not choose where they were resettled, this 
added to the vexed dynamic between Vietnamese refugees and some Black residents in 
New Orleans East and city-wide. In addition to being resettled into a space where many 
existing residents felt underserved and undersupported by New Orleans, this decision 
making on the part of Catholic Charities ensured Black/Vietnamese tension.  As such, it 
is clear that refugees from Việt Nam were spatially, economically, and socially 
ghettoized immediately upon being placed in New Orleans and became central players in 
an ongoing and fraught local racial politics.  
 
Figure 12. This table indicates the 2000 and 2013-2017 population of Village de l’Est by percentage of 
Village de l’Est—which, here, is delineated as a voting district distinct from New Orleans East (see figure 
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X in the introduction)—as compared with Orleans Parish, of which it is a part, and the U.S. These numbers 
indicate that in 2017, Village de l’Est is overwhelmingly Black (46.9%, which represents a 8.5% decline 
from pre-Katrina 2000) and Asian (42.1%, with a 5% increase since Katrina). While there are a number of 
non-Vietnamese Asian/American families and communities in Orleans Parish, the Village de l’Est numbers 
overwhelmingly indicate Vietnamese/American residents (The Data Center 2019)). 
 
*** 
Bankston later shares an interview with Ms. Carniglia, Director of Resettlement and 
Immigration Services for Associated Catholic Charities: 
having earlier been in charge of resettlement of Cuban refugees, [Ms. 
Carniglia] believed that refugees should be concentrated so that they could 
help one another. ‘I said ‘no, they need one another.’ So I started to resettle 
them in communities. That’s why I looked for housing that could take large 
numbers of people. The Government saw the success and that’s what they 
started doing elsewhere...New Orleans was a pattern for other places, no 
doubt about it’ (Bankston 1998:81).  
 
If we take Carniglia’s narrative seriously, Versailles Arms was meant to serve as a 
cultural hub. At the same time, whereas Vietnamese/American ethnic enclaves like Little 
Saigons in Houston, TX and Orange County, CA were established more organically 
through communities creating economic and cultural hubs in areas with longstanding and 
ongoing Asian/American presence and infrastructure (Collet and Furuya 2010; 
Mazumdar et al. 2000; Vo and Yu Danico 2004), 1975 Versailles was isolated from the 
now-negligible Philipinx and Chinese/American communities in New Orleans (which I 
address later in this chapter), and contained no existing Asian/American cultural 
infrastructure. 
 
This mode and space of Vietnamese refugee resettlement is unique, first, because unlike 
other areas of Vietnamese refugee resettlement in the U.S. where individual families were 
taken into sponsor homes or otherwise spread across a metro area, Versailles was 
immediately and definitely a Vietnamese neighborhood. While scholars of Vietnamese 
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refugeeism to the U.S. and many folks I know make clear that no major site of 
resettlement was explicitly interested in creating pathways for integrating Vietnamese 
refugees into full belonging or citizenship, Versailles Arms’ specific isolation 
immediately ghettoized the entire refugee community. Second and related to this, because 
of its location in New Orleans East, which is separated from the metro area by a large 
industrial shipping canal that must be traversed by a bridge and Chef Menteur Highway, 
a narrow, two-lane road, Versailles Arms and Vietnamese refugees were physically 
separated from the New Orleans metro area. At the same time, this approach to 
resettlement created spatial and social proximity between refugee families.   
 
Taking all of this together, the decision to resettle refugees in Versailles Arms suggests 
that while the church wished to act as refugees’ wardens, they did not necessarily seek to 
‘integrate’ them into the city. That Ms. Carniglia instrumentalized her knowledge about 
Cuban refugee resettlement in producing a space where the refugees “could help one 
another” points to the fact that prior to and during Vietnamese resettlement, there was 
little promise of support following the initial magnanimity shown them during the 
politically significant process of resettlement. This is because, as Tang and Patel explain, 
“Refugees have historically been enlisted by U.S. policymakers to corroborate an 
American identity most needed at the moment...the one million migrants from Southeast 
Asia — who constituted the single largest wave of refugees in U.S. history — were 
quickly cast aside after resettlement” (Tang and Patel 2016). In light of this, they would 
“need one another” for practical reasons—shared language, experiences, etc.—but more 
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than that, because in the months and years to come, Vietnamese refugees would 
effectively be left to their own devices with no one but themselves for support.  
*** 
Aihwa Ong unpacks the relationship between citizenship and governance in her work with 
Cambodian refugees and U.S. citizenship. Ong considers how processes of minoritization 
impact the ways Cambodian refugees are incorporated into citizenship as a structure of 
state power. Ong explains that the attributes of a ‘good’ citizen have changed since the 
1970s; then, good citizens recognized themselves as having duties and obligations to the 
nation. Today, a good citizen is an "autonomous, responsible, choice-making subject who 
can save the nation best by becoming 'entrepreneurs of the self'" (Ong 2003:9). She calls 
this good citizen a "flexible homo economicus," or an entrepreneurial subject who engages 
in a "bootstraps" mentality, inculcated in them by various state apparatuses to be an 
individual engaged in free market capitalism. Ong goes on to explain that those outside of 
this system find ways to resist or rearticulate this approach to and understanding of 
citizenship: 
Because of their multiple, diffused, and open-ended nature, normalizing 
practices never have a totalitarian effect, as some readings of Foucault’s 
work might suggest. Indeed, Foucault has argued that regulatory programs 
‘never work out as planned,’ not only because different strategies may be 
opposed, but because subject interpret and act in ways that undo systems of 
classification (cultural, ethnic, moral), refuse different kinds of objectives 
(involving needs, desires, behavior), and thwart rules of surveillance and 
punishment…By exploring the day-to-day experiences of Cambodian 
refugees in the context of Foucault’s power-resistance axis, I demonstrate 
how liberal governance in its everyday form entails a certain violent 
subjection in the process of becoming free, so to speak (Ong 2003:17).  
 
Ong’s tracing of the expectations of liberal governance was at play in the official 
landscape that produced the resettlement process outlined above. This is clear in Ms. 
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Carniglia’s story, which highlights how first-wave refugees’ communal survival in 
physical, economic, and social isolation was an expectation of refugees even prior to their 
resettlement by service organizations throughout the U.S., which was already being 
imagined through Nguyen’s gift of freedom: they got to live, they owe the nation for this 
life; they’d better figure this out themselves.  
 
Early in resettlement, the way Versailles—so named after Versailles Arms—was forced 
to cohere as a self-sufficient space was heralded by local media and the Catholic church 
as a success story—the refugees had made a way out of a horrifying situation and were 
thriving first, because of their mettle and determination, and second, because of the 
magnanimous support of the church and the nation, to whom the refugees would always 
owe their lives (M. T. Nguyen 2012). Over time, this forced self-determination became 
the center of the official narrative about Vietnamese refugees in Southeast Louisiana. As 
self-determined folks, the community in turn ‘kept to themselves’ in Versailles. This 
transmutation of deliberate ghettoization in an economically depressed, isolated space 
into a story about chosen, deliberate, autonomous self-isolation allowed city, state, and 
federal officials to depict Vietnamese refugees as people who did not need, and as such 
were not allocated, substantial support in the decades that follow. This official narrative 
was so easy to sell—read any story written by a non-Vietnamese/American about the 
community, and the suggestion of the deliberateness of isolation along lines of race and 
ethnicity will come early and often (Fertel 2014; Pfefferle 2014; Roahen 2008). This 
largely because refugees’ very existence in the nation underwrote the ways the U.S. 
imagined itself through the ongoing and ‘post-refugeeism’ landscape: gift given, debt 
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now owed, it was time for the refugees to do their part, become good neoliberal subjects 
and pick themselves up by their bootstraps.  
 
LOUISIANA REFUGEE SURVIVAL & THE MODEL MINORITY MYTH 
New Orleans geographer Richard Campanella is heralded as New Orleans’ foremost 
historian and documentarian. As such, his reflections of the city’s demography, 
sociocultural, racial, and structural landscape is looked on as the most exhaustive and 
representative data of the same. His work on Vietnamese resettlement, published in 2006 
a year after Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, reflects the now- apocryphal New Orleans-
based Vietnamese refugee success story (see chapter two): “Only two months after their 
arrival, the refugees were responsible for their own rent; within a few years, ‘the majority 
of Vietnamese had jobs, many had automobiles…an increasing number owned their 
homes, [and] approximately 200 of them were enrolled at the University of New 
Orleans’” (Campanella 2006:360). The story here is one of socioeconomic success, 
historically the mode by which immigrants, migrants, refugees, and other ‘new’ 
Americans are expected to show achievement—or assimilate—in the U.S. this pivots on 
the model minority myth, which Edith Wen-Chu Chen and Grace J. Yoo explain is 
predicated on the assumption that Asian/Americans are economically and educationally 
more successful than other marginalized peoples (Park 2008).  
 
Historically, the label of ‘model minority’ has been imposed upon Asian laborers and 
immigrants to the U.S. as a socioeconomic and cultural expectation. The model minority 
myth is predicated on the existence of Asian/Americans who reflect these values, 
specifically and most stereotypically East and South Asian/Americans (Xu and Lee 
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2013). However, Southeast Asian refugees have typically been used as foils to the model 
minority myth, where refugees are “Asian” in regulatory metrics like the census and local 
demographics data collection, but excluded from model minority-ness as an East and 
South-Asian centric, upper-middle-class status (Wong et al. 1998; Suzuki 1977; Saran 
2007). The model minority myth is highly destructive for all Asian/Americans, but is a 
particular violence for folks who do not meet its criteria, including poor, undocumented, 
refugee, and disabled Asian/Americans (Espiritu 2006b; Leong et al. 2007; Mereish 
2012; Poon-McBrayer 2011; Yang 2004).  
 
This is because the Asian/Americans who stand outside of model minority status are 
often consumed as failed Asians in the U.S. For Vietnamese/Americans, who, 
“According to the past three decennial censuses, Southeast Asian refugees have 
maintained the highest poverty and welfare dependency rates of any ethnic group in the 
country” (Tang and Patel 2016), economic exclusion from the model minority myth has 
been a foregone conclusion for decades. This reinforces Nixon’s definition of “the poor” 
as “those people packing resources who are the principal casualties of slow violence” 
whose “unseen poverty is compounded by the invisibility of the slow violence that 
permeates so many of their lives” (Nixon 2011:4). Given the disjuncture between refugee 
and model minority subject positions under the larger yellow peril/model racialization of 
Asian/Americans (Day 2016), Vietnamese refugees’ entrance into the larger body politic 
of the U.S. was an immediately foreclosed prospect. Bringing Mimi Thi Nguyen and 
Aiwa Ong’s critical work on refugeeism and economic mobility into conversation, it 
becomes clear that while the directive was for refugees to make themselves economically 
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and thus, socially, legible neoliberal subjects, their best outcome was to be economically 
and thus culturally successful enough in the eyes of the state to become only moderately 
failed persistent debtors. 
*** 
As I outlined earlier, in the aftermath of their vexed yet cohering process of refugee 
resettlement, Versailles’ residents had to rely on each other for resources. This ranged 
from, as I suggested above, youth who quickly learned English to translate for their elders 
to former commercial fishers entering Louisiana’s industry as deckhands, saving until 
they could pool resources and start their own businesses (Ha 2018). This at once 
reinstantiated refugees’ exclusion and forced them to develop tools outside of the 
purview of the church, city, and state to support their community, particularly during the 
first wave (1975-79) of resettlement. Given this, many found work where their lack of 
English was not a barrier. In Southeast Louisiana, this meant entering commercial fishing 
as deckhands on boats and taking jobs at factories where largely women did the work of 
processing shrimp, oysters, and other seafood for sale.  
 
VIETNAMESE REFUGEE COMMERCIAL FISHING 
Sue told me that “Our community was built on a boat” (Ha 2014). The labor of fishing 
did not require an entrance exam and at a processing dock or on a boat, if one was able to 
execute their work, it was not necessary for them to know how to speak or read English. 
This is even clear in Campanella’s demographic tracing of the community, where he 
says: “Sources of employment in the early years of Michoud [Versailles] and the West 
Bank enclaves included commercial fishing, sewing, welding at the Avondale shipyards, 
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and food services in restaurants, the seafood industry, and processors/retailers” 
(Campanella 2006:360). In the 1970s, Vietnamese refugees largely commuted one or two 
hours from Versailles to fishing docks along the Birdfoot Delta, taking work as 
deckhands on boats anywhere from a day to several weeks at a time or, in lieu of this, 
working at docks shoveling ice, bringing the catch in, and packaging it for shipping to a 
processing facility. These jobs were hard manual labor, but at the time, fuel costs were 
relatively low, shrimp was abundant, and boat captains could make $20/pound for larger 
white and brown shrimp (Le 2018), allowing them to pay deckhands a relatively good 
wage compared to other local blue-collar jobs. Over time, shrimping and to a lesser 
extent, oystering, became the primary fisheries Vietnamese refugees worked in both 
because they are two of the major fisheries in Louisiana and given the need for labor on 
shrimp and oyster boats.  
 
As Chú Le, a captain who has been working in Louisiana’s shrimping industry since the 
early 1980s told me “back then, we make a dollar, we save 98 cents” (Le 2018). This 
fiscal conservatism was imperative particularly in the 70s, as families had access to a 
limited number of early loans and social services (M. Nguyen 2013) and given the 
limited number of fields adults could enter into given the constraints of language and the 
illegibility of former knowledges they carried as professionals and workers in Việt Nam 
(M. Nguyen 2015). While commercial fishing is a relatively individualized industry—
boat captains and dock owners are private small business owners, deckhands and dock 
workers are contract laborers—in the hands of Vietnamese refugees, it became a 
communal enterprise, where the money made at the dock, on the boat, and for women 
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like Sue’s mother who worked in seafood processing entered single-family homes, then 
was re-invested in Versailles.  
 
Sue reflected on this process as she explained to me how her father was able to buy a boat 
within three years of their being resettled in New Orleans: “When one deckhand saved a 
decent amount, he’d borrow the rest [of the money he needed to buy a boat] from friends; 
after he repaid them, he helped other people” (Ha 2018). By reframing commercial 
fishing as a community-fortifying enterprise, Vietnamese refugees produced an internal 
lending system that kept capital in the community, allowing heads of households to 
consolidate and re-invest their income in the industry (Ha 2016). This approach to 
establishing revenue streams for not just individuals, but families and Versailles writ 
large allowed Vietnamese deckhands to matriculate to boat ownership and financial 
solvency more quickly than non-Vietnamese/American fisherfolk who did not have such 
a structured community lending network to lean on. While some small loans were made 
available to refugees by the state to support a percentage of the cost of buying a boat (M. 
Nguyen 2013), it was overwhelmingly the community that facilitated the process.  
 
When refugees were resettled in the East, it had no Vietnamese coffee shops, restaurants, 
grocery stores, or other imperative, community-sustaining businesses. As Vietnamese 
deckhands and dock workers transitioned from being workers to boat owners via saving 
and through a network of interest-free lending, the income boats generated allowed 
family members and friends to open community hubs like restaurants and stores, support 
services that provided education, citizenship training, and legal counsel, and gave the 
seed money for other business integral to the community. Commercial shrimping income 
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also underwrote the construction of Mary Queen of Việt Nam church, which was greenlit 
by the Archdiocese of New Orleans In September 1983, after which “funds were 
collected from Vietnamese Catholics throughout New Orleans and the Mary Queen of 
Vietnam Church was completed in May 1985. The church has served as a center of both 
the spiritual and the social life of this little neighborhood” (Bankston 1998:86-7). In 
every way, then, commercial fishing has solidified the community’s social and economic 
stability.  
*** 
The late ‘70s and early ‘80s marks a transitional moment between first and second-wave 
Southeast Asian refugees, who arrived with much fewer resources (Kelly 1986; Kula and 
Paik 2016; Rumbaut 1989), but into a space where a community network of boats, 
processing docks, and other fishing-dependent businesses were being established. This 
allowed many second-wave refugees to immediately begin working in commercial 
fishing, at once re/producing Southeast Asian presence in Louisiana and solidifying 
shrimping as the backbone of the community. According to Carl Bankston, by the end of 
the 20th century “close to one of every ten Louisiana Vietnamese men worked as fishers or 
shrimpers and the Vietnamese accounted for one out of every twenty workers in the 
Louisiana fishing industry” (Bankson in M. Nguyen 2013:267).  
 
As more Vietnamese refugees transitioned into Louisiana’s commercial fishing industry 
during the second wave of resettlement, the community spread beyond the siloed space of 
Versailles. New refugees made home across the river from New Orleans in what is 
known as the West Bank in Jefferson Parish, which today is a second space of 
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Vietnamese/Americanness in Louisiana. Additionally, because commercial fishing was a 
primary impetus for many to come to Louisiana (Bankston 1998), some second-wave 
refugees and later Vietnamese immigrants decided to move in closer proximity to the 
fishing docks, creating Vietnamese/American neighborhoods along the Birdfoot Delta in 
coastal towns from Buras to Cut-Off. While Versailles and the West Bank remain the 
primary spaces of Vietnamese/American life in Southeast Louisiana, the delta, in addition 
to being the space of commercial fishing, became a third and significant place of 
Vietnamese/American residence in the intervening decades, which is important to how 
the community has been understood, spatialized, and relegated to ongoing refugeeism 
into the present.  
*** 
Chú Le told me about his decision to go to Louisiana once arriving in the U.S. from 
Malaysia: “[When I left Việt Nam] a lot of people go to California, to Texas…[but I had 
heard that] a lot of people shrimp here and that’s why a lot of people move here—to 
shrimp” (Le 2018).  While he had worked on fin fishing boats prior to resettling in 
Southeast Louisiana, Le did not know the ins and outs of commercial shrimping in the 
U.S. So he learned from a Vietnamese captain who had established his own business: “I 
told [him] ‘I don’t know how to do anything on the boat right now, but let me learn.’” 
While many second-wave refugees brought extant skills to the growing 
Vietnamese/American commercial shrimping industry, others like Le began their 
shrimping careers in Southeast Louisiana.  
 
In spite of the growing Vietnamese refugee presence in Louisiana’s commercial fishing 
fleets, the modes and means of making life and livelihood remained vexed. It did not take 
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long before they were targeted for taking white Louisianians’ jobs. In this way, we see 
that while communal, scholastic, and governmental narratives of resettlement were 
outwardly crafted to ensure refugees’ ‘easy transition’ to the U.S., they materially 
maintained the ongoing exclusion of Vietnamese refugees and Vietnamese/Americans 
from full citizenship. There was no way to do refugee right, and every way to do 
“American” wrong, an internal and communal struggle that played out at varying 
registers of violence and sites of power consolidation in the burgeoning Vietnamese 
shrimping industry. At the same time, as I hope to make clear throughout the rest of this 
text, commercial shrimping, in addition to being economically and socially central to the 
community, is one of the primary sites of Vietnamese/American community-based 
knowledge production in the face of official narratives that make them other through a 
refugee racialization that persistently isolates and excludes them. 
 
THEY’RE TAKING OUR JOBS 
On a humid mid-July morning in 2014, I got a cab to cross the Mississippi River from my 
rental in New Orleans to Gretna for my very first interview of preliminary dissertation 
fieldwork. My driver Carl rolled the windows up to trap in the AC’s cool and asked me 
what I was doing across the river. I explained that I was heading to a small non-profit, 
Fisheries Support Services, founded after the BP oil catastrophe in 2010 to help 
commercial fisherfolk recover and retain their businesses. I was interested, I elaborated, 
in talking to Executive Director Sue Ha, who had spent her life helping Vietnamese, 
Khmer, Black, Cajun, and Chicanx commercial fisherfolk maintain their businesses in the 
increasingly politically and ecologically tenuous Gulf. Carl turned all the way around in 
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his seat to look at me in spite of our entanglement in I-10 commuter traffic and said: “I 
was an oysterman for almost thirty years; got out when my boat cost more than I could 
get for my oysters after the BP oil spill.” He went on “When the Vietnamese first came, 
you know, they made so much money cuz they brought their families on the boats and 
worked around the clock.” As he pulled up to FSS’s office in Vietnamese/American strip 
mall, Carl emphasizes: “I don’t have any problem with them, but I know a lot of guys 
thought the Vietnamese were putting them out of business” (Jones 2014).  
 
As Carl suggests, the institutional story of Vietnamese refugees entering commercial 
fishing was that they were superhuman unskilled laborers who, through their insistence 
on working around the clock and because they did not need sleep, took the jobs of 
everyday ‘American’ workers. This narrative does not take into account the ways 
refugees were linguistically precluded from doing other kinds of work, nor does it attend 
to the fact that in the decade during of resettlement, they had little fiscal or social support 
from New Orleans, Louisiana, or the federal government. For deckhands and newly 
minted captains to make enough money to support their families, they had no choice but 
to work longer and harder than white shrimpers who already owned and operated boats 
on Louisiana’s coast. As Chú Le explains: 
[Back then], all the Vietnamese fishermen, when we go to the ocean, we get 
a CB [radio, which facilitates communication between boats]—at that time 
we [were] talking on a CB—we get ten boats, we go out maybe five or six 
ways—different—and when we put the net down, we get shrimp right here? 
We’re going to call...all the boats come [to where we found the shrimp]. 
That’s why at that time, when we go out, we get income very easy. 
[Because] we worked together. So sometime we stayed home and [made a 
relationship with] the marine operator. They [would] call your house—my 
friend [would go out] one day, one day I [would go out]. That’s why we 
know [everything] happening on the ocean. That way we were out there, it 
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was easy [to] get shrimp. At that time, they had the American fishermen 
too. [Because] they worked in the daytime, the nighttime they [would] get 
tired and go to sleep. [We would work all day long, but] we not sleep—we 
keep goin’, keep goin’; that’s why when we come in, we had more shrimp 
[than] them (Le 2018).  
 
Here, rather than illustrating a superhuman ability to shrimp for days on end, Chú Le 
describes a well networked, collective, and thoughtful arrangement whereby Vietnamese 
boat owners ensured they were able to support their nuclear families and the broader 
community through their labor. While the ‘superhuman refugee’ script emerged early 
after first-wave resettlement in Southeast Louisiana, it continues to underscore the 
unattainability of cultural and corporeal citizenship for Vietnamese/Americans, and 
pivots on the perpetuity of their racialization as refugees. Inversely, the collective 
approach to establishing and concretizing shrimping as a primary site of 
Vietnamese/American employment, economic opportunity, and cultural capital became 
central to the stories community members told me throughout my research tenure.  
*** 
In Louisiana, the fear and animosity white fisherfolk felt toward Vietnamese refugees 
largely appeared in small confrontations and a general sense of distrust and dislike 
between white and Vietnamese boats. Laughing when I asked him about early racial 
tensions in the industry, Chú Le confirmed that in the early days, he and his compatriots 
took shrimp from the nets of white shrimpers when they weren’t expecting it: 
“Sometimes they [were] angry...they would [put down their] anchor and sleep, and we 
would go ‘shhhhhhh’ and we go close to them and we pick up their nets [full of] 
shrimp—‘oh, there’s some here!’ ‘oh, there’s more over here!’ They would wake up you 
know, they’d say ‘I don’t know what happened’” (Le 2018). While Le depicted this as a 
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delinquent, almost joking act, at the time, it was in many ways one of desperation: “We 
[were] just starting out...had to feed our families” (Le 2018). While this certainly gave 
white shrimpers a reason to feel animosity toward burgeoning Vietnamese boats, the 
story white shrimpers told elsewhere in the U.S. Gulf during this time was underwritten 
by a thinly veiled racism that hid behind a veneer of economic distress.  
 
In Galveston, TX, Vietnamese shrimpers organized to file a lawsuit against the Ku Klux 
Klan after white fishermen enlisted the Klan to intimidate Vietnamese/American 
shrimpers off their boats in the early ‘80s. As one section of the case explains: “Chief 
Kerber testified further that the tension between Vietnamese and American fishermen did 
not stem solely from fishing conflicts. According to Chief Kerber, some American 
fishermen believe there are just too many Vietnamese people [here] and therefore these 
individuals will only be satisfied when some of the Vietnamese leave the area” (District 
Judge McDonald 1981). That white shrimpers recruited the most visible white 
supremacist group in the nation to mediate this ‘problem’ shows that, rather than a 
concern of simple economics—our shrimping grounds are oversaturated and there isn’t 
enough shrimp for everyone—Texas’s white shrimpers’ disdain toward Vietnamese 
shrimpers stemmed directly from anti-refugee xenophobia and U.S. racism.  
 
The case details several acts of shrimper and KKK threats to Vietnamese boats, including 
the following:  
The admitted purpose for this introduction was for defendant Fisher [a 
Texas shrimper] to secure support of Louis Beam and the Klan in order to 
further the purposes of a group of American fishermen who were ostensibly 
concerned about "over fishing" in the...area of Texas. Defendant Fisher 
considered that the Klan was an organization that had the "courage" to stand 
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by their convictions and would provide needed publicity to draw the 
attention of various governmental agencies he felt had failed to address his 
concerns. This meeting resulted in a rally that was held on February 14, 
1981 on the property of defendant Joseph Collins that is located in Santa 
Fe, Texas. Defendant Joseph Collins leased this property for that purpose 
for a $1.00 payment from Mr. Stanfield. Defendant Fisher testified that he 
contacted defendant Beam to speak at the rally. Defendant Beam brought 
with him to the rally approximately 13 men who he refers to as his "security 
force" who were dressed in military garb and he gave a speech at that rally. 
He stated in substance that he would give the government 90 days to rectify 
the situation, (referring to the presence of the Vietnamese fishermen in the 
Kemah-Seabrook area) and if that was not accomplished the Klan would 
take action stating it "may become necessary to take laws into our own 
hands." He admitted stating in his speech that it was necessary to "fight fight 
fight" and see "blood blood blood" if this country was to survive. That rally 
was covered extensively by the news media. At that same rally, Beam 
demonstrated how to burn a boat. A cross propped with the aid of a pickup 
truck of defendant Joseph Collins was also burned at the rally. On that 
evening, defendant Beam offered to train American fishermen at one of the 
"military camps", later referred to as "locations" during his testimony in 
Court (District Judge McDonald 1981). 
 
The suit lists many more tactics, from KKK members standing at docks in full regalia to 
keeping Vietnamese boats from selling their shrimp and getting to land safely and “boat 
rides” in which hooded Klan members patrolled state waters fully armed on boats 
equipped with cannons. In spite of the Vietnamese Fishermen’s Association winning the 
suit, it is clear that even the lawyers who drafted the case understood Vietnamese 
shrimpers as inherently foreign; rather than identifying KKK members and the white 
fishermen who solicited their intimidation tactics “white,” the case uses the word 
“American.” This was at a time when many of the plaintiffs had been in the country for 
over five years and were either full citizens or lawful permanent residents (LPR)/green 
card-holders (Alperin and Batalova 2018). For me, this case highlights the ongoing 




While the Texas case represents the most visible and extreme example of this kind of 
intimidation and exclusion, it was rampant across the U.S. Gulf Coast. During the 1980s, 
many dock owners in Bayou La Batre, AL and Biloxi, MS refused to accept shrimp from 
Vietnamese boats, and intimidated other dock owners who did buy from them to 
eventually stop accepting Vietnamese shrimp. One shrimper from Biloxi told me the only 
reason there was still a Vietnamese presence in the industry was because a single white 
dock owner processed all of the shrimp brought in by Vietnamese-owned and operated 
boats (Tran 2016). That Vietnamese refugees developing businesses, supporting families, 
and fostering community by lending the seed money for on-land businesses was seen as a 
threat to the entire region’s commercial fishing industry highlights the imbrication of 
capital, citizenship, and refugeeism that has made fishing both an imperative industry for 
Southeast Louisiana’s Vietnamese/American commercial shrimpers, and also vexed, 
often volatile, industry to occupy.  
*** 
In spite of these institutional tactics of exclusion, Vietnamese/American representation in 
commercial fishing has only grown. Many of the folks I work with came to Southeast 
Louisiana in a tertiary migration from California, the East Coast, and the Midwest, where 
they were initially resettled in the 70s and 80s. This is, first, because other family had 
been resettled in Louisiana, and second and in a parallel migration, because through 
national and kinship networks, they heard that commercial fishing was a burgeoning 
Vietnamese industry in need of labor. As Chú Anh told me: “I moved down here from 
Oklahoma before I finished high school—I knew a captain down here and he said I could 
make good money” (Anh 2018). Additionally, through the 90s and aughts, immigrants 
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from Việt Nam joined the community and commercial fishing industry (Marks 2012; 
Tang 2011). While folks’ transit between Việt Nam and Louisiana slowed in these 
decades, it still has never entirely stopped, as Louisiana refugee networks wended their 
way back across the Pacific, facilitating close and distant family members to join their 
kin in Louisiana.  
 
At the same time, folks who landed in Louisiana via tertiary migration were often single 
men in search of jobs and a place to land. As the extant community was largely 
composed of dense family networks, many turned to Sue, who has been helping relatives 
and community members get citizenship and bring family here, to file the paperwork 
allowing kin and single women from Việt Nam to join them and build families in their 
new home. In this way, what was originally a small enclave of refugees in Versailles has 
deepened and extended its reach, both across Southeast Louisiana by making homes 
throughout the Birdfoot Delta, and in transnational transit between Việt Nam and the 
Gulf.  
*** 
Today, Vietnamese/American fisherfolk comprise almost 40 percent of the commercial 
shrimp fishery in Louisiana (Louisiana Sea Grant 2015:5). The folks I work with have 
overwhelmingly suggested that the early tensions I illustrated earlier are no longer 
present in Southeast Louisiana today. However, my observations during fieldwork 
showed that rather than being absent, racial tensions are effectively an unspoken matter 




During one shrimping trip I went on in 2017, facilitated by work with FSS, I spent the 
day with a white captain, Abe Johnson, and his white deckhand. As they were waiting for 
the tide to change so they could begin working, captains who knew each other would tie 
their boats together, allowing them to effectively build a floating village where they could 
pass time drinking beer and chatting. While I was in the boat’s cabin, I saw the shadow of 
a stern pass over us, then heard an engine stall. As I went back toward the back of our 
boat, I looked up and noticed that the boat who had just joined us was flying the US flag 
at the top of its mast and below it, the rebel flag of the Southern Confederacy. As my 
heart beat faster, the boat’s captain emerged holding beers for the two men I was with; 
the door that swung closed behind him bore decals of a glittering rebel flag, Robert E. 
Lee standing on a hill with one leg bent, claiming his territory, and several skulls and 
crossbones superimposed over other Confederate sigils. The new captain settled onto his 
freezer box, swinging his legs wide and hiking up his work pants to reveal two crossed 
Confederacy-era pistols on each shin; his unbuttoned shirt framed a waving rebel flag 
tattoo that proudly took up his entire abdomen.  
 
In my capacity as a researcher and because I was trapped in the middle of the ocean on a 
35-foot boat with nowhere else to go, I stayed for the conversation. Throughout, I was 
frozen in place like a rabbit who knows its only recourse is to become a statue and 
breathe more slowly; show neither signs of life nor distress. In the two hours we were 
tied up together, he shared lament after lament about the jobs Central American 
dockworkers and deckhands were taking from white shrimpers and how bad his yield had 
been this season, punctuating each sentence with racist and xenophobic language. At one 
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point, invoking both the local shrimping community and the increase of shrimp imports 
to the U.S. from South America and South and Southeast Asia, he said: “The Asians, 
they’re fucking us up too. Here and in Asia—they’re taking our jobs.” Once he untied 
and moved on to his shrimping spot, I asked Johnson if he shared his peer’s sentiments, 
to which he vigorously shook his head. Months later when I looked up the website for 
Johnson’s LLC, I found that the banner photo for his and his wife’s enterprise showed the 
same boat I had gone out on flying the rebel flag. I suspect now that because Sue, a 
Vietnamese/American fisherwoman whose work directly support his business, sent me to 
him, Johnson had opted to take the flag down during my visit.  
*** 
It is valuable to point out that I was on a white captain’s shrimping boat that day because 
most (though not all) Vietnamese/American captains felt it was too much of a liability to 
have me on board. This is for several reasons. First, most small boats that shrimp in state 
waters are not insured because, as Sue has told me, boat insurance costs roughly one-third 
of a shrimping family’s annual income. Not being covered by insurance makes our clients 
particularly vulnerable to storms and other decision-maker-produced disasters, because 
boat owners and deckhands cannot claim or recuperate losses that result from them. It 
also makes captains more concerned about having folks who are not well-versed in 
shrimping on their boats; if a visitor gets hurt, falls overboard, or otherwise experiences 
an accident while on their boat, captains are liable. This, second, concerns folks who are 
differentially vulnerable—because of race and ethnicity, class, immigration status, etc.—
to surveillance and legal processes. In federal waters, the Coast Guard is the primary law 
enforcement; the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF) plays the 
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same role in state waters. The Coast Guard and LDWF can board a boat for an inspection 
at any time and while having non-shrimpers on board is not technically illegal, it is not 
common practice and might raise red flags for inspectors, who can seize boat owners’ 
licenses, act as immigration enforcement and detain folks who are undocumented (a very 
small number of Vietnamese/Americans are undocumented, and most undocumented 
Central and South American folks working in commercial fishing stay on land at 
processing docks rather than risking being on a boat), hand out fines, and otherwise 
surveil everyone occupying a commercial vessel. Again, for folks more vulnerable to 
regulation like our clients—even if a boat is up to code and they adhere to the letter of 
every regulation, a lack of English could make these inspections much more difficult—
bringing a relative stranger who is unskilled in the industry on the boat is a liability many 
Vietnamese/American captains are reasonably unwilling to take on. 
 
CONCLUSION 
After this experience, it was abundantly clear to me that, rather than white shrimpers and 
other fisherfolk welcoming or even adapting to the idea of a large Vietnamese/American 
presence in their fleet, Vietnamese/Americans have conversely opted to look beyond the 
overt racism and xenophobia that pervades their industry as a matter of survival. And this 
brings me back to the gift of freedom; in the same conversations where 
Vietnamese/American fisherfolk told me they felt safe on the water, they also suggested 
that they felt lucky to be able to support their families as shrimpers. In the 1970s and 
‘80s, the gift of freedom disciplined Vietnamese refugees to the U.S. into being grateful 
for their lives in a nation that acquiesced to giving them asylum. In the 2000s, it is still a 
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part of the community’s collective consciousness in Southeast Louisiana: this place and 
its chosen people might continue to tell us we do not belong, but we can feed our families 
and make life here; we should be grateful.  
 
Three generations into Vietnamese/American presence in Louisiana, their otherness is 
still deeply attached to their initial entry into the country as refugee debtors to the state. 
Whereas full culturally legible citizens have the ability to malign, intimidate, and craft 
legal precedents that exclude Vietnamese/Americans, the folks with whom I work have 
no recourse but to keep their heads down, bear what comes their way, and be thankful 
when things are stable enough to survive in Southeast Louisiana. By continuing to live 
under the irreparable debt of the gift of freedom in an industry that, once codified and 
regulated, has fundamentally been anti-immigrant and anti-Asian, Vietnamese/Americans 
are held in the liminal state in which they entered the country: refugees of a nation in 
which the U.S. waged a war now living in a place that reminds them it is their ‘host;’ a 
place where they will always be read as ‘foreign’ others, asylum-seekers, perpetually 










CHAPTER TWO: KATRINA, BP, & REFUGEE RESILIENCE 
 
K10, RESILIENCE, & THE NEOLIBERALIZATION OF DISASTER 
I moved to New Orleans in the overwhelming heat and humidity of early July to ensure I 
was in the city for one important event: K10. Branded as such on banners, billboards, and 
press kits, the 10th anniversary of Hurricane Katrina’s landfall (August 23, 2005) 
promised to be a media circus rivaling that of the 1984 World’s Fair. For six weeks leading 
up to the anniversary the local paper, The Times-Picayune, ran regular Katrina stories, 
eliciting hundreds of comments. During the same period, WWOZ, the local public radio 
station, aired a weekly hour-long show, “The Debris,” (WWNO 2015) which focused on 
how the storm affected New Orleans communities. Residents used these forums to debate 
the merits of recuperating stories from a decade ago, divided between questioning each 
others’ taste and tact and yearning for spaces to shed lingering pain and heartbreak. 
  
In the week leading up to the anniversary, then-Mayor Mitch Landrieu’s administration 
rolled out press conference after convening to make plain to media, policymakers, and the 
“new,” post-Katrina New Orleans was economically and infrastructurally rebuilt and 
better than ever before. Landrieu used the K10 website, designed to aggregate and 
disseminate information about the week’s programming, to declare that “New Orleans has 
become this nation’s—and in many instances, this world’s—most immediate laboratory for 
innovation and change. Now, the opportunity is to position New Orleans as a global leader 
in resilience.” As a city that had not only survived, but in the mayor’s words, thrived since 
Katrina, New Orleans could, with the nation and international community taking notice, 
retain and replicate its self-designated status as a model of return, rebuilding, and most of 
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all, resilience. In this way, Landrieu’s administration presented New Orleans’ resilience 
as evidence for international and national visibility. By shifting the discourse from 
rebuilding to resilience, Landrieu set the tone for the whole week. Rather than focusing on 
what had gone wrong and what remained difficult for his people, the Mayor wanted K10 
to serve as an image makeover for New Orleans: globally competitive in the current fervor 
for innovative approaches to fortify urban and economic centers against risk under an 
increased awareness of ever-growing disaster and climate change threats. 
  
My first exposure to this discourse came on the Tuesday of K10 week, when, in partnership 
with The Atlantic Magazine and The Rockefeller Foundation, Mayor Landrieu’s 
administration hosted New Orleans: Ten Years Later, a day-long series of roundtables and 
presentations meant to showcase the city’s fortitude in light of disaster and devastation. 
As part of Rockefeller’s global 100 Resilient Cities Initiative, Ten Years Later preceded 
their announcement of a “comprehensive” Resilient New Orleans Strategy (now Resilient 
New Orleans). 
  
Upon arriving at the CBD Sheraton, I received a lanyard, pen, and program, all 
emblazoned with the logo specifically created for the week: “Katrina 10” was bolded in 
all caps, topped by a fleur-de-lis crown, flanked by the anniversary dates—2005 and 
2015—and anchored by three capitalized words: “Resilient New Orleans.” The text and 
materials were alternating navy blue and white, a watery memory standing in stark 





Figure 13. K10 logo, courtesy of SKDKnickerbocker, the Public Affairs Agency hired to “to manage the 
overwhelming international media interest in the anniversary, and execute a comprehensive media and 
communications program, which culminated in a week’s worth of commemorative events – including 69 
separate media panels and appearances by three United States Presidents” (SKDKnickerbocker 2015). 
 
Thinking I was attending an event honoring the past, the primacy of resilience language 
quickly reminded me that in fact, I was about to see first-hand how the city was designing 
itself into a global model of a resilient future. 
 *** 
New Orleans: Ten Years Later began with a town hall-style talk, “What Does it Mean to 
Know New Orleans?” featuring local writers, non-profit directors, city council members, 
and social justice workers who had all personally lived through the storm and whose 
community-engaged work had, in many cases, emerged in its wake. During this event, the 
panelists—including Lolis Eric Elie, one of the city’s most beloved social documentarians, 
Southwest National Student Poet Madeline LeCesne, Tracie Washington, Co-Director of 
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the Louisiana Justice Institute, and Minh Nguyen, Executive Director of VAYLA, a non-
profit designed to support young Vietnamese/Americans and other youth of color—laid 
bare the city’s insistence on using residents of colors’ resilience as a discursive and 
material tool of imagining a future “new” New Orleans. Addressing policing, education, 
and the low employment rates of the city’s Black men, those present critiqued how the city 
deployed its peoples as proof of its resilience, effectively using residents’ ability to survive 
immense hardship as evidence of its own structural resilience. 
  
This was one of many panels centering the experiences of New Orleanians of color in the 
decade since Katrina. However, its panelists—often critical of the current administration 
and its uneven, slow progress in addressing residents’ ongoing hardships both in the 
immediate aftermath of the storm and in light of its persistence in their daily lives—were 
interspersed with others that were overwhelmingly policy-centered, intent on driving home 
the positive attributes of the new New Orleans. For example, Judith Rodin, President of 
the Rockefeller Foundation, used New Orleans: Ten Years Later to paint a picture of New 
Orleans the template, learning experience, and laboratory for 100 Resilient Cities: 
  
New Orleans in some ways was the hotbed, the testbed, for all of these ideas. 
And it was a springboard for us for more than half a billion dollars we've 
invested in resilience building in cities of all sizes around the world in the 
last 10 years. It inspired us to create a network to help Asian cities better 
prepare for climate impacts and gave us the expertise to help New York to 
think its own resilience after Superstorm Sandy. And it was the model for 
100 Resilient Cities, an almost $200 million dollar commitment to help cities 
globally build social, economic, and physical resilience. And of course, New 




100 Resilient Cities was born of Katrina, with a broken New Orleans as its model. As the 
soft side of disaster rebuilding’s neoliberal coin, resilience programming presents itself as 
people-centric, community-based work rather than politically astute or economy-focused. 
However, its operation and the results it wishes to produce lean on the same structural 
value systems and implementation models as local and national governments. Its acute 
interest in generating capital by foreclosing risk belies its attachments to scorched-earth 
logics where, confoundingly, a city can only secure an adequate future if they begin 
developing resilience from a terra nullius corrective: a blank slate resilience (Klein 2008). 
As Rodin defines it, resilience is wholly imbricated with an emerging local and global 
concern with the effects of what I call decision-maker-produced climate change, where the 
risk of disaster looms around every corner and decision-maker-designed and -mandated 
environmentalism is the only way ‘out’ of our current predicament.  
 
Katrina’s destruction and sustained impacts on historically Black neighborhoods, in 
Versailles, and for Chicanx and Latinx communities have allowed New Orleans to stave 
off risk through its residents’ resilience. This state- and foundation-centered logic 
circulates in a vacuum, effectively denying the fact that for generations, coastal and urban 
communities had been forced to independently create their own means of survival in 
response to the structural and environmental vulnerabilities long foisted on them as the 
byproduct of doing business as usual in Southeast Louisiana.  
*** 
Rather than considering how governmental and other infrastructures might self-reflexively 
produce less change and disturbance in the realms of anthropogenic climate change, intra-
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national conflict, and other governance-mandated harms, through resilience, cities, states, 
nations, and foundations seek to understand just how much pressure systems (in this case, 
communities) can bear before they break. This cognitive dissonance—between 
institutionalized resilience and community survival—became most clear when I listened to 
community leaders who were still navigating the political and cultural vacuum created by 
Katrina. At the town hall, each panelist’s pointed and nuanced critiques of the city’s 
approach to post-Katrina resilience shed light on the way resilience has been 
institutionalized in Southeast Louisiana. While Rodin and Landrieu had alluded to the 
value of coalitional work, both held it firmly in the realm of governance and spending. In 
response to this, Minh Nguyen used his time to argue for New Orleanians’ strength and 
abilities in spite of rather than because of resilience, asking how those so often made 
invisible in and by the city might create new infrastructures, new values, new possibilities 
not with, but outside of decision-maker-crafted logics. Speaking to the by-products of what 
he and his peers saw as New Orleans’ misunderstanding of resilience, Nguyen said: 
  
I am so sick of people telling our narrative and our stories. Even this whole 
entire week of Katrina 10, I’m kind of sad that the people who have been 
affected and impacted the most aren’t being at these events—haven’t even 
been invited to these events—and they're the ones who we’re celebrating or 
we’re commemorating, and there are so many people who have made so 
much money off of them as well in our city, and they continue to be voiceless. 
We have to continue to fight, we have to organize, we have to take over our 
own media, we have to change our narrative. And that’s the reason why 
we’re being pushed down; we’ve been pushed away because right now, 
people are telling our stories. And that’s so sad, that we have to deal with 
[that]. And I think for us it’s just yes, we gotta fight, we gotta organize, we 
gotta stick together, we gotta work together, to make sure that our voices 




Nguyen’s critique of the way stories continue to circulate about Vietnamese/American and 
other racialized residents of New Orleans followed directly from The Rockefeller 
Foundation’s and Landrieu’s self-proclaimed resilience goals. He argued that rather than 
telling people they are resilient, rather than rebuilding at their expense—rather than 
profiting from their resilience—the city should listen. The fact that he was still asking them 
to shift both their understanding of and their approach to supporting residents a decade 
later points to their unrelenting disinterest in doing so. Rather, it seemed, the city’s 
declaration of resident resilience allowed decision-makers to claim a fully rebuilt post-
Katrina state for the new New Orleans wherein residents had so effectively managed the 
effects of their lives under ongoing disaster that New Orleans could actively decide not to 
be concerned about their wellbeing. It is important to note that Nguyen’s appeal was made 
in earshot of city and state officials, who I watched shift in their seats a bit—it seems that 
they had not expected folks to be critical of the official resilience narrative, which they 
ironically continued to use to rhetorically underscore their commitment to New Orleans 
and its people throughout the day.  
*** 
Leading up to K10, posters featuring a quote attributed to Tracie Washington had 
appeared on telephone poles and bulletin boards. They read: “Stop calling me resilient. 
Because every time you say, ‘Oh, they’re resilient,’ that means you can do something else 
to me. I am not resilient.” Already the voice of a Black-led response to resilience-based 




As resilience—or the risk mitigation that seems to be imperative to building a new New 
Orleans—became a formal tool of secondary and tertiary post-Katrina displacement—
where communities displaced throughout the region and nation returned to their city to 
find their homes repossessed and neighborhoods rezoned and renamed—New Orleanians 
felt the profit-making gaze of gentrification rapidly steal and subsume their most important 
places. That day, Washington sat next to Nguyen and the other panelists, a five-foot-tall 
banner with the words “Resilient New Orleans” behind her, and deftly answered question 
after question, speaking for her self-identified communities and pushing back against the 
metrics and mobilization of resilience over the last decade. After generative exchanges 
with her fellow panelists, Washington closed her remarks: 
  
So how do we get noticed? Well, we get loud. I evacuated as a single mom 
with a 12-year-old and a jacked up car, and an American Express and a 
law degree. So that was an awful combination for the evil ones who didn’t 
want Black folk back, cuz that law degree meant that I could get in any court 
and fight for anybody. And American Express said you can pay us when you 
can pay us. That was great. (to LeCesne:) you will vote because you will get 
angry. You will buy a house because you will want a homestead. And you’re 
gonna say doggonit, I’m not gonna live being forced to be resilient. I don’t 
want to hear that word again. I’m sick and tired of people saying “y’all are 
so resilient;” resilient means you can do something to me. No! I’m not 
resilient. I have a right not to be resilient. How do we do this? We keep 
fighting. You know, I’m here, I told [a friend], I’ll be the one turning off the 
light. This city isn’t going anywhere without me. And I say to everybody else 
who has that same spirit, I say to you [audience member]: we keep fighting. 
We keep fighting. And we demand that our voice be heard. We just demand 
it. I got a law degree—25925, you can’t take it away from me, that’s my bar 
number. I’ll sue to be heard. And I mean that (Washington 2015). 
  
That both Washington and Nguyen’s arguments were grounded in storytelling—if you 
would just listen to us—is critical. The city’s primary relationship to communities of color 
is one of surveillance (much of Landrieu’s talk centered around policing better rather than 
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putting an end to policing writ large), where their behavior is constantly monitored by law 
enforcement (specifically the New Orleans Police Department and ICE) who presuppose 
their criminality rather than, as most city officials would argue, to keep them safe. New 
Orleans’ reliance on law-and-order tactics of corporal and cultural management force 
particularly Black and Latinx community members to negotiate their relationship to space, 
place, self, group, etc., from a foundation of lack, where their experiences are immaterial 
in the face of narratives told about and for them. This is clear in Washington’s analysis—
that there were and are “evil ones who didn’t want Black folk back [in New Orleans post-
Katrina]” (Washington 2015). Here, she pointed out that in rebuilding, politicians, 
policymakers, and urban planners actively created barriers to Black residents’ return. 
Telling reporters that they wished to “clean up” the city to make it more navigable, 
liveable, and above all else, safe, city officials made it clear that New Orleans, an 
historically Black city, could do without certain “unsafe” elements in its risk-secured terra 
nullius. Upon returning (or, as often, as they were kept from doing so), Black New 
Orleanians were told they were resilient as planners rezoned their neighborhoods, seized, 
tore down, and rebuilt their homes for new residents for a considerable profit, and fed 
money into beautification and place-making projects rather than basic infrastructure like 
waste and water management, transit, or accessible grocery stores and pharmacies. 
  
When Nguyen invoked who was missing from K10’s self-referentially commemorative 
programming—“the people who have been affected and impacted the most”—he too 
indexed something of what was and continues to be missing from the post-Katrina 
landscape: a basic acknowledgment that the city has not in fact been rebuilt, revitalized, 
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and reimagined the same way for or in service to every resident. In Versailles, this looks 
like poor infrastructure and regular boil water advisories, local nonprofits being forced to 
provide the community’s basic necessities like a multilingual, low-cost health clinic, and 
an overwhelming concentration of industrial by-product in the air and water. It also looks 
like one public health study after another, used by the city and the state as the basis of 
policy, declaring Vietnamese/Americans’ resilience, which the rest of this chapter will 
explore. This elision made clear what the promotional materials did not: for New Orleans 
to move forward and away from risk, those communities read as risk had to exhibit 
resilience to circumstances that targeted and harmed them.  
  
Here, I do not mean to flatten the relationship between these abundantly heterogeneous 
communities and the city, nor between and across communities. Rather, in reading 
Washington alongside Nguyen, it becomes clear that while Vietnamese, Latinx, and Black 
residents of New Orleans have very different, nuanced relationships with these discreet 
and malleable categories of racialization and harm the city’s primary frame in addressing 
communities of colors’ hardships post-Katrina was through a resilience that sought to 
mitigate risk for the city. Washington’s inevitable conclusion—that to be resilient is to be 
used toward the needs of governance—is the direct result of the new New Orleans’ self-
actualized project. Framed from the standpoint of decision-makers, it functions as follows: 
if we can’t rebuild without Black residents in particular and residents of color writ large, 
we will continue as planned and tell them their sacrifices are evidence of their resilience. 
If they push back, we will reiterate that the city—the place they fought to return to in spite 
of us; the place they will fight to stay and cultivate—can only survive in the future if they 
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remain resilient. Between Rodin’s framing of resilience and the panelists’ it became 
abundantly clear to me that the new New Orleans—and by extension, the new Southeast 
Louisiana—while designed to be more resilient to storm surge, regional disaster, and 
economic fluctuation in the future, sees residents of color as a risk to be mitigated. As a 
risk that demands a very particular kind of resilience of its residents. As Washington says: 
Every time they [tell me I’m resilient], that means [they] can do something else to me. 
  
What was critical about the town hall was its direct response to past administrations’ use 
of the material, social, economic, cultural, and political landscapes of New Orleans to 
make claims about its present and future. Rather than forcing New Orleanians to be 
constantly reactive to and prepared for the worst, Washington and Nguyen implored, New 
Orleans should focus on making residents’ lives liveable. This would be much easier, many 
of the panelists claimed, if decision-makers simply listened to the people they served rather 
than imposing resilience-centered values on how the space, economy, and cultural values 
of neighborhoods, communities, and the new New Orleans should look. By nuancing and 
unpacking New Orleans’ national, state, and urban scales of resilience, it becomes clear 
that what Rodin and Landrieu call resilience is actually a way for decision-makers to make 
racialized and underserved communities sacrificial to the project of risk mitigation without 
recourse. For Nguyen and Washington, to be forced into this resilience schema is to be 






THE SLOW VIOLENCE OF RESILIENCE 
That resilience hat it is now firmly a part of the narrative of not just Southeast Louisiana, 
but a Rockefeller-imagined global network of ‘vulnerable’ cities, speaks to the 
institutionalization of resilience as a precedent in the coming catastrophe Haraway and 
others have gestured to as the logical conclusion of the Anthropocene. 
 
As refuge no longer exists under the Anthropocene—and for the folks with whom I work, 
specifically at the intersection of governance and decision-making in Southeast 
Louisiana—“Casualties of slow violence [or attritional violence that is typically not 
viewed as violence by all] become light-weight, disposable casualties, with dire 
consequences for...projected casualties (Nixon 2011:13).” This is particularly the case as 
state and federal officials increasingly think of New Orleans and Southeast Louisiana as, 
hearkening back to Rodin, a “laboratory of innovation” designed to foreclose future risk 
(Bahng 2018) and make the future a vision of statecraft and institutional 
environmentalism. This risk mitigation is only possible if “disposable people” (Nixon 
2011:4) exhibit and maintain resilience. In South Louisiana, resilience has been a critical 
part of the post-Katrina landscape. Importantly, in my work, it materially and 
discursively permeates outward and between two central axes: post-storm urban New 
Orleans (Adams 2013), and vulnerable segments of the coast, particularly the Birdfoot 
Delta at the state’s southeastern-most edge, replicating and remaking itself as it moves 
through and settles into place.  
 
As Vietnamese/Americans are sacrificed to imbricated political, socio-economic, and 
environmental violences in the present, their and their community’s future inevitably 
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becomes more and more tenuous. This chapter attends to three related and complex 
problems facing Vietnamese/American fisherfolk in Southeast Louisiana. First, I detail 
the omnipresence of refugeeism as the ongoing center of Vietnamese/Americans’ 
racialization under disaster and disruption. This, second, allows me to trace the ways this 
produces governmental and other official expectations of Vietnamese/American 
resilience in increasingly unnavigable environmental and social conditions that attach the 
community’s survival to extractable and volatile ecosystems. Finally, I bring these 
problematic official frameworks together to unpack how institutional risk mitigation 
requires the extractability of Louisiana’s coastal ecosystems, which bifurcates people 
from the places they rely on, in turn rendering them rhetorically (and in the new future, 
corporally) evacuable.  
 
HURRICANE KATRINA: RACE & RESILIENCE 
Hurricane Katrina, which made landfall in New Orleans on August 23, 2005, is now 
firmly a part of the West’s political imaginary, providing an example of drastic 
governmental failure (Grewal 2017). Those who are old enough to remember the storm 
saw photos of a New Orleans 85% underwater after the levees and eastern flood wall 
failed to break storm surge: images of families stranded on the roofs of their homes with 
“SOS” scrawled across sheets; of a Superdome with half the roof missing, and Charity 
Hospital with every window blown out. We now know how much racial and economic 
inequality and violence was present in the city’s fabric—watched as media at once took 
New Orleans to task for and amplified the same violences, painting Black residents as 
criminals and white residents as victims of the flooding (Klein 2008). Writing about the 
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media’s focus on figures of humanitarianism post-Katrina, Inderpal Grewal argues that 
“Celebrities and welfare providers emerged as responsible individuals, as exemplary 
exceptional citizens, while New Orleans residents were represented as insufficiently 
neoliberal and thus unable to help themselves” (Grewal 2017:52, emphasis mine). This is 
significant because as Grewal identifies, there is a third neoliberal subject that emerged 
following the storm: the failed neoliberal. The failied neoliberal is in many ways akin to 
the refugee, who operates as a different kind of failed citizen in the U.S.; forever 
racialized, always excluded, and incapable of fully becoming legible to the nation, the 
refugee and the failed citizen sit firmly in the interminable liminality of U.S. 
neoliberalism. This was particularly clear in the way Black New Orleanians were written 
about and discussed as a community post-Katrina, which I unpack below. 
 
REFUGEE: CITIZEN 
I am not a “refugee.” I wasn’t shipped here…We are not refugees. You hold your head 
up. We are United States citizens, and you be proud of that. A lot of us are taxpaying, 
honest, hardworking people. I’m like, when did I come from another country? That’s 
what they used to call people that was in the boats, and that was sneaking over here. I am 
a survivor. They need to say, “the survivors of Katrina.”  
- Sharon White, New Orleanian in Baton Rouge shelter, quoted on  
National Public Radio’s All Things Considered, September 7, 2005 (Troutt 2006) 
 
The diaspora that resulted from Hurricane Katrina displaced over a million people in the 
Gulf Coast region (Plyer 2016). New Orleans residents in diaspora were forced to 
temporarily support themselves in other cities, living with friends and family or in 
makeshift housing. While Vietnamese/Americans were the primary refugee group 
displaced following Katrina, they were not alone in being called “refugee” by the press 
following the storm; headlines calling all displaced New Orleanians of color “Katrina 
refugees” became the norm in U.S. publications, from the New York Times to The 
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Economist. Many Black residents of Southeast Louisiana objected to this language, 
saying that it divested them of citizenship. As NPR explained following Katrina, 
Reverend Al Sharpton had a particularly adverse reaction to the media’s use of “refugee”: 
“The word refugee has certain connotations. Sharpton's point was that it strips a person of 
dignity. ‘They are not refugees wandering somewhere looking for charity,’ he said. ‘They 
are victims of neglect and a situation they should have never been put in in the first 
place’” (Pesca 2005). Reverend Jesse Jackson echoed this sentiment, explaining that it 
was “‘racist to call American citizens refugees’…[as it implies] that the displaced storm 
victims, many of whom have been black, are second-class citizens—are not even 
Americans” (Associated Press 2005). In After the Storm: Black Intellectuals Explore the 
Meaning of Hurricane Katrina, an edited volume of Black scholars reflecting on the way 
Black New Orleanians were dispossessed post-Katrina, Clement Alexander Price takes 
up both leaders’ arguments, explaining that “the media actually contributed to the 
radicalized way in which Americans view black people, especially those in trouble and in 
need of aid. Early on in the crisis, poor blacks were curiously referred to as ‘refugees’ in 
the media, as if they were from another country” (Price 2007:71). Together, these 
responses to the media’s use of “Katrina refugee” reified the incommensurability of 
citizen and refugee, amplifying how each were understood by decision-makers and 
residents alike in terms of their access to resources and full personhood in a U.S. 
framework.  
 
Yến Lê Espiritu has reflected on this bifurcation in the space of New Orleans, saying: 
“As the Katrina controversy reveals...the term ‘refugee’ triggers associations with highly 
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charged images of Third World poverty, foreignness, and statelessness. These 
associations reflect the transnationally circulated representations of refugees as 
incapacitated objects of rescue, fleeing impoverished, war-torn, or corrupt states—an 
unwanted problem for asylum and resettlement countries” (Espiritu 2014:4). This 
highlights that while Black New Orleanians’ push-back against “Katrina refugee” might 
have emerged from anti-refugee sentiments, the much more plausible explanation is that 
it was a knee-jerk reaction to the violence of an already underserved and harmed 
community being positioned in a way that stripped them of even more rights, protections, 
and resources in a rapidly neoliberalizing post-Katrina New Orleans.  
 
Pointing to the effects of calling Black residents of New Orleans refugees, Lisa Cacho 
explains, “‘refugee’ was deployed to foreclose empathy for the impoverished African 
American victims of Hurricane Katrina, and it did so through likening them to differently 
devalued people of color, whom the debate over the use of ‘refugee’ erased as victims 
too” (Cacho 2012:16). If we return to Grewal and consider the ways Black New 
Orleanians were already positioned as failed neoliberal citizens, we see that by rejecting 
‘refugee,’ while meant to bring them closer to citizenship, Black New Orleanians became 
trapped in a double bind of exclusion and abjection. If, as Espiritu suggests above, 
refugees are unwanted dependents, and, as Grewal suggests, failed neoliberal citizens 
become wards of the state by refusing to do neoliberal citizenship correctly, rejecting 
refugeeism did not bring Black New Orleanians closer to citizenship; rather, as we will 
see, it reaffirmed and deepened their extant exclusion from the body politic of New 
Orleans, Southeast Louisiana, and the U.S. writ large.  
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MODEL MINORITY, RESILIENT REFUGEE 
What the popular media overwhelmingly left out of their Katrina coverage was that in 
addition to the New Orleans metro area, the hurricane and levee failures’ flooding and 
high winds also reached Versailles. This elision is in part because, while the East is a part 
of Orleans Parish, it has been rhetorically and geographically positioned as separate from 
the city. As such, it was not a region that made news immediately following the storm. 
The way Vietnamese/Americans were incorporated into and excluded from the post-
Katrina landscape was not linear but followed a convoluted calculus of refugee debt and 
neoliberal bootstraps survival that in many ways paralleled the places they lived.  
 
All rebuilding residents had to live out of state or in neighboring cities for months 
following their return. Commuting every day or several times a week, community 
members would convene in Versailles to trade carpentry, roofing, plumbing, and other 
skills to bring back not just their own homes, but their neighbors’. In an early 
conversation with Sue, I learned that her experience of post-Katrina rebuilding in 
Versailles followed the gift/debt blueprint. She and her family fled the storm, staying 
with relatives in the Florida panhandle as they rebuilt. She explained that for months, she 
and her husband would start their five-hour drive before dawn, work on their house in 
New Orleans or boat in Buras all day, then head back to Florida. Expressing that she was 
not surprised by but felt lucky for the way her community worked together during this 
time, Sue told me: “We knew no one was going to help us. We had to help ourselves. So 
when a roofer finished his house, he moved on to the house next door; when a plumber 
fixed the pipes, his neighbor [returned the favor and] did some carpentry work” (Ha 
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2015). What she describes was echoed in every formal interview and casual conversation 
I had with community members throughout my fieldwork: we helped each other because 
we wanted our neighborhood, our businesses, and our neighbors back. This, importantly, 
was made possible by two things:  the strong economic support networks Vietnamese 
fisherfolk established in the early days of resettlement and maintained in the following 
decades, and the imperative of early survival that made Vietnamese/American 
community-building the work of the community alone.  
 
MODELS OF RESILIENCE  
All of these modes of excluding Vietnamese/Americans post-Katrina laid the foundation 
for critical shifts to how they were subsequently held up as models of disaster survival. 
Because the Vietnamese/American community had been forced to create strong economic 
and social survival support systems in-community during resettlement and in the three 
decades leading up to Katrina, they were now better equipped to rebuild following 
disaster. In short, their prior subjection and racialization—first as resettled refugees, and 
later, as refugees living in Southeast Louisiana—had, in the eyes of decision-makers, 
vested them with the ability to pick up and keep moving under this, just the latest harm.  
 
As the city increasingly relied on neoliberal, bootstraps resilience to parse who was and 
was not a part of the new New Orleans, decision-makers reasoned that following the 
storm, Vietnamese/Americans exhibited model refugeeism, which is highlighted in the 
communal rebuilding Sue described above. This was underwritten by public health 
scholars and disaster analysts, who, in addition to making resilience a foundational 
Vietnamese/American trait as VanLandingham did in the introduction (Vanlandingham 
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2015), lauded their ‘exemplifying the city at its best’ (Airriess et al. 2008; Fussell, Sastry, 
and VanLandingham 2010; Leong et al. 2007; Vu and VanLandingham 2012). To briefly 
return to Black New Orleanians’ rejection of refugeeism: while Black New Orleanians 
determined that distancing themselves from refugeeism after the storm would allow them 
a modicum of legibility in what was absolutely a racist disaster, in fact, as 
Vietnamese/Americans became ‘exemplary’ survivors of Katrina, the way refugeeism 
attached to each community was drastically different. Where it doubly foreclosed Black 
residents’ access to the space of New Orleans, Vietnamese/Americans who, by percent of 
population and area, returned the most quickly and completely, were celebrated by local 
business owners, media, and within their own communities for ‘doing refugee well’ while 
other New Orleanians—particularly Black, Chicanx, and Latinx residents—“failed” to 
rebuild and reclaim their belongings and homes (Li et al. 2010; Shelton and Coleman 
2009). In this way, Vietnamese/American refugeeism, while still held in firm opposition 
to citizenship, was exemplary, where Black and other New Orleanians of color were 
failed refugees, failed citizens—failed neoliberal subjects.  
*** 
Reading these effects of post-Katrina Vietnamese/American racialization together, it 
becomes clear that in valorizing Vietnamese/Americans’ ‘can-do’ attitude and bootstraps 
rebuilding ethic post-Katrina, the press, along with city and state officials, made model 
refugees into models of resilience. I call this extension of federal, state, parish, and 
neighborhood-level insistence on refugee-predicated disaster return and rebuilding 
resilient refugeeism. Resilient refugees are, first, exemplary survivors of disaster. In 
addition to their particular aptitude for assimilating U.S. culture and values into their 
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families and communities (traits of a good refugee as outlined in chapter one), resilient 
refugees are adept at incorporating disaster policy and coastal regulatory practices into 
their daily lives. While this reinforced hierarchies of racialization where 
Vietnamese/Americans were better survivors of the storm, as perpetual refugees, they 
were still not “American.” As neoliberalism at once conscripts people into exceptional 
citizenship and resilience, it becomes clear that the division between those who are 
citizens and those who are resilient are diametrically opposed in the calculus of post-
Katrina New Orleans. In this way, refugee resilience became yet another model of 
survival under decision-maker-produced violence and in fact, was just an extension of the 
slow violence of refugeeism: as refugees you had to keep your nose down, do better than 
white folks to survive, and above all else, had to be grateful for the gift of freedom that 
has allowed you to live in Louisiana. As debt-bearing resilient refugees, you survived this 
disaster well; are now better prepared to survive the next disaster, then the one after that. 
While we did not protect or support you in the last three decades, resilient refugeeism is 
the same contract under a different name: don’t expect us to show up after the next flood, 
either, because we know you know how to make do without us. Refugees’ debt, it was 
clear, was still not repaid.  
 
NEOLIBERAL RESILIENCE 
“...bodies need to get in the way to open up a world to others...Smoothing things over often 
means: eliminating the signs of injury to create a fantasy of a whole. Smoothing things 
over often means: eliminating those who are reminders of an injury.”  
-Sara Ahmed, Living a Feminist Life ( 2017:184) 
 
As Naomi Klein and other scholars of post-Katrina New Orleans and the rise of disaster 
capitalism show, resilience is a critical next step following sustainable development in 
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neoliberal disaster rhetoric (Grewal 2017; Klein 2008; Tierney 2015). In the hands of 
New Orleans, Louisiana, and U.S. decision-makers post-Katrina, resilience underscores 
and replicates how systems maintain and reproduce themselves in light of shifting 
material, political, economic, and social conditions. It does this by quantifying how 
communities rebound from pain, dislocation, and other effects of human-produced 
disaster and change. As Danny MacKinnon and Kate Derickson posit, “[the external 
definition of resilience by state agencies and expert analysts] presents something of a 
paradox of change: emphasizing the prevalence of turbulence and crisis, yet accepting 
them passively and placing the onus on communities to get on with the business of 
adapting” (MacKinnon and Derickson 2013:259). By naturalizing both crisis and 
adaptation, decision-makers weaponize resilience against communities the state has long 
made vulnerable, trapping them in an unending loop of vulnerability-devastation-
rebuilding.  
 
For Vietnamese/Americans, this double bind of ongoing crisis and adaptation showed up 
immediately following Katrina in three transparent acts of displacement and violence that 
produced a blueprint of what they are expected to endure in the present and future as 
resilient refugees. First, immediately following Katrina, non-Vietnamese neighbors and 
policymakers reflected on Vietnamese/Americans’ collective approach to rebuilding in 
several ways. As one New Orleans-based writer reasoned, given that Katrina hit South 
Louisiana rather than a region of Việt Nam, it was “easier for the Vietnamese to rebuild 
because they have no nostalgia holding them back from the future, no template for living 
in New Orleans that was drawn by their ancestors [there]…this enables them to think 
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more freely, and with innovation, about how to begin again” (Roahen 2008:176). This 
belief that Vietnamese/American residents of Southeast Louisiana were ‘less’ impacted 
by the storm because they hadn’t set down ‘roots’ was common among non-Vietnamese 
residents and government officials. That a lack of ancestry in the area means a 
community is better at ‘beginning again’ reaffirms the fact that their resilience is 
predicated on their refugee foreignness. For Roahen and many others, 
Vietnamese/American residents of Southeast Louisiana had and will always be foreigners 
on Louisiana soil. It also reinforced Vietnamese/Americans’ racialization as refugees, 
maintaining the now calcified distance between refugeeism and citizenship in the 
emerging post-Katrina neoliberal landscape.  
 
 





The second on-the-ground, resilience-predicated violence that followed the storm was a 
short-lived but discursively powerful approach to rebuilding: the Green Dot Map ( shown 
in Figure 14 above). In spite of the description on the map, green space was not zoned for 
public parks, nor was it meant to be space for a wildlife refuge. Instead, the areas 
designated above were to be set aside to build industrial parks, factories, and office 
buildings. This showed just how useful the storm was in service to advancing city and 
state-level economic goals (Adams 2013; Klein 2008; Solnit 2010), which invariably 
superseded the needs of the people who stood in the way of those goals. The focus on the 
economic over people was by no means new in Louisiana’s extractive postcolonial 
approach to management, which I explore in more depth in chapter three. However, it 
underwrote, as Vy, a lawyer who grew up in Versailles argued, that post-storm, the city 
effectively used the community’s resilience as a way of evacuating them from the 
landscape of Versailles (Nguyen 2016). While the green space initiative was never 
carried out, in large part due to residents fighting for their homes, Vy told me that at a 
press conference, one city planner suggested that Versailles had been free of residents 
prior to Katrina, saying “we didn’t know anyone was there” (Nguyen 2016).  
 
Crucially, as Julian Reid shows, the emphasis on the continual need for resilience in the 
face of inevitable crisis has the effect of constituting a “resilient subject that must 
permanently struggle to accommodate itself to the world . . . a subject that accepts the 
disastrousness of the world it lives in as a condition of partaking in that world” (Reid 
2013:355). As such, Reid argues, resilient subjects are not political subjects, but rather 
subjects whose thoughts and actions center on adjusting to external conditions, who have 
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“accepted the imperative not to resist or secure themselves from the dangers they face but 
instead adapt to their enabling conditions” (Reid 2013:355). However, 
Vietnamese/American residents of Versailles did resist the third act of institutional, 
resilience-predicated violence they were subjected to immediately following Katrina.  
 
In the months that followed the storm, then-New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin mandated 
that a landfill of toxic Katrina waste, called the Chef Menteur Landfill, be opened just 
two miles from Versailles. Unlike the green dot initiative, the landfill was built; however, 
the community stopped the city from renewing its lease a year later with the help of 
several service organizations and NGOs (Chiang 2014). This act of resistance to refugee 
resilience shows, on the one hand, the community’s attachment to the space and place of 
Southeast Louisiana and their willingness to fight for it (see chapter four), and on the 
other, suggests that they had realized something fundamental about how they were meant 
to live in Louisiana: knowing how displacement works following disaster, 
Vietnamese/American community leaders recognized that disaster in its broadest sense 
will never end. This is devastatingly and poignantly illustrated in the fact that while the 
landfill was closed, the toxic waste remains just two miles out of Versailles and continues 
to seep in the neighborhood’s groundwater, impacts its soil health, and very likely, is 
affecting the health of all residents in proximity of the site.  
*** 
It is important to recognize that resilience is not a verb; it is an adjective and a noun—an 
attribute, an object. As Chú Anh told me: “what can you do with it? It’s not something 
you can eat. It’s not something that can take care of you. It’s not something you can do” 
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(Anh 2018).  Both in the realms of grammar and in Vietnamese/American fisherfolks’ 
lived experience, resilience cannot be a practice because there is nothing to practice. The 
tacit assumption in Louisiana’s resilience is that for the folks I work with to be resilient, 
they must do something: survive. To survive, as many movement leaders tell us, is a 
basic act in the most fundamental sense of ‘basic’: to continue to exist. Lauren Berlant’s 
conception of slow death is useful to think with here. For Berlant, slow death:  
prospers not in traumatic events, as discrete time-framed phenomena like 
military encounters and genocides can appear to do, but in temporal 
environments whose qualities and whose contours in time and space are 
often identified with the presentness of ordinariness itself, that domain of 
living on, in which everyday activity; memory, needs, and desires; diverse 
temporalities and horizons of the taken-for-granted are brought into 
proximity (Berlant 2007:759).   
 
To live on, then, is not to live well or, as Sue hopes FSS’s work with commercial 
fisherfolk will eventually facilitate, to thrive. It is to occupy space that, from the official 
perspective of the spectacular, is ordinary. For Vietnamese/American fisherfolk 
occupying the slow violence of refugeeism, resilience, and disaster as ongoing and 
devastating prospects that are meant to appear ordinary, or ‘normal’ from the perspective 
of the state, living on—surviving—is all they are allowed.  
 
SUCCESSFUL RESILIENCE: RESILIENCE AS COMPLICITY 
When asked how it feels to be called resilient, Sue responded: “We are resilient! When I 
started crying about our house flooding [after Katrina and Rita], my mom said, ‘Stop it! 
Katrina is just a little pinky finger compared to leaving.’ She’s right—we lived on a boat, 
we got through camps. Almost died. Katrina was nothing compared to that” (Ha 2014). 
Here, Sue uses her own body to map pain attached to refugeeism and diaspora, which I 
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have shown are pathologized as the primary attributes of Vietnamese/Americanness by 
academics, psychologists, and social workers (Vanlandingham 2015). In so doing, she 
invests her whole self into the experience of refugeeism both as a past event and an 
ongoing prospect, where the present is not only measured, but inhabited alongside, co-
constitutively with, and against prior displacements and flight. If Katrina is a pinky’s 
worth of hardship, refugeeism is the size and shape of a whole community—for 
generations, on land and at sea, in political persecution, and under legal citizenship.  
 
Significantly, Sue’s understanding of resilience emerges directly from the same place my 
own does: our work with decision-makers, NGOs, and philanthropic organizations. She 
and I have spent the last three years slipping behind the curtain, observing the statecraft 
of coastal and regional resilience, and in Sue’s case, has folded the structural language of 
resilience into her own calculus of being Vietnamese/American, being a shrimper, and 
being the executive director of a fisherfolk-centric service organization in Southeast 
Louisiana. Where my education on New Orleanian, Louisianian, and 
Vietnamese/American resilience began in 2015 with K10 and has extended into spaces of 
decision-making like State of the Coast 2016 and 2018, CPRA and coalition meetings, 
and the day-to-day operations of FSS, Sue has lived under the rubric of resilience since it 
became a metric for regulating her family, community, and industry. While my analysis 
emerges from a great deal of participant observation and community engagement, the 
way Sue internalizes and mobilizes resilience emerges from her drastically different role 




Critically, communities who are politically, socially, infrastructurally, culturally, and 
physically marginalized by the U.S. have little recourse but to either use or vocally 
oppose language produced by institutions to limit and harm them. Reviewing Robin 
James’ Resilience and Melancholy Elliott Powell highlights James’ understanding that 
resilience is a technique of Foucauldian biopower, regulating life and death to manage 
populations. As a disciplining, managing device, resilience “reward[s] those who are 
complicit and further marginalizes those who are not” (Powell 2017:180). As refugees 
were forced to learn how to manage mainstream U.S. racism, class logics, and 
relationship to immigration, migration, and asylum, and as these modes of engaging 
refugeeism have not changed drastically under racialization, Vietnamese/Americans are 
disciplined into their own resilience without having a language for it or even knowing 
that decision-makers have vested this attribute to them (see later section ‘“Resilience” in 
Vietnamese’).  
 
Powell asserts, “Successfully resilient subjects only become included in hegemonic 
oppressive systems if they can champion their resiliency to such systems, and thus 
individuate, normalize, and ultimately shore up oppressive institutions” (Powell 
2017:181). Sue’s role as a community leader and service provider requires that she tells a 
story to herself and her clients about their ability to survive and, as she says “thrive.” 
Speaking to a funder about the MBSD, Sue said: “I don't think anybody can rebuild this 
coast with more heart than our fishermen. They have been resilient all their lives.” In two 
sentences, Sue both makes an appeal for fisherfolks’ knowledge and skill—arguably 
borne of resilience—to be properly considered and utilized by CPRA, and at the same 
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time, uses this knowledge and skill to make claims about her clients’ life-long resilience. 
This, finally, affirms their value to CPRA, Louisiana, and the federal government. That 
she continues to circulate this story about the people she works for and belongs to shows 
both her political savvy—she is telling the right stories to the right people—and emplaces 
her in the reproduction of resilience as its Vietnamese/American spokeswoman and 
arbiter. This shows that resilience is the logical and enduring legacy of ongoing 
refugeeism framed through Mimi Thi Nguyen’s gift of freedom, amplifying the 
attachment between the slow violence of refugeeism and the slow violence of resilience. 
It is also an airtight alibi for Louisiana, the U.S., and private industry as they continue to 
sacrifice the very people on whom they rely to maintain resilience in the face of 
Louisiana’s drive to maintain oil capital and other private industry.  
 
Sue’s use of the language of resilience is important for several reasons. First, it is clear 
that it is the direct result of her decades learning about the way policy, NGOs, and other 
stakeholders operate along the coast. In this way, we are able to see that, second, by 
appealing both to the official landscape’s articulation of resilience and defending her 
clients’ livelihoods, Sue’s narrative of refugeeism points directly to how resilience is 
required of people who are structurally underserved in the past and present, across space, 
and through generations and who, most importantly, are always in a position of crisis not 
as coastal residents per se, but as a direct result of the state making them into resilient 
refugees. This is most clearly confirmed, finally, by the fact that everyone I have spoken 
to in my work either never heard the word or, if they had, could not define it, a damning 
paradox I will explore later in this chapter.  
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RESILIENCE & DISASTER ON THE COAST 
As I have traced, Vietnamese/American refugee resilience was produced by scholars and 
decision-makers using Versailles as a case study. While U.S. and international press 
coverage of Katrina showed New Orleanians in varying stages of failure through the 
lenses of refugeeism and resilience, it rarely attended to the storm’s effects on coastal 
communities and ecosystems, where docks were subsumed by storm surge, and coastal 
communities fled the region. Less than a month later, Rita toppled everything they rebuilt 
in the interim. Most fisherfolk lost their homes, which they struggled to reclaim or 
receive compensation for, and those who hadn’t lost their boats entirely had to make 
significant repairs to their gear.  
 
It is important to note that the East-centric Vietnamese/American rebuilding-predicated 
refugee resilience quickly became the single story of Vietnamese/Americanness in and 
after Katrina. While I have argued that the Versailles-centric storytelling about refugee 
resilience is a deeply flawed element of the slow violence the community experiences in 
Southeast Louisiana, this produced an urban:coastal binary that did not take into account 
either the community’s reliance on the coast for commercial fishing or the fact that 
Vietnamese/Americans, among many other communities, live south of New Orleans, 
where residents are particularly vulnerable to storm surge and flooding. However, 
because refugee resilience was now firmly a Vietnamese/American attribute, it extended 
from Versailles all the way to the edge of the Birdfoot Delta and far into the Gulf. At the 
same time, the harm to both home—be it in Versailles or elsewhere—and business 
rendered the region’s Vietnamese/American community more tenuous and vulnerable 
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than communities whose entire industry was not impacted by the storm. For families 
without savings, an inability to navigate legal (loan, claims, etc.) documents in English, 
and who were otherwise unable to rebound from the effects of a hurricane, Katrina is, in 
many ways, still happening.  
 
THE SLOW VIOLENCE OF DISASTER 
 
Chú Anh: I bought a boat in 2005; my mother-in-law loaned me $8,000. And then from 
the bank, I loaned $60,000 somewhere in March in 2005. And in August, Katrina hit and 
the boat—the place where I docked the boat—it picked the boat up and put it on land. 
And I had insurance, but the thing is…the insurance didn’t pay me. And I called [the 
insurance company and] they said they weren’t authorized to do business in Louisiana. 
And the problem was the boat went on land so far—it had to be on the canal or next to 
the water for the government to pull it back down. The boat didn’t meet those criteria, so 
I lost the boat. I lost everything…The only way I can do anything is to get a SBA [Small 
Business Association] loan and buy another boat. Because it’s going to cost $100,000 
just to pull the boat back into the water and then probably going to cost another 
$150,000 just to fix it because the boat—water got in the engine and it was flipped 
already. So it’s not worth it…A lot of people that were [dealing with Katrina], they called 
the SBA every day, every day, and it was [always at least] a two-hour wait. It took me 
half a year of doing that and you know, at the time, the whole family you know... 
 
…the word resilience, it means that a tragedy hit[s] and you can get back on your feet 
and be better and stronger. And nobody [could] help me—what can I do, really? So I 
tried to get an SBA loan but a lot of people were in the disaster so it was hard to get 
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results; you’re talking about a year [before] you get those kinds of results. Somehow, one 
time I called up the SBA, and I didn’t mean to call this lady, but somehow I put in [the 
wrong] extension and I hit her phone. And she asked me what was the situation, and you 
know what, in two weeks, she resolved everything for me. [It was] just luck—taking me 
half a year calling in every day. The endurance I go through, you can say that is 
resilience. But you know, this job here, it requires a lot physically and mentally—you 
know, sometimes it’s so hard. You have to think about your kids and just grind and grind 
and grind. You know [if I was] by myself I would have probably given up already—say 
it’s not worth it.  
 
Chú Anh’s story shows how at once spectacular and slow the post-Katrina and industry-
specific violence he experiences are; for him and the majority of fisherfolk, the best they 
could hope for after Katrina was a loan that would take years to repay. At worst, because 
insurance premiums often amount to a third of a small boat’s take-home income, there 
was no way for shrimpers to recuperate their losses and were forced out of the industry 
altogether. As Vietnamese/American fisherfolk returned to their docks and boats 
following Katrina, their resilience traveled with them. The logic went that as hardworking 
refugees who were resilient at home and on land, their lives on the water—on the boat, at 
the dock, and in the markets attached to both—should be resilient as well. The fact that 
most captains lost their boats, the other fishing-dependent industries they relied on, or 
local infrastructure did not preclude them from coastal resilience. It mattered less that 
almost all of them either suffered major damage to or entirely lost their homes as well; 




On a mid-July day during preliminary fieldwork in 2014, Sue brought me down to her 
clients’ docks in Triumph, Buras, and Empire to meet “her fishermen” and learn firsthand 
what they had experienced over the last decade. I heard many stories that day, but one 
dock owner, Happy’s, was particularly devastating. As we settled down at a picnic table 
next to a massive shed full of blocks of ice, I remarked at how sturdy the two-story 
processing area was: its high corrugated metal roofs, concrete walls, and humming hoses 
and belts that carried shrimp from vessel to create seemed impervious to the elements. 
Happy smiled kindly, and, waving his hand to take in the vastness of his operation, said: 
“Katrina blew it all down. We had some walls up—then Rita blew it down [in mid-
September 2005]...Then Gustav and Ike blew it down again [in 2008]. We come back 
after that, I say my wife ‘we can open a [grocery] store in town.’ She said ‘This is what 
we do. This is all we know.’ So we rebuilt” (Vuong 2014). As we worked our way 
through the losses his business had suffered, Happy ended with the BP oil catastrophe 
(April 20 - September 19, 2010): “We lost a whole [brown shrimp] season. Then the 
white shrimp [season]. No one left the dock that year.” But, he repeated: “It’s what we 
do. It’s all we know.”  
 
Stories like Happy’s are often romanticized and used as evidence of the enduring spirit 
and resilience of coastal people the world over. While he and all of the fisherfolk I have 
worked with do think of the coast as home and feel wedded to commercial fishing as the 
source of their income, in both cases, they also feel as though they have no recourse but 
to continue fishing. This is because, for many Vietnamese/American fisherfolk, 
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commercial fishing is their only source of steady income; a lack of formal education, 
technical business skills, and/or English proficiency makes it extremely difficult for 
Vietnamese/American fisherfolk to seek employment outside of commercial fisheries or 
beyond the coast. By the same token, the impacts of ongoing and growing disaster, as 
well as the way the notion of disaster is weaponized against them, makes 
Vietnamese/Americans’ reliance on the coast differently devastating and difficult. When 
I asked Happy what he will do if commercial fishing disappears as an industry, he 
shrugged, gestured again to his dock, and said: “We’ll be here as long as we can.” 
 
The way Katrina and Rita stick to Vietnamese/American fisherfolk into the present 
highlights how disaster becomes slow rather than spectacular violence; where decision-
makers declare disaster over and wash their hands of its effects, for risk-mitigating 
resilient sacrificial communities, the spectacular calcifies, becomes everyday. And yet, 
decision-maker-predicated environmental and structural disaster has not stopped coming 
but in fact, erupts even more rapidly and regularly, specifically on the coast. Three years 
after Katrina and Rita, hurricanes Ike and Gustav rolled through and, while not nearly as 
severe as Katrina, damaged everything. And then, five years into Katrina, Rita, Ike, and 
Gustav recovery, the Deepwater Horizon oil platform exploded.  
 
RESILIENCE, FISHING, & THE BP OIL CATASTROPHE 
“The Coast Guard got on the radio and called our guys in—everyone thought it was a 
little thing. Wouldn’t take long to get back on the water.” — “2010 was the year I felt we 
fully recovered from Katrina; people were at 90% [financially]—had mostly finished 
paying back their loans. I kept thinking ‘this is our year to come back’. So when BP 
happened, I caught a panic attack. We all did.”  




After the Deepwater Horizon platform exploded on April 20th, 2010 just days after the 
state’s brown shrimp season opened, oil rolled into the Gulf unabated for 87 days 
(through September 19th, 2010). Although boats were allowed back out in October, most 
stayed off the water, their captains worried that working now would preclude them from 
repayments from BP on lost income. As British Petroleum’s 2.3 billion settlement sifted 
down the Louisiana court system, individual lawyers turned the disaster to their benefit. 
Knowing many Vietnamese and Cambodian fisherfolk could not read English, they went 
into New Orleans and coastal neighborhoods, conning families to agree to receive far less 
than they were owed, and making them cede a significant percentage of the compensation 
they did receive to legal fees. In this way, fisherfolk lost a full year of work and 
compensation for the same.  
 
ENVIRONMENTAL SACRIFICE & COMPOUNDING SLOW VIOLENCE 
“The legacy of racial dispossession underwrites how we have come to know space and 
place, and that the connections between what are considered ‘real’ or valuable forms of 
ownership are buttressed through racial codes that mark the body as ungeographic.”  
-Katherine McKittrick, Demonic Grounds: Black  
Women and the Cartographies of Struggle (2006:3-4) 
 
Vy Nguyen, a lawyer who advocates for communities being subjected to environmental 
racism and other harms through the weaponization of a community’s place against them, 
was a law student on the West coast at the time of the spill. Having grown up in 
Versailles, she knew her family and extended community members were being taken 
advantage of in the wake of one of the worst environmental and economic disasters in the 
nation’s history. After driving two days straight from the West Coast, Vy made it to the 
docks in the Birdfoot Delta and began examining the paperwork local lawyers were 
distributing to Vietnamese/ and Cambodian/American dock owners, boat owners, 
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deckhands, and other fishing- and coast-dependent locals. She quickly realized that more 
often than not, the people entreating community members to sign legal documents were 
using language against them: English-only forms were put in front of fisherfolk with little 
or no interpretation, after which they were urged to sign immediately by lawyers intent 
on claiming their cut. This was the clearest example of post-BP targeted violence, which, 
through decision-makers and lawyers, poor Vietnamese/American fishing families lost 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in payouts from this practice, leading some to leave the 
industry for good. 
 
*** 
In this post-BP economic, environmental, and political context, Vy helped Southeast 
Asian/American fisherfolk address concerns over claims, seek temporary work, and 
navigate the legal language of compensation. In so doing, her longer-term project became 
helping fisherfolk file a subsistence suit that aimed to secure them compensation for the 
shrimp and bycatch (unsellable fish and shellfish pulled up alongside shrimp in fishing 
nets) they brought home to feed their families. While all fishermen took home some of 
their catch before the disaster, bartering by-catch and shrimp was one of the first 
economies in Versailles; Sue underwrote this, saying that from 1975 on, “we knew we 
could feed our families if we were on a boat.” The loss of a primary food source was one 
of the myriad ways the catastrophe specifically impacted Vietnamese/American 
fisherfolk and by extension, the whole community.  
 
The suit ultimately succeeded and benefitted fisherfolk from white, Cajun, Black, and 
Southeast Asian/American communities. However, other residents of Southeast 
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Louisiana balked at the suit, saying that fisherfolk were trying to get handouts from the 
government on unfounded claims. As the primary plaintiffs were Vietnamese/Americans, 
this response was clearly racialized and classed, and echoed back to the xenophobia 
Vietnamese refugees were subject to in their early days in the industry.  
 
Reflecting on how slow violence makes itself both so opaque and so effective, Nixon 
argues: “In the long arc between the emergence of slow violence and its delayed effects, 
both the causes and the memory of catastrophe readily fade from view as the casualties 
incurred typically pass untallied and unremembered. Such discounting, in turn, makes it 
far more difficult to secure effective legal measures for prevention, restitution, and 
redress” (Nixon 2011:9). In light of local storytelling about handouts and 
Vietnamese/Americans’ upward battle for restitution and redress, Vy echoed back to her 
critique of New Orleans’ building the Chef Landfill in Versailles after Katrina, 
explaining that this was a microcosm of the ways Southeast Louisiana local decision-
makers, the governor, state representatives, lobbyists, and private corporations “didn’t see 
Vietnamese people” (Nguyen 2016). Chú Bình, a leader among Vietnamese and 
Vietnamese-American shrimpers, confirmed this in a conversation with Vy, saying: “they 
spilled on us like we weren’t there; like they didn’t see us.” On its own, this erasure—the 
assumption that fisherfolk were not on the water, did not rely on it and most pointedly, 
did not matter—is a damning snapshot of how refugee resilience allowed the state and 
private industry to not just rhetorically, but materially ignore the needs and presence of 
Vietnamese/Americans following yet another disaster. However, in addition to not seeing 
fisherfolk, Bình told Vy: “they’re compensating us like we don’t matter” (Nguyen 2016). 
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This statement reinforces that BP was a pivotal moment for Vietnamese/American 
fisherfolk for several reasons. It showed first, how the state prioritizes oil companies and 
their revenue over coastal residents’ economic and by extension, social stability by 
allowing oil companies to harm the coast’s ecosystems and human and more-than-human 
communities. Second, this highlights just how little the families and vast networks of 
small businesses that relied on the commercial fishing industry factored into federal, 
state, and private industry-led decisions about Louisiana’s coast. That this exclusion was 
predicated on resilience reinforces that for decision-makers in Louisiana, 
Vietnamese/Americans were not just beyond, but no longer needed support—they knew 
how to survive just fine.  
 
While BP is often consumed as a human-made disaster, it is less often explicitly cited as 
an act of environmental racism, which, through its violent control over communities and 
the place they occupy, is, again, “state violence” (Pellow 2016:4). With this in mind, the 
third critical effect of BP was the precedent it set for denying local knowledges under 
environmental devastation through appropriation, which follows Braun’s argument: “In 
the face of climate change, what we see is that the administration of life—biopolitics—is 
itself changing…taking hold of new knowledges, technologies, and practices that either 
did not previously exist or had not previously been appropriated as a means of 
administration” (Braun 2014:51, latter emphasis mine). One of the ways this manifested 
was in how, in the ongoing ‘leak’ and throughout clean-up efforts, BP left primary 
decision-making about cleanup to already resilient boat captains whose knowledge they 




For example, a senior shrimper I work with was put in charge of leading over ten boats in 
burning oil off the water’s surface for two months during the catastrophe. This work 
included seeing to other boats’ wellbeing, directing day-to-day operations, and keeping 
up morale. As Stefano Harney and Fred Moten have explained, “Policy will discover 
what is not yet theorized, what is not yet fully contingent, and most importantly what is 
not yet legible. Policy is correction, forcing itself with mechanical violence upon the 
incorrect, the uncorrected, the ones who do not know to seek their own correction” 
(Harney and Moten 2013:78). This is just one of many examples of the way refugee 
resilience is taken up by decision-makers to advance state aims. As I have shown, the 
way disaster, environment, and policy come together under environmental racism—
zoning Versailles as a site for toxic Katrina waste, telling community members they were 
so good at rebuilding that they didn’t need help after the dual effects of Katrina and Rita, 
the uphill battle to receive compensation for lost bycatch—reaffirms the need for 
Vietnamese/American resilience. By making fisherfolk resilient, then effectively 
appropriating their knowledge, BP and the state made official the community-based work 
of Vietnamese/American fisherfolk who knew the Gulf far better than them.  
 
Weaponizing the landscape Vietnamese/Americans rely on to make home, to make life, 
to build futures, against them while valorizing their survival was tied directly to their 
refugeeism as a way of ensuring that the latter remained a central part of their lives on the 
coast, and in the same move, ensures the endurance of the former. That 
Vietnamese/American fisherfolks’ survival tactics (rebuilding as a community, 
establishing new boats from loans and immediately repaying them, bycatch subsistence, 
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responding to BP with fishing knowledge, leading and communicating with one another, 
etc.) have been written into post-disaster decision-making at varying scales shows that 
rather than creating new coastal futures in the name of supporting local residents, the 
state is instead using the coast as it always has: as critical space for producing 
infrastructure that protects oil, gas, and other capital to the detriment of every human and 
marine community, home, boat, and processing dock in the way. This also normalizes 
resilience, making it Vietnamese/Americans’ duty as gift-bearing debtors to the U.S.  
 
Taking these three major outcomes of the catastrophe into account, I argue that, as I was 
told by Jonathan in the introduction, BP became a godsend for coastal restoration, 
especially as the state increasingly became aware of and in turn exerted power over how 
grassroots environmentalism represented a risk to ongoing oil revenue. In this way, it is 
clear that Louisiana’s environmentalism is predicated on state-produced environmental 
violence. As Rob Nixon explains: 
Violence, above all environmental violence, needs to be seen—and deeply 
considered—as a contest not only over space, or bodies, or labor, or 
resources, but also over time. We need to bear in mind Faulkner’s dictum 
‘the past is never dead. It’s not even past.’ His words resonate with 
particular force across landscapes permeated by slow violence, landscapes 
of temporal overspill that elide rhetorical cleanup operations with their 
sanitary beginnings and endings (Nixon 2011:8).  
 
Remembering how risk-mitigating state environmentalism seeks a terra nullius of a 
future, Nixon’s call to understand how, in the hands of decision-makers, the past is 
dragged into the present and mapped onto the future through environmental racism 
returns me to the early recognition that for folks being subjected to slow violence—as in 
the example of K10–recognizing the value and veracity of past harms allows them to 
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make claims, heard or not, about how they are being harmed now, and how they will be 
harmed in the future. In chapter four, I will unpack this through the intervention of 
visionary responses that allow the folks with whom I work to intervene in foreclosed 
presents and futures as people already imagined out of them. 
 
At the same time, as the entire Vietnamese/American community’s social, political, and 
economic wellbeing relies on the health of coastal ecosystems to ensure that BP and other 
international oil companies can continue, and extend, their extractive agendas reifies a 
already foreclosed risk-avoidant, terra nullius future. In this way, formalizing 
Vietnamese/American resilience acts as a silver bullet for the state to go about the 
business of creating and maintaining disaster in the name of capital production. While 
spectacular at the time of Vy’s conversation with Chú Bình, BP has become just another 
slow violence in the lives of Vietnamese/American fisherfolk in the intervening decade, 
which I will take up more firmly in chapter three and the conclusion, but that also haunts 
the rest of this discussion.  
 
SACRIFICING THE SHRIMPING ECONOMY 
In the almost decade since the oil catastrophe, commercial fisherfolk have felt the 
economic pressure of its after effects. While Gulf seafood was declared safe to eat within 
a few months of the ‘leak’ being capped, the public was reticent to eat Gulf shrimp after 
seeing images of pelicans, dolphins, and the entire coastline coated in oil. This resulted in 
a rise in shrimp imports from South America and Southeast Asia (somewhat ironically, a 
large percent of shrimp imports to the U.S. come from shrimp farms in Việt Nam, China, 
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and the Philippines), which has only increased annually. As imports flood the market, the 
prices shrimpers can fetch at the dock goes down (Bittenbender 2018), a problem 
exacerbated by oil, pollutants, and a hypoxic dead zone, all of which ensure that there are 
fewer shrimp in the Gulf, and that fewer still can develop to full size (Coalition to 
Restore Coastal Louisiana 2017; Louisiana Sea Grant 1999). While Louisiana’s 
shrimpers harvest more shrimp than any other shrimp fishery in the Gulf (Bourgeois et al. 
2015), in my conversations with them, it became clear that today the shrimpers I work 
with are making significantly less than they were even five years ago. This is particularly 
true for Vietnamese/Americans who are unable to leave commercial fishing; as shrimping 
becomes less economically viable at the intersection of a shifting global fishing economy, 
national trade deals, oil extraction, and other modes environmental sacrifice, being a 
shrimper grows harder each day. For the folks with whom I work, whose lack of English 
and other technical knowledge effectively keeps them trapped in the industry, being told 
they are resilient when they are struggling to feed their families is not just damning, but 
transparently violent. Most importantly, they recognize that like disaster, like not being 
seen or compensated; like being resilient—this slow disaster is not just a past or present 
state, but very much of their future.   
 
“RESILIENCE” IN VIETNAMESE 
In the spring of 2018, I returned to New Orleans to conduct follow-up interviews with 
some of FSS's clients whom I had either casually or formally talked to during fieldwork. 
In anticipation of my visit, I asked Sue to contact them on my behalf and tell them that I 
specifically wanted to hear about how they experienced resilience, which I had observed 
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largely from a decision-maker-based standpoint rather than how it was lived on the 
ground until then. In our conversations leading up to the interviews, Sue said that it was 
going to be difficult to prepare our clients for the interviews, as there was no word for 
resilience in Vietnamese. It says a lot about my own gaps as a non-Vietnamese speaking 
researcher that this had not occurred to me in the two years I had been doing this work to 
that point. In every car trip, meeting, office day, dock visit, and casual conversation we 
had in the time I lived in New Orleans, Sue and I had discussed resilience thousands of 
times. This was particularly the case in my last year of fieldwork, when “coastal 
resilience” had become the buzzwords in grant solicitations geared toward supporting 
coastal communities and the fishing industries, which I write on behalf of FSS, which I 
showed in the introduction and above, given the question of Sue’s own complicity in 
affirming her community’s resilience. We had strategized for hours about resilience: 
identified what, in grant speak, it looks like for our clients, how they create it, and what it 
means to them. But this, it became clear to me then, was us superimposing the language 
of the state onto our day-to-day work, rather than the inverse.  
 
I had, in spite of my best intentions, personally reinforced the power of resilience by 
thinking it from the perspective of a grant writer without directly engaging our clients 
about how they experienced it. And this strategy—if you can call it that—had been 
successful every time. Each resilience-related grant I wrote brought imperative funding 
into FSS. These grants allowed my peers to log hours calling Medicaid and interpret for 
our clients; gave them the resources to teach ESL and computer literacy classes; made it 
possible for us to set aside two days a week for a month between January and February to 
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painstakingly walk each boat owner and their family through the convoluted process of 
filing taxes in English. While this was a win, it did not absolve me of the massive blind 
spot I had allowed to creep into my research.  
 
Determined not to right this wrong, but to understand it, I got on the phone with Jane, 
FSS’s Senior Project Coordinator who is fluent in both Vietnamese and Khmer, to figure 
out how to best have this conversation with our clients. I asked her to develop her own 
transliteration of “resilience” in Vietnamese, thinking after years of doing this work and 
given her fluency, she would know much better than I what to say. On the day I finally 
arrived in the office to conduct the interviews, Jane wrote out a phrase on a yellow post-
it, breaking down each word for me. It read: “ khả năng phục hồi cộng đồng — the ability 
to change [your] community.” I was surprised by Jane’s definition; while I had been 
parsing every word state and local officials, funders, community partners, environmental 
and big green NGOs, partner academic institutions, and local foundations used to connote 
our clients’ ability to survive better than other coastal residents and small business 
owners, she had been doing the grounded work of ensuring they survived. Given this, 
Jane’s understanding of resilience was inherently one that reflected the community 
cohesion and collaborative work she had seen foment among the folks we worked with 
from BP-on: they survived by making clear, deliberate changes to and in their 
community.  
 
To Jane, this community-level work must be what resilience is, because, as Sue told me 
that day, “a woman from some university came into our office and said ‘y’all are a model 
of resilience; this is what resilience looks like. How do we copy this?’” (Ha 2018). This 
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added another layer to what resilience looks like for our clients: as folks perceived as 
being models of resilience, their basic lived experiences of trying to make a way out of a 
no-way had become extractable. It was legible enough to outside actors as resilience that 
it could, in turn, be made into a blueprint of resilience. Could, in this formulation, be 
packaged, bullet-pointed, and shipped to the next vulnerable coastal community, as Rodin 
suggested during K10. Could be modeled and made real in the Mekong Delta, the 
Solomon Islands, in Alaska or Hawai’i, as the need arose in the already foreclosed future 
of the decision-maker produced global catastrophe that is anthropogenic climate 
devastation.  
 
Over the next six hours, I conducted three interviews with four of FSS’s clients—the 
second was a couple—and felt the weight of this blueprint, of their lives enumerated and 
replicated, with each word. The first three folks I spoke with engaged me primarily in 
Vietnamese, requiring thoughtful interpretation by Jane. Each of them was over the age 
of 60, and when we got around to the notion of resilience, balked, saying effectively: we 
survive. We know how to do that. What else do you want to know? In both of these 
interviews, I chose not to press the issue; it was clear to me from the responses that 
defining resilience was far less interesting to the fisherfolk I was speaking with than their 
lived experiences of something like resilience. These included the savings accounts they 
started the minute they could afford a boat to send their children to school; the 
innumerable financial and personal losses they had weathered to stay in the business; the 
too-small shrimp they kept paying too much in gas, ice, deckhands, hours driving from 
New Orleans to the docks, to catch; the oil ‘spills’ and ‘heavy rain,’ wind and water they 
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had endured to stay afloat. I smiled, nodded, and thanked them for sharing so much with 
me. These interviews made clear to me that resilience as a state-mandated state of being 
was not a part of these clients’ lives; survivial, however, certainly was.  
 
My final interview of the day was with Chú Anh, a 46-year-old shrimper (cited above) 
who had moved to Louisiana after being resettled in the Midwest in his 20s because he 
heard that shrimping money was abundant in the Gulf. He was fluent in English, so Jane 
left us to our own devices and got back to the pressing work of helping other FSS clients. 
When I asked Chú Anh to define resilience, he said: “it’s like a rubber band—it stretches 
and then goes back to its original shape” (Anh 2018).  Sue remarked later that this was 
the clearest definition of the term she had ever heard: “ I always ask everyone ‘you say 
resilience—what do you really mean?’ And they can’t tell me. No one knows what 
resilience actually is!” (Ha 2018). As Anh and I spent an hour parsing exactly what 
resilience meant, he grew angry: “I mean, they say that and what, just leave the fishermen 
with their resilient thoughts and ignore them and let them cope with all the [destruction] 
and the natural disaster or whatever[’s] coming their way? Yeah if you’re resilient it’s 
good but still, without [decision-makers’] help, the word is only an adjective. It’s not a 
noun.” (Anh 2018). He then lamented that he was one in a hundred in terms of his 
English fluency—had access to the language of governance and decision-making, of 
licensing and regulation, in ways the majority of his Vietnamese/American shrimping 
peers did not. In spite of this, he was not necessarily aware that he, a 
Vietnamese/American shrimper, had been tasked by the state he lives and works in to be 
resilient prior to our conversation. Our discussion of the term for him emerged out of the 
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current epidemic of gun murder in the U.S.: “you hear after those shootings—oh those 
people are resilient. It’s like that, right?” And here is the crux of the issue: resilience is 
not Vietnamese, nor is it Vietnamese/American. In the context of coastal Louisiana, it is a 
decision-maker-designed concept parachuted into communities for whom Louisiana, 
CPRA, and others have decided is a central tenet of from an outside they cannot even 
name. In this way, resilience is not just a burden they must reverse-engineer into their 
lives if they are ever to survive it—a gift that resembles and now runs in direct parallel to 
the initial and ongoing burden of refugeeism vested Vietnamese/Americans by the state. 
A debt they cannot hope to repay and that, in the same way, will haunt them far into an 
opaque and, as I will show, already foreclosed, sacrificial future. Rather, 
Vietnamese/American refugee resilience is an official insurance policy—a state 
recognition that it cannot let the people it made vulnerable and under-resourced from 
resettlement on get in the way of mitigating risk for future oil investment. To secure and 
restore the landscape the state needs to make sure that investment remains not just 
possible, but is ensured.  
 
CONCLUSION: RESILIENCE AS TOOL 
Resilience as an apparatus of state control follows Jasbir Puar’s formulation of “debility”: 
“Those ‘folded’ into life are seen as more capacious or on the side of capacity, while 
those targeted for premature or slow death are figured as debility” (Puar 2017:153). 
While debility is profitable for capitalism—folks who are relegated to a non-
future/premature death no longer stand in the way of industry and governmental 
extraction and risk-mitigation that ensures capital gain—“so is the demand to ‘recover’ 
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from or overcome it” (Puar 2017:154). In the hands of local, state, and federal decision-
makers, resilience is the mechanism that allows for this kind of future foreclosure and 
sacrifice. The stories of resilience articulated by Vietnamese/American community 
members throughout this chapter are discrete and damning reflections of the ways 
Louisiana’s relationship to Vietnamese/American resilience is an ongoing and slow 
violence: in its transit from refugeeism to resilience, Vietnamese/American ‘model’-ness 
has been reinfolded into refugeeism as a racial category; has been adapted to the contexts 
of those whom it aims to subsume. From war-contingent to multi-generational, from 
being predicated on war resettlement to encompassing a wide range of differently 
resourced presents, from equally homogenizing and overlapping global to U.S. South 
imaginaries, and from abstract nation to the material space and place of Southeast 
Louisiana, Vietnamese/Americans are asked to at once acquiesce to slow death and to 
overcome it.  
 
The constantly moving target of resilience and its attributes ensures that 
Vietnamese/Americans will always be resilient. By adopting the criteria of resilience to 
match their already lived experiences— rather than responding to the ways they might 
need support or fostering their ability to live rather than merely survive—local, state, and 
federal decision-makers keep Vietnamese/Americans trapped in slow violence of the 
state’s making. In instances where the future is opaque—feels alarmingly like risk—
resilience is a story decision-makers can use to avoid reading Vietnamese/Americans into 
the landscape of an imagined, terra nullius-looking and sounding future that does not 
include them. In this way, resilient refugeeism allows “responsible” agencies like BP, 
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governmental bodies, and individuals to affirm Vietnamese/American resilience such that 
responding to radical change like disaster is not just a personal responsibility, but 









































CHAPTER THREE: RESTORATION & SACRIFICE AT THE MOUTH OF THE 
MISSISSIPPI 
 
THE GREAT MISSISSIPPI FLOOD OF 1927  
& ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 
 
In the genealogy of my work, the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 is central to 
understanding how the management of water creates a blueprint for and justifies the 
management of water-dependent communities on Louisiana’s altered and vulnerable 
coast. This is both because the flooding represented a clear shift in the federal 
government’s deployment of colonial management thinking, and, significantly, is cited by 
CPRA as the origin and singular source of Louisiana’s land loss. To parse the complexity 
of both the impact of the National Flood Act of 1928 and to give context to CPRA’s claims-
making about the flood, I use the rest of this section to trace a genealogy of risk, 
restoration, and power. 
*** 
The Mississippi River began to rise in the spring of 1926. It eventually overtopped its banks 
to inundate cities and food-producing regions from Illinois to the Gulf in the worst flood 
the nation had seen. Called a ‘natural disaster,’ the river’s flooding was in large part the 
result of ongoing federal management of the Mississippi’s basin, including levees, the 
designation of floodplains in majority-Black areas, and longstanding social and spatial 
segregation throughout the watershed (Barry 2007; Earnhardt 2017; Tucker 2011). Colton 
argues that by draining, filling, and otherwise manipulating the marsh to settle and fortify 
New Orleans, early French colonial settlers brought the Mississippi and its tributaries into 




What’s more, “When Europeans applied their concepts of rivers as boundaries, they 
introduced legal notions of exclusive use or control over a fluid resource” (Colten 
2014:29). This allows shows that in addition to pre-existing levee structures, thinking 
rivers as boundaries and sovereign territory made the Mississippi a space of science-
backed and military precise coastal and communal management. infrastructure and socio-
political precedents for the routes the flooding took, who it affected, and which human and 
more-than-human communities have been disallowed from recovering, even today. 
  
Historian Susan Scott Parrish highlights how these environmentally and culturally situated 
violences were particularly transparent in Southeast Louisiana during flooding:  
  
The flood’s most dramatic moment occurred on April 29, when 
authorities—hoping to protect New Orleans—dynamited the levee 13 miles 
below the Crescent City at Caernarvon in order to flood the relatively less 
populated Acadian region of St. Bernard and Plaquemines 
parishes...Without trees, grasses, deep roots, and wetlands, the denuded soil 
of the watershed could not do its ancient work of absorbing and stalling 
water after seasons of intense snow and rain. All the work of water 
management was meant to be accomplished by the towering levee system, 
one which had no outlets or spillways at the time. When a four-story-high 
levee burst, the river emptied itself upon southern land with the fierceness 
of Niagara Falls. Not only were levee structures a modern, industrial 
feature in the Delta, then, but the water draining so swiftly into the “funnel” 
was a byproduct of industrialized environmental development (Parrish 
2017). 
  
Colton goes on to argue that while levees were a dominant part of the post-1927 discourse, 
“The principle adjustment from the 1927 flood-control policy was the explicit adoption of 
‘outlets’ or structures to guide the ‘escape of excess water from the main stem’” (Colten 
2014:72), which set in motion the design and implementation of two flood mitigation 
structures, the Bonnet Carré Spillway and Morganza Floodway, into Lake Pontchartrain 
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and the Atchafalaya River basin, respectively.  I will discuss both in more depth in the 
conclusion 
 
This approach to ecosystem management—establish a protocol; when it fails, create a 
second; amend both using a third ‘mitigation’ strategy, and so on—is a hallmark of today’s 
approach to coastal restoration, itself direct extension of the colonial logics of resource 
extraction and manipulation Colton pointed to above. It also marks the beginning of a 
science-dependent model of disaster mitigation and response, which, we will see, relies on 
developing ‘fair and measured’ science-based protocols that espouse federal, state, and 
local governance’s objectivity in relation to coastal resources, people, more-than-human 
species, and futures. 
 
Macarena Gómez-Barris’ extractive capitalism is a useful analytic for these overlapping 
violences, wherein “colonial capitalism has been the main catastrophic event that has 
gobbled up the planet’s resources, discursively constructing racialized bodies within 
geographies of difference, systematically destroying through dispossession, enslavement, 
and then producing the planet as a corporate bio-territory” (Gómez-Barris 2017:4). In the 
Anthropocene, decision-makers have irrevocably altered Earth’s hydrologic, atmospheric, 
geologic, biospheric, and other processes to extract and produce as much capital as 
possible, and these changes overwhelmingly harm the most underserved, over-exploited, 
and ostracized communities globally. 
*** 
The transference of colonialist environmentalist management to the communities who live, 
work, and rely on those ecologies was particularly clear in The National Flood Control 
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Act of 1928, forwarded by the federal government to address the 1927 flooding. Under the 
act, the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) fortified extant levees and built 
new ones around the mouth of the Mississippi River, locking it into its current meander 
path (as indicated in the second map in Figure 15, below). While this was meant to keep 
cities, farms, and industry safe from future major flood events—effectively, mitigating 
risk—this mode of river management was a short-sighted fix to a complex problem. Prior 
to the Act, the river flowed into the marshes surrounding its mouth via a network of small 
streams; after 1928, the Mississippi was forced into one single path that first, closed all of 
these this marsh-feeding channels, and second, because the river’s mouth lines up with the 
edge of the continental shelf, sent all land-building sediment deep into the ocean.  
  
To protect Baton Rouge and New Orleans from the river, USACE exacerbated the 
devastation of the landscape below both cities by cutting the Mississippi off from 
Louisiana’s coastal marshes and the human and more-than-human communities who rely 
on them. In this way, leveeing and damming produced a zero-sum game where either 
landowners or the coast, cities or marshes, could survive. This follows the way I have 




Figure 15. The map on the left, created by the Army Corps of Engineers, the Mississippi River Commission, 
the Coast and Geodetic Survey, and the Red Cross in 1928 shows “approximate areas flooded by the 
Mississippi River and Tributaries in Seven States during 1927” (Red Cross 2019). The map on the right, 
commissioned by the Department of the Army Mississippi River Commission Corps of Engineers in June 
1986, shows the levee system (in red) that was produced in light of the 1927 flooding (Department of the 
Army Mississippi River Commission Corps of Engineers 1986). Both maps indicate how the U.S. Army Corps 
and its partners understood the Lower Mississippi River Basin as a region, within individual states, and 
infrastructurally, throughout the post-flooding period. 
  
With these disjunctions in mind, it becomes clear that post-1928, the Mississippi and its 
tributaries function as imaginary-yet-tangible spaces that are used by decision-makers to 
contain, exclude, and function as sites of transit for resources and capital, including people 
(see: Du Bois 1998; Gardner 2019; Lawrence and Lawless 2018; Lawrence 2019) and 
state-making narratives. Given these properties, the post-National Flood Control Act 
Mississippi has been used as ‘neutral, risk-evacuated space’ where local, state, and federal 
decision-makers can execute and refine approaches to managing coastal human and more-
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than-human communities who, largely because of state-produced vulnerabilities, rely on 
the river the most. This approach to conservation—based on scientific management rather 
than designed to holistically conserve complex coastal ecosystems, as Gómez-Barris 
showed in the introduction—paved the way for contemporary Louisianian risk-mitigating 
environmental restoration. Rather than a temporally fixed event, then, the flooding of 1927 
has created a blueprint for how decision-maker-produced disaster and restoration-based 
responses haunt federal and state approaches to managing Louisiana’s water, land, 
people, and more-than-human species.  
  
This is particularly clear given that many of the communities and people most vulnerable 
and as such, most comprehensively sacrificed, to the 1927 flooding were Black, poor, and 
rural-dwelling (Parrish 2017). While what we now call environmental sacrifice reaches 
much further back into Louisiana’s colonial Anthropocene than the late 1920s, as the flood 
is so often invoked in present-day coastal restoration imaginaries, I think it is worthwhile 
to be critical of how environmental racism consistently underwrites state-designed disaster 
response, from restoration to policy that manages disaster-prone places and the people 
whose lives are lived in them. It is useful to again invoke David Pellow’s definition of 
environmental racism—“a  form of authoritarian control over  bodies,  space,  and  
knowledge  systems” which allows us to “more effectively theorize it as a form of state 
violence” (Pellow 2016:13)—in this conversation about colonial management regimes and 
Louisiana’s water past and present. This is because, as Katrina and BP showed, and as we 
see here, reaffirming vulnerable communities’ ability to survive management-produced 
and replicated disaster is a neoliberalist bent on environmental sacrifice: everyone in the 
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way of generating oil revenue must take care of themselves. Every failure to survive and 
adapt is an individual failure to meet state resilience needs. 
 
RESTORATION & ENVIRONMENTAL SUBSUMPTION 
“Fisher[folk] were crying out for restoration—they see the coast bleeding every day. We 
always thought [oil] drilling was the issue...and we got restoration, but not the way we 
thought.” 
-Sue Ha, interview (2017) 
  
According to CPRA, its diversion-centric restoration approach to the coast is a direct 
response to 90 years of land loss resulting from the Army Corps’ leveeing of the river 
following the Great Flood of 1927. The 2007 Master Plan for a Sustainable Coast, where 
the Mid-Barataria Bay Sediment Diversion was first forwarded, uses the following 
language: “Because the Mississippi River is contained in levees and no longer overtops 
its banks in regular floods, the wetlands throughout the Deltaic Plain do not receive the 
sediment and water they need to regenerate. As a result, areas that were land are fast 
becoming open water. Reconnecting the river to the wetlands using large-scale river 
diversions will help the wetlands rebuild and reduce rates of land loss” (Coastal 
Protection and Restoration Authority 2007:22-3). In protecting New Orleans and other 
river-adjacent communities from future flooding, the Corps trained the Mississippi’s 
land-building sediment away from the marsh that protected the region against gale-force 
winds and storm surge, instead sending it impotently over the continental shelf. 
  
The 1927 flood in many ways represents the beginning of the state’s reliance on 
attritional catastrophe—which is marked by displacement that, across cumulative slow 
violence, “smooths the way for amnesia” (Nixon 2011:7). CPRA relies on attritional 
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catastrophe to create distance between the community-level effects of the diversion and 
its own extractive goals. By centering USACE’s management of the river as the primary 
problem the coast faces, the Authority absolves the federal government and state from 
culpability in reproducing the very ecosystem-level and climate-related violences that 
hasten coastal land loss. Both have variously done this by: leasing the Gulf to private oil 
and gas companies, refusing to implement environmental and ecosystem-level 
protections, welcoming shipping and river commerce that pollutes the air and water, 
creating subsidies for large-scale industrial farming, which dumps billions of pounds of 
nitrates and other runoff into the Mississippi, helping produce a dead zone in the Gulf 
that grows larger every spring, and more. By pointing the finger solely at levees and poor 
river management on the part of the Corps, CPRA is able to refuse responsibility for 
practicing a risk-mitigation whose imperative it is to disappear Vietnamese/American 
commercial fisherfolk, shrimp and oysters, the community, and all industries and 
communities linked to them from Southeast Louisiana in a matter of years.  
  
As Sue points out above, whereas Vietnamese/American shrimpers, who suffered 
economically from and actively cleaned up the BP oil catastrophe, knew drilling was a 
major culprit of coastal degradation, the institutionalized coastal restoration they got does 
not reflect this knowledge. Importantly, these two identified harms are not 
incommensurate; it is clear to everyone who works along the coast that unsustainable and 
violent oil and gas practices cut up and accelerate the loss of marshes that are starved for 
silt and sediment from a re-routed Mississippi. That the two are treated as singular and 
oppositional roots of coastal land loss—one or the other can be possible, but not both—
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rather than united threads of the fabric of coastal environmental sacrifice points to the 
ways CPRA, in its official capacity as the coast’s protector and restorer, has crafted an 
official landscape that serves its own best interests. 
*** 
As my introduction suggested, in several conversations I had with scholars, community 
leaders, and water advocates, I was told that the people who fought most fiercely for 
Louisiana to address coastal land loss had all but been forced out of the conversation 
once CPRA was codified. As I briefly explained elsewhere, because of the press coverage 
and governmental oversight engendered by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita’s impacts on 
Louisiana’s coast, the state passed Act 8. This established the CPRA, a state agency that 
partners with marine biologists, soil specialists, and other scientists, non-governmental 
organizations, and industry heads to solicit and implement three types of restoration 
projects: structural, non-structural, and restoration. It has a dedicated budget largely 
comprised of federal- and state-allocated funds, and publicly releases a budget annually 
to identify how these funds are and will be directed. In creating this organization, 
Louisiana integrated hurricane protection and coastal restoration, formerly the purview of 
disparate local authorities and parish governments, under one agency. Tasked with 
developing a comprehensive, science-vetted plan to stop the coast from washing away, 
CPRA created the 50-year Master Plan for a Sustainable Coast which, “in its purest 
sense, is a list of projects that build or maintain land and reduce risk to our communities” 
(Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority 2017:ES-2). What this benign description 
leaves out is the voracity with which CPRA has positioned itself as the arbiter of 
Louisiana’s neoliberal, state-centric environmentalism whose genealogy can be traced 
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back to French colonial resource management strategies in Louisiana long before it was 
annexed as a territory of the United States. 
*** 
Historical geographer Craig Colten has argued that European colonialism’s impact on the 
U.S. South remains visible in the region’s ongoing relationship to water. From the 
beginning of French settlement in Louisiana in the 16th century, the water, land, and 
marsh were spaces to be managed: “Europeans brought with them notions about deriving 
power from watercourses and legal principles to regulate access to and the just use of 
water. The colonists arrived with ideas of wetlands as undesirable and even dangerous 
places that demanded transformation for improved usage” (Colten 2014:12). Colten 
argues that colonial relationship to water was one of management, which consistently 
“followed the path of maximum exploitation to meet short-term needs rather than one of 
sustainability” (Colten 2014:8). Significantly, in Colten’s narration, water management 
was a primary way to impose Euro-colonial values on an Indigenous landscape: “when 
colonial bodies drew on European concepts of water rights...European transformations 
ultimately led to [the] demise of some natural resources...It was the combination of 
expectations and capabilities to alter the waterways that overlaid thoroughly European 
legal concepts on the water” (Colten 2014:35-7). The irreversibly destructive quality of 
this approach to coming into relationship with ecosystems has produced today’s climate 
catastrophes, accelerating both disaster and harm at a growing pace. The confluence of 
colonialisms as a primary tool to consolidate power and the advent of global heating and 
the extinction of human and more-than-human communities is no coincidence. By 
mandating environmentalism, restoration, and resilience to coastal peoples ensures CPRA 
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is able to consolidate its hold on the space and future of coastal Louisiana. By telling its 
own story about the coast rather than listening to those of residents, CPRA instantiates 
novel tools of a next-wave superhuman survival under climate change and a ‘scientific’ 
environmental relationships to space, place, and ‘resource’ (Gómez-Barris 2017; Park 
and Pellow 2011; Voyles 2015). 
 
This is central to CPRA’s approach to risk-mitigation, which requires vulnerable coastal 
people to be resilient under ever-increasing risk-mitigation-predicated harm. This, in turn, 
makes Vietnamese/American fisherfolk and other coast-dependent communities 
sacrifice-able under neoliberal logics that require them to survive in spite of harm rather 
than because of CPRA support. Under the master plan, to “help the wetlands rebuild and 
reduce the rate of land loss,” the sacrifice will be commercial fishing: 
As sediment rich fresh water enters the system, areas that are suitable habitat 
for resources such as oysters and shrimp will shift…possibly within just 25 
years, the habitat may deteriorate to the point that important fisheries are no 
longer viable. In a very real sense therefore, we must accept that fishing 
locations will need to change in order to provide a sustainable landscape 
over the long-term (Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority 2007:22-
3). 
 
By using “we” in the 2007 plan, CPRA reinforces that MBSD is the best plan for the 
future of all Louisianians, a future the Authority itself arbitrates because as an agency, 
they use “the best available science and engineering” to “speak with one clear voice for 
the future of Louisiana’s coast” (Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority 2007). In 
spite of its own sobering findings, however, CPRA has failed to address these potential 
impacts to fisheries. To date, MBSD’s design includes no mitigation measures to help 
fisheries adapt to increases in fresh water throughout Southeast Louisiana, nor has CPRA 
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substantively changed their approach to the diversion based on these findings. In fact, 
CPRA has slowly backed away from acknowledging that the diversion will harm 
fisheries at all. In subsequent plans (2012 and 2017), the above language about changes 
to commercial fisheries has effectively disappeared and been replaced with sections of 
the plan that position commercial fishing, oil and gas, shipping, and other industry as 
commensurate in terms of their need for land building. 
  
That this management is predicated on refugee resilience underscores Nixon’s claim that 
the slow violence of environmental catastrophe is an attritional catastrophe, which 
(re)produces displacement in time, place, rhetoric, and through technologies of violence 
that render sacrificial communities just another cost of doing restoration. For the folks 
with whom I work, commercial shrimping, the Birdfoot Delta as a space of daily life, and 
the future of both have effectively been made irretrievable in CPRA’s drive to make the 
diversion that will preserve the land and water on and in which oil is extracted, refined, 
and shipped, and that creates a storm buffer for the cities of New Orleans and Baton 
Rouge. Foreclosing Vietnamese/Americans’ present and future smooths the way for a 
collective amnesia—a forgetting people and more-than-human species are or were ever in 
the way—that in turn allows for restoration to not just proceed as planned, but to burst 
through the red tape of environmental protection laws, stopgaps like the USACE’s 
Environmental Impact Statement, which itself deploys parallel logics of presence and 
absence, and other criteria for building massive diversion structures on an already volatile 
and tenuous ecosystem, rendering it not just possible, but a foregone conclusion. As the 
rest of this chapter shows, it is the foregone-ness of the MBSD—in both design and 
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implementation—and the particular resilience it will require that is most terrifying for 
Vietnamese/American commercial shrimpers and by extension, the entire community. 
 
COMMERCIAL FISHING & COMMUNITY-BASED EXPERTISE 
 In a recent meeting I attended remotely in my work with FSS, Kimberly, the executive 
director of a restoration-based NGO that subcontracts to CPRA reported that for the next 
master plan, which will go live in 2023, CPRA has switched its decision-making 
structure. Rather than dividing folks into focus groups, a model that had certainly failed 
FSS and our clients (see the ‘Community Sacrifice and ‘Good’ Science’ section below), 
they have segmented the coast into zones based on coastal freshwater basins, including 
Barataria Bay and Breton Sound, the two diversion sites (see Figure 16, below). 
 
Figure 16. Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act (CWPPRA) basin map (Louisiana 
Coastal Wetlands Planning Protection and Restoration Act Program 2018). 
  
She went on to explain that these groups were small and made up of members from the 
previous stakeholder groups (private landowner, energy and industry, and navigation). 
When I asked why community-based organizations were not present in the basin-based 
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focus group model, Kimberly grew exasperated, saying: “making decisions about coastal 
restoration is very technical.” This reinforced what I have been suggesting throughout: 
‘the technical’ is the purview of the state. Given this, the technical has crystallized into a 
set of knowledges based on risk-mitigating scientific data and environmentalism that 
coastal communities already relegated to resilience are incapable of exhibiting given the 
metrics that determine technical knowledge: academic degrees, governmental titles, and 
so on. With said knowledge, coastal decision-makers can, in turn, sacrifice those less 
knowledgeable, more resilient, to whatever future they imagine. 
  
Immediately after Kimberly deployed this rather transparent formulation of the technical 
in the meeting, an Elder of one of coastal Louisiana’s First Nations tribes fired back: 
“Sure, it’s technical, but it’s not rocket science either.” Robert Bullard apprehends how 
“the technical” is deployed against sacrificed/sacrificable communities, writing: “Current 
environmental decision making operates at the juncture of science, technology, 
economics, politics, special interests, and ethics and mirrors the larger social milieu 
where discrimination is institutionalized. Unequal environmental protection undermines 
three basic types of equity: procedural, geographic, and social” (Bullard 2001:4). In “A 
Brief History of Asian American Activism and Why It Matters for Environmental 
Justice,” Sunny Chan addresses the erasure of people of color write large and 
Asian/Americans in particular from environmentalism: “Because activists against 
environmental racism work in a style different from the more conventional approaches of 
environmental conservation, it has been easy to overlook their actions as not 
environmental in scope” (Chan 2018:172). Institutionalized environmental decision-
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making, then, erases what is not legible to it. Namely, the lives of Indigenous folks and 
people of color and the more-than-human communities and places they create life with. 
  
Taking seriously this notion that Asian/Americans’, Indigenous communities’, and other 
people of color’s environmentalism is illegible and thus not valuable to decision-makers, 
Nixon argues that sacrificed communities are “treated as disposable by turbo-
capitalism…[and] confronted with the militarization of both commerce and 
development” (Nixon 2011:4). As such, they “can seldom afford to be single-issue 
activists: their green commitments are seamed through with other economic and cultural 
causes as they experience environmental threat not as a planetary abstraction but as a set 
of inhabited risks, some imminent, others obscurely long term” (Nixon 2011:4). This 
makes legible the mechanisms by which, as Puar suggested in her work on debility, 
Vietnamese/Americans, who are already marked for slow death, must always exhibit both 
their sacrifice (racialized refugee debtors to the nation) and ability to endure in spite of it 
(refugee resilience) under CPRA’s disaster-reinforcing, restoration-based 
environmentalism which, I will show next, is exclusively interested in the reproduction 
and maintenance of the state. 
 
COMMUNITY SACRIFICE AND ‘GOOD’ SCIENCE 
 
While the master plan has placed an emphasis on the value of coastal communities (see 
Figures 17 and 18 below) in its literature, CPRA regularly disregards community needs 




Figure 17. A collage of photos representing coastal Louisiana residents, with a caption reading: “While 
coastal Louisiana provides the state, region, and nation with important natural resources, here the greatest 
assets are not oil and gas, fisheries, or sugar cane, but the people.” The inclusion of these images and the 
accompanying caption in the 2017 Master Plan for a Sustainable Coast is an example of how CPRA 
identifies coastal communities as both an asset and a justification for the way it implements restoration 
projects (Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority 2017:ES-3). 
Figure 18. This infographic is captioned: “Together, the Louisiana coast and the Mississippi River create 
billions in economic value” in the master plan. Here, we see that while people matter in the prior image, it 
is, in fact, the economic value of the region that is central to CPRA’s decision-making processes (Coastal 
Protection and Restoration Authority 2017:25). 
  
As I have suggested, one of the easiest ways to keep fisherfolk out of decision-making 
processes is to deny their expertise of the place they rely on to make life and livelihood. 
In three years of attending CPRA-led community forums, public comment sessions, and 
CPRA stakeholder meetings, community ‘input’ was never spoken about in proximity to 
expertise or knowledge. When myself, Sue, or others voiced our dismay that the people 
with whom we work were treated as red tape—public comments and responses to them 
were presented as a formality rather than used as a site for modifying or responding to 
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master plan projects, whose parameters were set far in advance of draft plans getting to 
the public—we were told CPRA had spaces for us to contribute to the plan’s design. 
  
The space they spoke about was a “community” focus group, one of five focus groups 
that brought together representatives from a particular subset of coastal stakeholders and 
ostensibly created a forum for stakeholder input. I learned later that the private 
landowner, energy and industry, and navigation groups did in fact function this way. 
However, the community focus group meetings I attended were sites for Authority 
representatives to speak about projects, as they were required to do, and nothing more. 
This met the base metric of a focus group, where attendees are kept informed (however, 
as CPRA was filtering what they shared with us, this could be debated), the people who 
ran the meeting consistently left less than ten minutes at the end of each meeting for 
questions. These meetings and question and answer periods did not give group members 
the opportunity to actually act as representatives of or advocates for their communities 
but instead made them passive consumers of state plans. The community focus group was 
dissolved following the 2017 master plan, and has not been replaced by another 
institutional or official forum. This shows, first, that ‘the community’ functions more as a 
metric than a heterogeneous group of people whose lives and livelihoods matter to the 
state, and second, that community knowledge will never be given legitimate weight or 








CPRA ENVIRONMENTALISM: LOBBYING & REDEFINING THE LEGAL 
CPRA’s MBSD narrative—“While coastal Louisiana provides the state, region, and 
nation with important natural resources, here the greatest assets are not oil and gas, 
fisheries, or sugar cane, but the people” (Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority 
2017:ES-3)—follows Anna Tsing’s understanding of social mobilizations. For Tsing, 
who is both critical of and finds value in social mobilizations, they are “facilitated by 
their appeal to diverse social groups, who find divergent means and meanings in the 
cause...are held up and redirected by their inclusion of varied groups, who disagree about 
what are supposed to be common causes and objects of concern. In this process, 
universalist causes are locally reconfigured, even as they are held by a wider-reaching 
charisma” (Tsing 2004:245-6). Through its use of risk-mitigation-centric 
environmentalism, CPRA makes the master plan a broadly charismatic site where 
differently positioned groups can come together around a common cause. While CPRA’s 
outreach work and rhetorical centering of coastal communities suggests that they have 
designed the process to be reconfigured at the local level—a narrative they reinforce by 
‘offering’ public comment sessions and at community-style meetings like FSS’s—the 
plan, through its broader charismatic reach, in fact reconfigures the local, reinforcing a 
single story of proper science-based environmentalism and coastal saviorship. 
  
Most importantly, these mobilizations form around collaborative objects, “which draw 
groups into common projects at the same time as they allow them to maintain separate 
agendas” (Tsing 2004:246). This was reinforced by Louisiana Governor John Bel 
Edwards at the fourth State of the Coast conference in 2016. Edwards opened the 
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conference saying: “Protecting and preserving our coast first, encompasses so much of 
what [Louisiana is] knowing for—Cajun culture, Native groups, surge barriers, 
sportsmen—and second, shows the unique ability of [coastal preservation as an] issue to 
bring folks together with a common cause” (Edwards 2016). By appealing to the value of 
coastal culture, Edwards reinforced that his administration, and under it, CPRA, has 
designed a plan of and for the people of Louisiana, effectively making an appeal for the 
master plan as a collaborative object where all Louisianians can see themselves, and 
through which they can forward common goals.  
 
For my purposes, and because MBSD has become the most widely written about, 
advocated-for, and significant project in the plan, rather than the master plan in its 
entirety, the object of CPRA’s environmental mobilization is the diversion itself. As an 
object, its primary purpose is building land and specific goal is intervening in disaster as 
an ongoing process. While variously contested, praised, and forced through red tape other 
projects would have no chance of meeting the criteria for, as a future event with serious 
present-day implications, the MBSD functions as a collaborative object that brings 
together environmentalists, people concerned about coastlines under climate change, 
folks engaged in restoration as a local and global project, and a myriad of planners, 
policymakers, governmental representatives, NGOs, in addition to coastal residents, 
small business owners, and other coast-dependent people at different times, intersecting 







FSS DIVERSION MEETING 
 
In May of 2017 just after the official master plan was passed, FSS attempted to bridge the 
divide between CPRA’s exclusionary decision-making model and our clients by hosting 
an MBSD-centered meeting that brought together Vietnamese/American fisherfolk, 
FSS’s partners, which included environmental NGOs like CRCL and Healthy Gulf, and 
coastal community-based organizations, and CPRA representatives. The meeting was 
held on the West Bank in the banquet hall of a Vietnamese restaurant next door to FSS’s 
offices. Sue planned this both to make fisherfolk comfortable (she said: “we want them to 
know this is on our turf—that it’s a place our [clients] know and come to” (Ha 2017)) and 
because the West Bank is a central node for Southeast Louisiana organizations to come 
together. Its relative proximity to Baton Rouge and our clients’ docks made it equally 
easy and difficult for all invited groups to travel to, although the time cost for our clients 
was much greater than that of state representatives, whose job it arguably is to travel 
throughout Southeast and South Louisiana to ‘educate’ the populace about their work. 
  
On the day, all of us at FSS woke up early and helped the restaurant’s staff set up the 
banquet hall, which, with its crystal sconces, royal blue velvet curtains, and painted gold 
filigree, was designed to host weddings and private Tết celebrations rather than 
governmental restoration meetings. As our clients, partners, and CPRA representatives 
filtered in, we asked each to sign in, allowing us to document the attendees. Additionally, 
we asked Vietnamese/American attendees to grab Vietnamese language packets my peers 
had made detailing the MBSD project plan as it had been outlined in the final 2017 
master plan. The packet also included a double-sided sheet of paper where they could 
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give comments regarding what they learned during the meeting. Once our 200-plus 
guests, overwhelmingly Vietnamese/American fisherfolk, settled in, Sue took the stage, 
erected five feet above the hall’s dance floor, and welcomed everyone with an 
impassioned speech about the value of coastal education and creating a space for 
community feedback.  
 
Figure 19. A photo I took during CPRA’s presentation during FSS’s diversion meeting.  
 
And then it was CPRA’s turn. One white man, a scientist who worked on the diversion 
project, stood behind a podium, allowing him access to a microphone and giving him 
control of a computer, from which a slide show presentation was projected on a large 
screen usually reserved for wedding videos and karaoke. The other CPRA representative 
was also an engineer; today, it is not unreasonable to think that he is the only 
Vietnamese/American in the entire organization, and was recruited on this trip for that 
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reason. In the months leading up to the meeting, Sue had suggested that she or Jane, both 
fluent in Vietnamese and, more importantly, in the language our clients used to talk about 
their businesses, the coast, and restoration, act as interpreter during CPRA’s presentation. 
Our contacts at CPRA had, in turn, assured Sue that they had their own interpreter, whose 
scientific acumen made him the ideal interpreter. 
  
As the CPRA portion of the day began, the white scientist launched into a practiced, 
dense explanation of each of the 30-plus slides. In his presentation, he detailed the 
USACE’s mismanagement of the Mississippi and the resulting coastal land loss, 
presented CPRA maps of a future with no diversion to highlight its land-building 
capacity, and explicated the diversion’s slated opening times in the spring, its proposed 
structure, and other minutiae about MBSD. As the white representative started to speak, 
the Vietnamese/American engineer took his own mic off its stand and assumed the affect 
of an MC: he paced the stage, initially speaking loudly and gesturing with each word, 
following the English language presentation of each slide with a passionate, but sparse 
interpretation. As the crowd continued to sit quietly, the Vietnamese/American scientist’s 
performance diminished. By the middle, he was offering our clients single sentence 
explanations of ideas it had taken his English-speaking peer over a minute to explicate. 
By presentation’s end, void of his earlier vigor, the Vietnamese/American scientist was 
muttering into the microphone, barely audible and it was clear even to me, whose 
Vietnamese has always been just below conversational in spite of years of study, was 




At this point, and much to the chagrin of Sue, who brings what follows up to this day, Vy 
Nguyen, who is not just a confidante of many of our clients but a long-time friend of 
Sue’s, stood up from her place at a banquet table set to the right of the stage to designate 
our special guests, and said: “I don’t mean to be rude, but less than twenty five percent of 
what was spoken [by Mr. Brown] was translated. I am going to ask people to raised their 
hands of they feel like they do not have enough information to comment on what was 
said.” From my station at the back of the room, I silently celebrated Vy’s intervention on 
behalf of the people for whom this presentation was meant but who were no clearer on 
the goals, and most importantly, the outcomes of the diversion for their fishery, than they 
had been forty-five minutes prior. As Vy asked her question in Vietnamese, over 80% of 
the fisherfolk assembled raised their hands, indicating that they had not learned anything 
from the presentation and as such, could not cconfidently comment on MBSD’s operation 
or output. Sue resumed the stage, her face pale and hands shaking. She thanked the 
CPRA representatives for their presentation and suggested we all break for lunch. 
  
I walked to the generous buffet our hosts had set up and used my broken Vietnamese to 
listen in as our clients joked about how horrible the presentation had been. Given their 
experiences of being underserved as residents, in disaster, and following myriad rounds 
of public meetings, public comments, and other ‘engagement opportunities,’ many 
fisherfolk felt that they were just there to be there. Walking into meetings like this, and 
after decades of being treated like lab rats in the machinery of Louisiana politics, they 
knew they would be neither educated nor heard. This cycle of receiving the ‘opportunity’ 
to engage in the decision-making process through the mechanism of public comments, 
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learning that their comments largely or wholly went unacknowledged once the final 
version of the policy, plan, ordinance, etc. is published, then being effectively told that 
they are not experts on the place, industry, ecosystems, etc. they personally rely on daily 
and as such, their contributions did not ‘fit’ the plan,  has become so devastating that they 
expected such a performance from CPRA. That FSS had been the organization to deliver 
it was both frustrating—we thought you all had our backs—and at the same time, 
softened the blow: Sue does have our best interests at heart, so we just have to grin and 
bear this most recent reminder of how little we matter. 
  
When we resumed the meeting, fisherfolk were given the opportunity to ask questions of 
CPRA. This process followed so many other meetings I had attended prior to this one: as 
Sue and Jane took turns translating our clients’ questions from Vietnamese to English, the 
white CPRA scientist shook his head: we just don’t know how the MBSD will impact 
shrimp. One older Vietnamese/American shrimper stood up, and in crystal clear English 
said: “you’re telling us our industry don’t matter,” to which the representative, as shaken 
as Sue had been half an hour before, told him, “Of course you matter! We just can’t tell 
you how diversions will impact shrimp.” The muttering of our assembled clients reached 
a fever pitch even before Sue translated what he had said in Vietnamese. No one bought 
this and frankly, they had no reason to; it was just more of the same nonsense they had 
been hearing since at least the 2012 plan, and for some, for a full decade. 
  
The rest of the day, while more community-focused, felt as ineffective. After the CPRA 
representatives and many of the big greens left, Vy and Sue shared the mic, trying to 
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make sense of the convoluted feedback form, which had clearly been passed through 
Google translate, making the resulting language a near-Vietnamese version of CPRA 
legal/scientific restoration language. This too had been done by CPRA rather than Jane or 
anyone else who had Vietnamese and coastal, shrimping-centric language acumen. Some 
overwhelmed, others annoyed, our clients, who cared for everyone at FSS and wanted to 
see us succeed, diligently scribbled a few words on the comment form, then began 
filtering out to smoke cigarettes outside of the restaurant, talk shit about another failed 
meeting, and head home knowing they had lost a day of work for little to no gain. 
*** 
Because CPRA’s engagement processes refuse the needs and knowledge of coastal 
residents, the fisherfolk I work with feel as though they have nowhere to turn to address 
what they know is impending doom. As I suggested above, as people who have also been 
subjected to innumerable coastal studies following disaster, and given the ways they have 
been made into objects of research by scholars (see the introduction), 
Vietnamese/Americans are well aware that the sites in and through which they are 
brought into conversations about the coast are not for them. Rather, as FSS’s diversion 
meetings and other ‘engagement opportunities’ I highlight below show, public comment 
sessions and community forums are a box for decision-makers to check on their road to 
pushing through policy, projects, and other legislation that was a foregone conclusion 
long before they reached the communities that will actually be affected by their 
implementation. At the same time, the way Vietnamese/Americans are brought into this 
conversation affirms that, rather than being valuable as community members, 
Vietnamese/American fisherfolk are useful because their resilience in the face of 
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everything that comes their way makes them a natural fit for caretaking an environmental 
sacrifice zone.  
  
While we had meant the day to be a community-centric meeting where our clients finally 
felt empowered to speak their truths and get tangible answers to their real, pressing 
questions, it had instead reinforced for them that decision-makers do not think about 
Vietnamese/Americans and fisherfolk as knowledgeable about, let alone experts of, the 
ecosystems and political landscape of Southeast Louisiana. In our quest to use the official 
landscape’s tools to dismantle it—or, at least make it more community-centric—we, a 
fisherfolk-centric organization who is not just sympathetic to, but adamant about uplifting 
Vietnamese/American and other fisherfolks’ concerns and deep, generational, 
heterogeneous, and nuanced knowledge of their industry and the places they live and 
work, had only reaffirmed and highlighted the ways Vietnamese/Americans are left out 
of the master plan process in the present such that they are foreclosed from its imagined 
future. 
  
As this meeting showed and, following Bahng on risk, the MBSD is CPRA’s corrective 
to the fear of a disaster-subsumed future. The state at once produces and seeks to 
recuperate a former state of pre- or non-disaster through restoration. Each time a CPRA 
representative reaffirms that they cannot say what the diversion will do to oyster, finfish, 
and shrimp populations, state waters, and the larger commercial fishing ecosystem, they 
are writing these populations, state waters, and the larger commercial fishing ecosystem 
out of existence. The fact that a science-based plan doesn’t understand the science of its 
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own project shows how deliberate Vietnamese/American sacrifice is—it is not that 
CPRA does not know the science underwriting the project, but rather that it does not 
focus on the ways this science will impact communities summarily refuses them a place 
in the state’s terra nullius future landscape. This elision and erasure is produced by 
CPRA’s restoration-specific, diversion-centered environmentalism, which has been 
formulated by power brokers and that CPRA emplaces itself in through alliances it builds 
in relation to the diversion. This was highlighted in my experiences at State of the Coast, 
where community members, coastal tribal Elders, and small business owners like 
commercial fisherfolk were not present, but private industry members, ‘good’ scientists, 
and governmental and NGO-based representatives were effectively having the 
conversations that shape the coast today and well into the future behind closed doors. 
This elision shows, too, how CPRA’s environmentalism pivots on upholding some 
knowledges and rejecting others, namely the wealth of regional, ecosystem-level, and 
industry-specific expertise Vietnamese/Americans have developed to survive in 
Southeast Louisiana. 
*** 
In the following section, I trace some of the ways Louisiana representatives and CPRA 
officials have used their primacy as environmental decision-makers to force MBSD 
through federal and state-level red tape. To do this, I critically trace the ways MBSD 
functions as an object of statecraft that, packaged in the language of environmentalism, 
ensures a future for state oil, shipping, and tourism capital, as well as its major cities. 
This allows me to further interrogate how MBSD-centered environmentalism subjects 
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Vietnamese/American fisherfolk to ongoing slow violence in the form of disaster- and 
refugee-predicated resilience in the state’s terra nullius void of risk.  
 
COASTAL LOUISIANA: AN EMERGENCY 
“Projections of futurity abound, each preoccupied with fears of oncoming deterioration, 
disaster, or accident. Some invite us to buy into these futures markets, placing bets on 
which will return the best dividends; others imagine things differently.” 
-Aimee Bahng, Migrant Futures (2018:9) 
 
In spring 2017, USACE was solidifying their approach to the Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) for Mid-Barataria, projecting a 5-year timeline to project completion. 
Louisiana Governor John Bel Edwards and several congressmen felt this timeline failed 
to acknowledge the urgency with which they were forwarding the project and, on April 
19th, 2017, the same day the final 2017 master plan was approved by CPRA, Edwards 
declared a State of Emergency for Coastal Louisiana. The State of Emergency was the 
first of several tactics Louisiana officials employed to appeal to the federal government to 
accelerate the process. In a press release from his office, Governor Edwards explained:  
 
The Louisiana coast is in a state of crisis that demands immediate and urgent 
action to avert further damage to one of our most vital 
resources…Immediately addressing this crisis will rejuvenate Louisiana’s 
economy and provide benefits across generations and positively impact the 
nation’s economy, including energy production; transportation and 
refining; intermodal commerce and trade; fisheries; disaster resilience; and 
natural resources (Office of the Governor 2017). 
 
The press release went on: “Louisiana’s coast is home to over half of the state’s 
population and significant industries that provide jobs, taxes, and products that are 
intertwined with the entire state’s wellbeing and economic productivity. These coastal 
resources are also vital to the national interest in the areas of energy, chemicals, 
international trade, fisheries, and national defense” (Office of the Governor 2017). By 
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framing disaster resilience as both an environmental threat and an economic benefit, 
Edwards appealed to the 45th administration’s recent interest in “High Priority 
Infrastructure Projects.” In March of the same year, 45 had signed an executive order 
entitled ‘Expediting Environmental Reviews and Approvals for High Priority 
Infrastructure Projects,’ after which Edwards had sent a letter appealing for 45 to flag the 
master plan as “high priority,” (Edwards 2017) to which 45 did not respond. 
  
A Nola.com article on the state of emergency explained that “The proclamation is to be 
sent to [45] and members of Congress. Edwards wants [45] to declare coastal erosion a 
national emergency and pressure the Army Corps of Engineers and other federal agencies 
to speed approvals for sediment diversion projects and other initiatives outlined in 
Louisiana's $50 billion, 50-year coastal master plan” (Baurick 2017). This suggests that, 
rather than stemming from concern over coastal land loss writ large, Edwards was 
demanding that the EIS process be expedited specifically for MBSD. This is confirmed 
later in the article: “Edwards also is asking Congress to change federal laws to exclude 
coastal restoration projects from environmental laws. In the alternative, he asked that 
Congress allow approvals under a special fast-tracked process” (Baurick 2017, emphasis 
mine). The laws the article refers to are the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), the 
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), and the 
Interjurisdictional Fisheries Act (IJFA), which, as I outlined in the introduction, are key 
laws that regulate fisheries and ensuring the health of more-than-human marine species 
commercial fisherfolk rely on. Critically, while commercial fisherfolk must observe these 
laws to the letter—a practice they overwhelmingly benefit from, as fisheries stock are 
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kept robust through monitoring under each—in the above appeal, Edwards does not 
believe the state of Louisiana should be required to do the same. The governor and 
CPRA’s eagerness to circumvent environmental laws, which overwhelmingly apply to 
marine fish and mammal species, shows that the diversion is not intended to (re)build 
land for commercial fisherfolk or their families, but to preserve the ecosystems needed 
for continued private oil and gas investment.  
 
As I suggested in the introduction, this commitment to circumventing environmental 
protections also showed up during State of the Coast 2018 when a prominent CPRA 
official suggested that they would find ways around all three acts. It is clear now that the 
irony of this allusion is that the Vietnamese/American and other fisherfolk sacrificed in 
favor of building and operating the MBSD must adhere to every letter of each of these 
laws to remain in good standing with LDWF, NOAA, and the Coast Guard to maintain 
their businesses and community. This, in addition to all of these methods of creating state 
workarounds to what it sees as hurdles and community members feel the economic, legal, 
and social pressure of, highlights how MBSD has always and will continue to operate 
outside of the everyday ‘given’ structures that contain residents’ mobility in service to a 
governance-produced imaginary that, unbounded in this way, easily elides regulation.  
 
GRAVES’ ENDANGERED CAJUNS 
While Edwards’ letter and declaration of a state emergency failed to elicit a response, 
they set a precedent for subsequent attempts at accelerating the EIS process or otherwise 
pushing MBSD through without a full EIS. The most absurd approach was that of former 
CPRA Director and now-Louisiana Congressman Garret Graves, who introduced an 
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amendment to designate Louisiana’s Cajuns as an endangered species before the House 
Natural Resource Committee on October 10, 2017 (Graves 2017). Graves argued that by 
requiring an Environmental Impact Statement for the project, the federal government is 
preventing CPRA from restoring Cajun habitat. In naming South Louisiana Cajuns’ 
“habitat,” Graves makes Cajuns the region’s primary stakeholders. This, first, nativizes 
an early colonial community, at once erasing the existence of Chata, Houma, 
Chittimacha, Atakapaw, and Chickasaw first peoples and equating settlement with 
inheritance. Second, in evacuating Indigenous and other communities of color from 
South Louisiana, Graves re-imagines the relationship between the region’s history and its 
land, water, and people, which sets a precedent for erasing the folks with whom I work 
from the region.  
 
The primary concentration of the Cajun community is in an area called Acadiana (or land 
of the Acadians, which was Cajuns’ identifier when they fled British colonial persecution 
in Nova Scotia to Louisiana in the 17th and 18th centuries) spans central coastal 
Louisiana. As you can see from the map below (Figure 20), Lafourche parish is 
Acadiana’s southeastern-most edge, which lies across the bay from the diversion site, and 




Figure 20. Map of coastal Louisiana indicating the boundaries of Acadiana in orange (American Planning 
Association Louisiana Chapter 2019).  
 
Examining the map, it becomes clear that declaring Cajuns an endangered species is most 
useful in that it would set a precedent for implementing future coastal projects. Writing 
about the erasure of First Nations communities, Winona LaDuke says “This is the 
problem with history. If you make the victim disappear, there is no crime” (LaDuke 
2017). For Graves and his peers, endangerment operates on a spectrum: Indigenous first 
people, people of color, and all other underserved residents of the coast occupy one end 
and Cajuns the other. In the middle lie ‘resources’ including land, water, more-than-
human communities, infrastructure, and, most importantly, state legibility. In this 
configuration, Vietnamese/American shrimpers and their community, Isle de Jean 
Charles tribal members, oyster leaseholders, and so many others are mobile whereas 
Cajuns are fixed; many communities must be resilient to survive while one requires that 
the state adapt to ensure their—or more pointedly, its own—survival. That Isle de Jean 
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Charles’ residents have been forced to adapt to survive the ongoing state-sanctioned 
genocide to which LaDuke alludes (and are now being asked to resettle), points to the 
deep power imbalance inherent in Graves’ articulation of Cajun “habitat.” 
*** 
Although Graves’ measure failed and CPRA has yet to get the green light to throw 
marine protections out the window, the very possibility of their appeals 
simultaneously amplifies and erases how power operates at the intersections of 
governance, coastal restoration, resource use and management, land and water habitat 
preservation, race, and class. By using Cajuns as a strawman to center state interests 
above all else, Graves both irreversibly rearranges the geography of the coast and sets 
a precedent for how decision-makers deploy it in discourse. This, in turn, reinscribes 
the value of settler colonialist governance over Indigenous communities’, 
Vietnamese/Americans’, and other underserved communities’ survival. Put 
differently, by forwarding and yet ultimately failing to secure endangered species 
status for Cajuns, Graves highlights the deeply colonialist threads that run through the 
state’s environmental imaginary. Similarly, CPRA’s insistence on dissolving 
environmental protections for some of Louisiana’s inhabitants—the ones, 
incidentally, that shrimpers rely on to make their living and life in Southeast 
Louisiana—shows that the state’s diversion-centered environmentalism is nothing 
like Vietnamese/American, Indigenous, or other coastal peoples’. Together, Graves, 
former head of CPRA, and the current representative show that, instead, Louisiana's 
restoration environmentalism is a technical, ‘good science’-backed one that reaffirms 
the need for diversions—but not for Vietnamese/Americans—in Southeast Louisiana. 
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ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT SCOPING MEETINGS & 
COMMENTS 
 
In the lead-up to the USACE’s Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), which allows 
them to develop an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to ensure that a project meets 
the federal government’s definition of environmental justice under the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Corps conducted scoping meetings, meant to be 
informational for attendees as well as sites for locals to submit oral public comments, 
throughout July 2017. 
 
Sue asked me to go with her to one of the scoping meetings in Belle Chasse, a central 
node of commercial fishing in the delta, last minute; when we arrived at the Belle Chasse 
Auditorium at 5:10 pm, I realized that while I had worn my official FSS shirt and good 
slacks for the event, I had been rushing to meet Sue and instead of more presentable 
shoes, had worn Birkenstocks to an even well-attended by suit-wearing USACE and 
CPRA representatives. The auditorium, which, from the outside, looked like an old 
coastal church, had been renovated earlier that year. Like a church, it had one primary 
meeting area that ran the width of the building and boasted beautiful vaulted ceilings. 
Rather than pews, the center of the room was filled with folding chairs, which were 
overwhelmingly occupied by our clients, who wore what they had worked in that day—
house slippers, muddied once-white shrimping boots, jeans and t-shirts—in addition to 
heavy black headsets. For this and other meetings, the Corps had contracted an 
interpretation service to interpret the evening’s presentations in real time. Three 
interpreters sat at a collapsible picnic table in the back of the room where, I imagined, 
they traded off relaying USACE and CPRA’s message. I stood in the back corner of the 
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massive room where I hoped my chipped toe polish and worn-in sandals wouldn’t be as 
noticeable.  
 
My shoe discomfort was borne entirely of the room’s tone; our clients, numbering about 
200, felt matched in numbers by tall, impeccably dressed agency officials who had set up 
large, academic-style posters full of diversion maps and statistics against both walls on 
either side of the folding chairs. At the front of the space, a USACE representative 
delivered opening remarks from a podium, an enormous screen full of text behind them. 
As USACE and CPRA officials traded off speaking their piece, I saw fisherfolk examine 
the program, lean toward their partners, and discuss what they were hearing. It was all 
incredibly familiar to me at this point; whereas FSS’s diversion meeting presentation had 
gone on for almost 45 minutes, what was being covered this evening was short and basic. 
As the programming came to a close, a USACE representative gestured to a set of 
questions on a slide behind him and told the crowd that there were official reporters 
available following the meeting. The idea was that if folks wished to give oral rather than 
written comments, the reporters would listen—for up to three minutes, which I had 
observed was the standard oral comment time for both state and federal business—and 
record what commenters said such that their ideas would be added to the pool of scoping 
comments USACE was currently in the process of soliciting. Several well-dressed folks 
stood up and waved, indicating that they were those to whom comments could be 
addressed.  
 
I looked up from examining my program as metal folding chairs ground against the 
newly finished mahogany flooring and our clients began filing out of the 
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auditorium, realizing that not one ‘audience member’ took USACE up on the opportunity 
to give oral comments. USACE has also left a stack of comment cards at the interpreter 
table, which most of the attendees did pick up on their way out. Sue rushed out the door, 
and I was left to make small talk with the CPRA representatives and organizational heads 
I recognized. After about twenty minutes, I went to look for her—she was my ride back 
to New Orleans—and found Sue squatting on the auditorium's clapboard steps, smoking, 
and listening to the twenty-odd fisherfolk who had formed a circle around her. Upon 
seeing me, she said her goodbyes and we walked back to her pickup. Closing the door, 
she rolled her eyes and said “Another pointless meeting. You know what we’re gonna 
do? We’re gonna turn our office into a formal place for our fisher[folk] to give 
comments. We’ll help them and translate and shit—that way they can feel comfortable” 
(Nguyen 2017). 
 
What our clients had told Sue—what I already knew reading the room—was that the 
event, as formal as any we had attended behind closed doors, was deeply alienating for 
them. While they had had access to interpretation, which, in the summer of 2017, was 
only then becoming something state and federal officials considered when organizing 
events, hearing everything the speakers said only reaffirmed what they already knew: 
MBSD was coming, it would hurt them, and not one slide or word addressed how. As one 
of our clients later wrote in their comments: “the scoping meeting processes wasn’t very 
effective in hearing people’s opinions. They instructed us to choose one of the 3 





A 60-day public comment period (July 6 – September 5, 2017) overlapped the meeting 
we attended, in addition to two others in Lafitte and Port Sulphur which, to USACE’s 
credit, were also in areas where many of our clients worked, lived, or both. During the 
comment period, written comments could be submitted by anyone living in the MBSD 
project area and Southeast Louisiana using a form that, when folded in half, already bore 
the Corps’ local mailing address and pre-paid postage. In the six weeks leading up to the 
scoping comments deadline, Sue followed through on her plan to make our offices a hub 
of support: FSS conducted outreach throughout its service area and in our client networks 
to let residents know they could receive linguistic and technical help submitting their 
comments. 293 clients participated in this process and wrote their own comments with 
the help of Jane and Sarah. Many were written by fisherfolk themselves in Vietnamese 
and English; some were interpreted, then translated by staff members from Vietnamese 
into English.  
 
Sarah scanned each written comment into digital form and uploaded it to our system, 
giving every FSS staff member access to our clients’ comments. Sorting through them, I 
chose to screenshot several responses (all of which I removed names from and that have 
since been made public in the USACE’s Scoping Report (USACE 2017)) in English that 
are representative of the general tenor and breadth of FSS’s clients’ collective comments. 
I also chose these comments because they represent the perspectives of fisherfolk who 
work on boats every day, as well as their partners and dependents, all of whom will be 
similarly affected by MBSD. More, the authors of these comments represent the 
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experiences of the majority of Vietnamese/American residents in Southeast Louisiana 
who are all connected to a commercial fishing boat in some way, be it socially, 
economically, and through given and chosen kinship networks.  
 
Figure 21. Comment 1, which reads: “Diversion affects: (1) my business (2) my lifestyles (3) my future. 
What the government should do for me: (1) give me a grand w/low to no interest rate so I can build myself 
a bigger boat. (2) provide me some job training so I can get a new job. Plus, Louisiana should hire people 
from Louisiana instead of out of state people [to work on the diversion]. My job training should be 
specifically for coastal restoration jobs. (3) Buy me out (business and property) so I can go into a different 





Figure 22. Comment 2, which reads: “I do not agree with the releasing of the freshwater into the saltwater 
for many reasons. My father will not make enough money to pay for our family. He is the worker of our 
family, meaning he is the one who is paying for our financial bills and education for my brother and me. 
My mom cannot speak English, so she stays home and takes care of the house and her children. We have 
friends who have the same occupation as my father, and they depend on the profit that they make to 
survive. If you decided to release the freshwater, keep in mind all the lives you would make more difficult 
and all the hard work you would put down the drain. Many of the fishermen have children that, with the 
release, will have to work in order to help their father. I understand that it’s a small thing to ponder about, 
but the release of freshwater will move the shrimp away, creating less shrimp to profit [off] of. Please don’t 
release the freshwater. It can create a gruesome impact in our lives and many of others who have worked 





Figure 23. Comment 3, which reads: “I don’t doubt the Corp’s ability to build this project. All I’m asking 
is for the EIS and powers that be to consider the lives and communities that will be impacted by the project. 
The MBSD project would definitely kill brown shrimp (May) season. When the brown shrimp migrate 
somewhere else those who are able to come after them (shrimp) need bigger boats and have them IF they 
are fortunate but what about those that don’t? I’m fortunate to have the skills needed to be a successful 
fisherman but that’s it, my skills are solely fishing skills. With the diversions, us fishermen would lose 6 
weeks work of work. I would like to see a funding program in place to assist the ‘true’ commercial 
fishermen [to] make their boats bigger. Fishermen need to be compensated one way or another, we need 
help!” (GEC 2018a).  
 
Together, the comments above cohere to represent a depth and breadth of community-
based knowledges that exist within the Vietnamese/American Southeast Louisiana 
community that directly confront and engage with the official narrative meant to subsume 




1. The future of commercial shrimpers requires maintaining a particular kind 
of ecosystem-level health in Barataria Bay and along the coast more broadly: 
Shrimp require primarily saltwater to survive and reproduce; this is particularly 
true of brown shrimp, who, as Figure 8: Shrimp Lifecycle in the introduction 
shows, require the muddy marsh to reach maturity. Commercial fisherfolk have a 
feel for the water’s health—they study salinity levels, follow moon charts to know 
when tides will come in and go out. They know what water and shrimp, other 
marine communities, wind and weather feel like below their feet and in their 
bodies. While CPRA says they do not know what will happen to shrimp when 
MBSD is opened, fisherfolk absolutely do.  
2. An influx of freshwater will push shrimp out of state waters: As I have 
suggested, most of FSS’s clients are economically dependent on state waters for 
their income first, because they, as comment 3 suggests, cannot afford to build 
boats that are big enough to shrimp in federal waters and second, because the 
permitting and other regulatory processes that govern each kind of shrimping are 
drastically different—the kinds of licenses, permits, and insurance required to 
shrimp in federal waters are not just financially prohibitive for lower-income 
fisherfolk; for a decade, a moratorium on new federal shrimping permits has 
prevented fisherfolk with the means to build or buy bigger boats from entering 
federal/offshore waters. If shrimp are no longer abundant in state waters because 
the water itself is inhospitable to their survival, most commercial fisherfolk will 
no longer be able to support their businesses, families, and community. 
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3. Shrimping is most folks’ primary or only skill set: Specifically for fisherfolk 
older than 60 and with limited or no formal English, seeking work in another 
industry feels near impossible. This is not because folks have not tried; 
commercial shrimping has been a tenuous source of income since BP, and folks 
who rely it have sought out alternative employment at various times; most have 
returned to their boats either because they could not find other jobs or because it 
became clear that they could not support their families with the minimum wage, 
multiple-shift work they were able to secure outside the industry.  
4. Shrimpers understand the economy of Southeast Louisiana and know they 
cannot survive without the industry: This goes to number three, and specifically 
addresses the portions of comments that suggest government-funded training 
programs, loans, and buyouts. However, in suggesting these measures—which are 
often positioned as ‘mitigation’ measures by decision-makers and which, 
significantly, CPRA has never included in any master plan or annual plan—FSS’s 
clients are well aware that they will never come to fruition. Rather, these ideas for 
formalizing a diversion-related set of mechanisms for supporting the effects of 
freshwater inundation into Barataria Bay recognizes and recenters commercial 
fishing as an entity unto itself—lifts it up as a set of interrelated and 
interdependent human and more-than-human communities that will certainly need 
a new way of life or, barring life, a new way of imagining, once it is wiped out.  
 
While these responses seem to in some ways reflect the official landscape back to itself, 
by re-centering the value of commercial shrimping not just to individuals, but as an 
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industry that is firmly situated in the ecosystems of Southeast Louisiana and within the 
bedrock of the region’s Vietnamese/American community, these comments reflect a 
community-based knowledge of how the coast actually works. By directly addressing the 
silences that surround and the opacity of CPRA’s process, silences that are firmly a part 
of the Authority’s official landscape, FSS’s clients refuse their foreclosure in the oil-
centric, risk-mitigating terra nullius the state has been crafting for a decade. These 
comments push against a CPRA-produced imaginary of the coast that not just excludes, 
but evacuates Vietnamese/American and commercial fishing from the delta and the 
diversion.  
 *** 
As our understanding of our clients’ expertise around the diversion was reinforced by 
their comments, Sue and I incorporated the above knowledges into an official FSS public 
comment, which I have replicated in full below: 
  
To Whom It May Concern,                           August 30, 2017 
  
[Fisheries Support Services (FSS)] is the only 501(c)(3) non-profit dedicated to serving 
the industry-specific needs of Southeast Louisiana’s commercial fisher[folk], fishing-
dependent small business owners, and their families. [FSS’s] primary function is to support 
our clients through business technical assistance and training in imperative operational 
skills, and act as a liaison between commercial fishermen and key agencies to keep them 
up to date on shifting coastal circumstances. 
  
Over the last 3 years, we have provided outreach and education to our clients regarding 
the Mid-Barataria Bay Sediment Diversion, the projected design and implementation of 
which could drastically impact the area’s shrimp and oyster populations. The majority of 
[FSS’s] 1,300 clients fish highly regulated inside [state] waters, which makes them more 
economically vulnerable and significantly more reliant on the coast’s ecological health. 
To this end, we wish to submit comments based on the feedback we have received from 
Southeast Louisiana’s commercial fisher[folk] regarding the Army Corps’ EIS of the 




Given our clients’ feedback, we are concerned about the following ecosystem-level issues: 
• Running diversions primarily in the spring when up-stream water volume is highest 
will suffocate juvenile shrimp, crabs, and other species, who use the bay to reach 
maturity from March to May. This will drastically impact both the size and volume 
of shrimp in the bay and Gulf writ large.  
• As oysters are stationary throughout their life-cycle, they will instantly die any time 
the diversion is run. This will harm and potentially indefinitely shut down the 
fishery in the bay and surrounding areas; 
• Inundating the bay with fresh water will kill most shrimp larvae in the area. Those 
that do survive will be pushed further out into the Gulf, beyond the inside water 
boundary designated by the Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries Commission. This 
will disallow the majority of our clients from participating in the industry, forcing 
them to find employment and possibly, residence, elsewhere. 
• this study should explicitly identify the impacts of the diversion on brown shrimp, 
white shrimp, oysters, and other seafood that is the foundation of Louisiana’s 3rd 
largest industry to holistically evaluate the direct effects of diversions not just on 
marine life, but on the thousands of commercial boat owners, deckhands, fishing-
dependent small businesses, and families who rely on them for survival. 
  
Our clients have also identified several community-specific issues, as follows: 
• The diversion will cause more flooding in low-lying communities; over 20% of our 
clients live on the coast, and 100% of them dock their boats and process their catch 
there. Diversion-related flooding is likely to impact local fisher[folks’] homes and 
displace their families, and inflict physical damages the vessels docked in these 
areas.  
• Diverting oyster leases will create job decline throughout Southeast Louisiana. As 
CPRA has not allocated any mitigation funding for fisher[folk[ to relocate or train 
for new careers, many of the region’s oyster[folk] will be out of a job.  
• Will there be loan and grant programs for commercial fishing and other small 
businesses to assist in transitioning their operations and perform upgrades to 
mitigate potential loss for sustainability.  
• The diversion will severely impact the entire commercial fishing industry, which 
our clients rely on as their and their families’ only source of income. This is 
particularly true of families living along the coast. 
Louisiana’s commercial fisher[folk supply over 26% of the U.S.’s shrimp and Barataria 
Bay represents at least 41% of that catch. If diversions run as projected, this number could 
sink into the single digits, disbanding the fishery and devastating its workers. We believe 
that the Army Corps, CPRA, and other state agencies must create forums for addressing 
commercial fisher[folk] and their communities’ concerns before building a structure that 
will drastically impact thousands of industry-dependent families. Part of this outreach must 
include a much more detailed assessment of CPRA’s process, their project evaluation and 
implementation timeline, and most importantly, the true impact of diversions on our 
fisheries and the future of our industry. To date, we have only received clear information 
regarding the division's ability to build land; those in charge must study and circulate 
equally robust information about its effects on industry-dependent species (shrimp, oysters, 
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crab, finfish, etc.) and Louisiana’s commercial fishermen and coastal residents. We also 
specifically ask that the U.S. Army Corps explores other approaches to running the 
diversion such that it harms brown shrimp, white shrimp, oysters, and other species as 
little as possible. 
  
Finally, our clients have posed several key questions, including: 
1. Will there be a state-led community mitigation plan if key fisheries and/or the entire 
industry is harmed by freshwater inundation? Will there be a mitigation plan for 
damaged boats, docks, and gear? 
2. Will fisher[folk] who are unable to work as a direct result of the diversion receive 
financial support to train in new industries and/or transition their businesses. 
3. Will there be state assistance if the community have to relocate? 
4. What is the state planning to do with the thousands of oyster leases in Barataria 
Bay and adjoining waterways? 
5. Will there be a fund allocated to train fisher[folk] in other industries and help them 
transition to more economically secure jobs in the face of an uncertain ecological 
future? 
  
Our job is to ensure that Southeast Louisiana’s fisherfolk can provide for their families as 
consistently and equitably as possible. Exploring the Mid-Barataria Bay diversion’s 
impact to fisheries is imperative to not only the future of thousands of fishing families, but 





I feel that the most significant portion of this comment are the five questions at the end. 
As an aggregate of our clients’ comments, this list represents their truest, densest, most 
personal concerns. Taken together, they can be read as: why don’t you care? When will 
you, if ever?  
*** 
CONCLUSION: COMMUNITY KNOWLEDGE & ACCELERATED TIMELINES 
CPRA’s official landscape has looked, sounded, and elided the same way for roughly a 
decade: If MBSD as it is currently designed pivots on the science of building the most 
land, and if the problem it was designed to solve is land loss, and if land loss was a 
problem that first impacted coastal people who asked for state support the mitigate the 
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same, then MBSD is not just executing the best possible plan for land building, but for 
every Louisianian who lives on the coast. 
 
Conversely, the letter FSS submitted to USACE is a contribution to and illustration of the 
community-centric landscape of Southeast Louisiana commercial fishing and 
Vietnamese/American life. Whereas the official landscape refuses the very fact of 
Vietnamese/Americanness, shrimping, and coastal knowledges, FSS’s statement firmly 
uplifts and centers all of these lifeworlds and ways of knowing. At the same time, 
because we were in a position where we were speaking in a formal capacity as the sole 
organization who represents commercial fisherfolk in the region and as such, could not 
wholly alienate CPRA or USACE, our letter reads much more gently than fisherfolks’ 
public comments. The intermediary-ness of Sue and my peers’ position knowing much 
about the official landscape and also as Vietnamese/Americans who live within and 
(re)produce a collective landscape every day is unique and imperative to the ongoing 
visibility of this community-based knowledge through our work. 
 
In fall 2017, USACE released its scoping report, which included every comment 
submitted to them and the final EIS chapters they would be addressed in, which included 
purpose and need, alternatives, affected environment, environmental consequences, 
compliance and other environmental laws and regulations, and public involvement 
chapters (GEC 2018b). While I had witnessed the ways the EIS had failed to do justice 
for the Standing Rock Sioux tribe in North Dakota—in part because the federal 
government refused to take USACE’s Dakota Access Pipeline EIS findings or 
recommendations seriously, and in part because the EIS itself understood the capital 
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interests of private landowners and other economically important stakeholders as just as 
valuable as tribal concerns about their primary waterway being devastated by pipeline 
construction and oil spills and their sovereign land being harmed by the same—seeing 
our clients’ comments reproduced in full and flagged as significant to USACE’s 
evaluation process gave me some hope that the Corps would create parameters for the 
diversion that  took commercial fisheries’ needs into account.  
*** 
 
Figure 24. The most recent MBSD project timeline in CPRA’s 2020 annual plan, where steps in grey (1-3) 
have already been executed, and those in navy are slated to be completed in the next two years (Coastal 
Protection and Restoration Authority 2019:25). 
  
CPRA’s 2020 budget included the most up-to-date timeline for completing the diversion, 
which is detailed above in Figure 24. As the timeline shows, Edwards’, CPRA’s, and 
Graves’ lobbying successfully reduced USACE’s EIS timeline from the projected 5 to 2 
years. This was because, after much outreach on the part of Louisiana’s representatives, 
the 45th administration finally intervened in late January 2018, when it mandated that the 
EIS take no longer than two years (Stole 2018). More recently, CPRA representatives 
told a roomful of fisherfolk that they must stop talking about “if,” shifting the 
conversation to “when.” Instead of listening to the experts—those whose very lives rely 
on maintaining and cultivating the coast in spite of decision-maker-produced disaster—
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state and federal actors push ever forward in a battle not toward salvation, but for capital. 
By making land stable, oil can consistently be transported on the region’s highways and 
refined near its small towns, and Baton Rouge and New Orleans retain their land buffers, 
making them more stable in the face of the next 100-year storm.  
*** 
Today, the risk presented by Louisiana’s disaster-full future is mitigated through its real-
time restoration and environmental work. However, the EIS is a federal rather than state 
process that is meant to meet the federal government’s definition of environmental justice 
(EJ), which NEPA defines as follows: 
 
Executive Order 12898, ‘Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice 
in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations,’ provides that ‘each 
Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of its 
mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately 
high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, 
policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income 
populations.’ The Executive Order makes clear that its provisions apply 
fully to programs involving Native Americans. In the memorandum to 
heads of departments and agencies that accompanied Executive Order 
12898, the President specifically recognized the importance of procedures 
under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) for identifying and 
addressing environmental justice concerns. The memorandum states that 
‘each Federal agency shall analyze the environmental effects, including 
human health, economic and social effects, of Federal actions, including 
effects on minority communities and low-income communities, when such 
analysis is required by [NEPA].’ The memorandum particularly emphasizes 
the importance of NEPA's public participation process, directing that ‘each 
Federal agency shall provide opportunities for community input in the 
NEPA process.’ Agencies are further directed to ‘identify potential effects 
and mitigation measures in consultation with affected communities, and 
improve the accessibility of meetings, crucial documents, and notices’ 
(Council on Environmental Quality 1997:1). 
 
The above is the directive USACE must follow when scoping for, undergoing, and 
creating the final report under the EIS. In the aforementioned coalition meetings FSS 
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attends, many members of community-based organizations were puzzled by the fact that 
the timeframe required to do environmental justice could change so drastically—what, 
we wondered, would fall out of the USACE’s assessment if the EIS was reduced by three 
years? As David Naguib Pellow suggests in a roundtable on environmental justice:  
 
In my community and in my view, environmental justice is a goal, a vision, 
and a practice in which no community is unfairly burdened with 
environmental harms and when social justice, democracy, and ecological 
sustainability prevail. It is also a process and a goal of recognizing that we 
live in and have always lived in multispecies societies and that we must 
work to make those multispecies societies multispecies democracies. It is 
also a vision of regenerative development, where our activities don’t seek 
to merely reduce socioecological harm (which is generally the rather limited 
goal of sustainability), but rather they seek to produce benefits and 
prosperity for the denizens of our socioecological systems. In other words, 
it is a practice and theory of indispensability—where we are all viewed as 
critical participants in creating and sustaining our democratic collective 
present and futures (Bauer et al. 2019). 
 
This definition of EJ is much closer to the practices of the folks with whom I work. 
Although environmental justice is not an immediate part of their communal or shrimping 
lexicon, as Pinderhughes, Chan, Nixon have variously argued, environmental struggles 
are the undercurrent of many sacrificed communities’ day-to-day struggles for labor, 
economic, health, and civil rights (Pinderhughes 1996).  
 
The imbrication of folks’ struggles for rights is most visible in Pellow’s argument that 
under environmental justice, “our activities don’t seek to merely reduce socioecological 
harm (which is generally the rather limited goal of sustainability), but rather they seek to 
produce benefits and prosperity for the denizens of our socio-ecological systems.” This 
approach to environmental justice centers the value of communities as well as their 
commensurate and thoughtful role within a larger ecosystem, rather than a top-down 
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analysis that centers neoliberal risk-mitigation, as the EIS does. Kai Bosworth has argued 
that under NEPA, USACE adjudicates environmental justice through the Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS) process (Bosworth 2018). Put differently, the EIS is the federal 
government’s analog to CPRA’s risk-mitigating environmentalism—rather than uplifting 
the environmental and ecosystem-level knowledge and needs of communities who rely 
on them, following Harney and Moten’s understanding of policy as subsumption, both 
organizations craft their own understanding of environment and community such that 
both serve their own ends. The primary difference between CPRA and USACE’s use of 
‘the environmental’ is the federal government’s insistence that the EIS is actually a 
practice of doing environmental justice. It remains to be seen exactly what this will look 
like, but given the historical precedent New Orleans, Louisiana, and the CPRA have set 
in the work of maintaining an official landscape that sees disaster on the horizon and 
works to secure its economic investments over the livelihoods and lives of 




















CHAPTER FOUR: VISIONARY RESPONSE & IMAGINING OTHERWISE  
IN VIETNAMESE/AMERICAN 
 
As many will remember, several major storms and hurricanes rolled through the Gulf 
during the 2017 hurricane season; images of Houstonians trapped in situ after Hurricane 
Harvey and of Puerto Rico and the Solomon Islands ravaged by Hurricane Maria evoked 
Katrina comparisons in the press and in the nervous systems of all Southeast 
Louisianians. Prior to Harvey making landfall along Texas’ eastern coastline, coastal 
Louisiana was bracing for impact. As Chú Anh told me: “Katrina taught us what to do 
next time—we are prepared for another Katrina” (Anh 2018). Wanting to know what this 
looked like, I called Sue and asked her how our clients were faring: “Simi, they’re all on 
their boats.” I was overwhelmed by nerves—knowing a hurricane was coming, the 
captains, deckhands, dock owners, and dock workers we work with had stayed in or on 
the Gulf? I had assumed from Chú Anh’s simple statement that what “we know what to 
do” had meant getting their boats out of the water, hauling them to dry land, and taking 
the family north or east as fast as possible. This assumption, like so many others, was 
wrong. I could hear Sue rolling her eyes at my audible gasp: “If they stay on the boat, 
they can move it around so it doesn’t hit anything—won’t get hurt by the dock or go on 
the levee. They remember Katrina. Nobody’s gonna lose another boat this time.” She 
then told me that all of our boats were in close contact with each other via CB radio, 
checking in and warning others if they encountered any danger in the increasingly 
choppy waters. As we hung up, I sat with what Sue had said, thinking about how bad the 
shrimp season had been so far (this was September, just after brown shrimp season had 
closed and at the beginning of the white shrimp season, which would only last to the 
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early days of December). In our conversation, Sue had mentioned the same, saying how 
desperate “our boys” were to keep working—they had barely recouperated the cost of 
gas, paying their deckhands, and ice during brown shrimp season, which had been the 
worst on record to date (soon to be followed by even many republicans meager yields in 
2018 and 2019). I realized they were not staying on the boats to catch shrimp, though; 
rather, they were making sure that no matter what their catch looked like next week, they 
would have a boat, a business, to make shrimping possible.  
 
I immediately reached for a yellow legal pad in my Minneapolis apartment, so far away 
from the doom everyone I worked with was sure would come their way, and started 
making a list of adjectives that might be used to describe what would be seen from the 
outside as outright foolishness, and came up with: tenacity, grit, recklessness...finally 
arriving at the most damning and, in the current landscape, appropriate adjective: 
resilience. Diagramming how this would be talked about by decision-makers in the weeks 
to come—show of resilience; evidence of resilience; adaptability; persistence—I thought 
about the fisherfolks’ experience of being on the boat as waves grew bigger, the wind 
kicked up, and the deep blue of a Louisiana summer sky turned dense and grey. No, I 
thought, this wasn’t resilience: it was knowledge. Was a generations-deep knowing that 
the structures designed to govern them would never protect them. Was a fundamental 
acknowledgment that they, their boats, their deckhands, and peers, were alone in this 
now; would be alone in fixing whatever happened next. Was, fundamentally, not an 
attribute à la VanLandingham and thousands of others who willed Vietnamese refugee 
resilience into existence, but an action: a community-level response to the official 
 
205 
landscape that already imagined them out of the future. Already refused their survival and 
told them to survive anyway.  
 
While Harvey, Maria, and the innumerable storms that formed in the Gulf thankfully 
veered away from the Louisiana coast that summer, I had learned something critical 
about the folks I worked with: they would not—now or ever—give in to sacrifice. They, 
experts in the life they and their peers and ancestors led and that other 
Vietnamese/Americans might lead after them, would always come together and respond.  
 
RESPONSE 
“How do our stories of the future chart the ways we invest—financially, politically, 
ideologically, and intellectually—in the present?”  
-Aimee Bahng, Migrant Futures (2018:3) 
 
During fieldwork, I made a regular practice of asking boat owners, deckhands, 
bookkeepers, and so many others what they would do when the diversion came. No 
matter the context or season, their answers began to run together, solidifying into a 
common refrain: we will do what we always have done: we’ll figure it out. When I 
returned to my notes, the word folks used most often in these conversations was, not 
surprising, given my newfound understanding: “respond”: when things happen, we know 
how to respond; when it feels impossible to do it on our own, we come together, form a 
plan that brings everything we know together; now that we saw what a storm like Katrina 
does, now that we have been through BP, we can respond to another thing like that no 
problem; the state won’t tell us about diversions? We’ll figure out how to respond: we 
will try out new technology like flash-freezing shrimp on the boat to get a higher yield; 
we will do what we did when we were first resettled here and share knowledge, telling 
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each other when we find caches of shrimp; we will develop a shrimp processing 
cooperative to make money at each level of the supply chain. Response, as articulated 
here, is an act of refusal, an act of reckoning—an act, full stop—in the face of CPRA’s 
risk-mitigated, evacuated future where Vietnamese/Americans both do not exist and are 
called on to be resilient. To merely survive knowing full well they are not meant to.  
  
I want to read this response as a speculative act that juxtaposes CPRA’s rhetorical and 
material understanding of diversion and resilience and coastal restoration in which 
Vietnamese/Americans never appear—not even in the present. Following José Esteban 
Muñoz’s call that “We must strive, in the face of the here and now’s totalizing rendering 
of reality, to think and feel a then and there” (Muñoz 2009:1), Aimee Bahng offers 
speculative fiction, which “shifts the emphasis of scientific pursuit from fact-casting to 
experiment-reveling” as a liberatory space “wherein cultural producers from the global 
financial undercommons have refused to relinquish the terrain of imagined futures” 
(Bahng 2018:8). Together, Muñoz and Bahng offer inroads to resisting the state’s 
science-centered, objective, environmentalist formulation of MBSD-specific restoration. 
In Octavia’s Brood, which they co-edited, Walidah Imarisha and adrienne maree brown 
build on a Bahngian speculative fiction to offer a collection of stories that, they argue, 
represent and extend the genre of visionary fiction. In the book’s “Outro,” brown tells us 
that the elements of visionary fiction are that it: “explores current social issues through 
the lens of sci-fi; is conscious of identity and intersecting identities; centers those who 
have been marginalized; is aware of power inequalities; is realistic and hard but hopeful; 
shows change from the bottom up rather than the top down; highlights that change is 
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collective; and is not neutral—its purpose is social change and societal transformation” 
(brown 2015:279, emphasis mine). While all of these criteria are essential to producing a 
present in a foreclosed future, two stand out to me as central to Vietnamese/American 
response. First, response fundamentally shows—and makes—change from the bottom up 
and, I would add, directly engages with imbalances of power and governance. Second, 
the vehemence with which brown addresses the function of visionary fiction—the fact 
that “it is not neutral”—is imperative to the work of Vietnamese/American response: a 
community seeking to build their own futures in spite of being explicitly written out of 
the future of the places and economies they occupy is not neutral, nor is it passive—it is 
an act of defiance.  
 
In this chapter, I bring Muñoz, Bahng, brown, and others in conversation with the folks I 
work with to apprehend a restoration-contingent, sediment diversion-centered 
environmental imaginary that forecloses Vietnamese/American socio-economic futures 
by forwarding what I am calling visionary response, or visioning coupled with fisherfolk-
identified and executed response. By centering queer of color critique, and with Muñoz’s 
understanding that “Queerness is essentially about the rejection of a here and now and an 
insistence on potentiality or concrete possibility for another world” (Muñoz 2009:1), this 
chapter’s deployment of visionary response offers a way to make visible the silences and 
gaps in heterogeneous yet linked imperial, colonial, settler-colonial, governance-crafted, 
national, transnational, and global histories that are retroactively siloed as unrelated, 
neutral ‘events’ in Southeast Louisiana. Using a multi-vocal and patchy (Tsing 2017b) 
approach that brings together community member testimony from interviews, public 
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comments, participant observation-derived data, and elements of visionary fiction, I 
argue that visionary response is fundamental to Vietnamese/Americans’ ability to 
produce and occupy a future in Southeast Louisiana environmental sacrifice. This is 
because in refusing the flatting singularity of the Asian/American model minority or 
failed assimilant, Vietnamese/American commercial shrimping response imaginaries 
allow space for the heterogeneity of thought, experience, class, and practice inherent in 
the community it represents.  
 
REFUGIA IN THE ANTHROPOCENE 
“It’s like they don’t even know we’re here. Or they don’t care.”  
- Chú Bình, Vietnamese/American commercial shrimper, Buras, July 2016 
 
Chú Bình, the shrimper who spoke with Vy post-BP, and Sue, whose story of personal 
and community rebuilding post-Katrina I recounted in chapter two, are good examples of 
imagining speculative futures. They teach us that Vietnamese/American residents both 
understand that the state has already foreclosed their future—“We knew no one was 
going to help us”—and, given this, that they must look to one another to create spaces of 
possibility: “We had to help ourselves” (Ha 2015). Critically, this space that exceeds state 
imagining is nothing like a utopia; because the future is still imagined by the state, it is, 
as Amitav Ghosh explains, a space where Vietnamese/American residents “confront most 
directly what Thoreau called ‘vast, titanic, inhumane nature’” (Ghosh 2017:62-3).  
 
As I showed in the introduction, the specter of climate change in the Anthropocene as it 
has been conceived of by CPRA and other governmental actors allows them to claim an 
environmentalism that is legible to the politics of recognition and place in late liberalism 
(Povinelli 2016). With the recognition that the Anthropocene is itself a complex and 
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contested epoch, I explored how, in Southeast Louisiana, restoration’s sacrifice of 
Vietnamese/Americans relies on an extractive capitalism (Gómez-Barris 2017) that 
pivots on environmental racism as state violence. Writing at this convergence and, to my 
mind, repositioning the Anthropocene through a speculative imaginary, Amitav Ghosh 
retemporalizes the Anthropocene: “The Anthropocene has reversed the temporal order of 
modernity; those at the margins are now the first to experience the future that awaits us 
all” (Ghosh 2017:62-3). This rendering of the epoch gives me the tools to rethink the 
imbrication of time, power, and sacrifice. In the context of Southeast Louisiana’s 
Vietnamese/American commercial shrimping fishery, by transfiguring refugeeism and 
resettlement into resilience, capital-centric environmental racism and sacrifice stretches 
time: past refugeeism is attached to community members’ presents, wherein 
Vietnamese/Americans are expected to be resilient, an all-encompassing state they must 
maintain indefinitely. In this framing, resilience is not quite a simulacra (Baudrillard 
1994), but instead a specter (Davis 2014) of refugee-centered otherness and xenophobia 
that promises to reach into the community’s tenuous economic and climate futures. To be 
clear, this is not a passive shift, but one knowingly produced by decision-makers like 
CPRA representatives, Louisiana Congressmen, oil and gas lobbyists, and so on. 
Critically, framed through Ghosh’s Anthropocene, where fisherfolk and other sacrificed 
communities are the first to experience the violence of decision-maker-produced climate 
change and its attendant violences, refugee resilience is a kind of lived speculative 
fiction, following Bahng above. This is because in building a diversion that preserves and 
grows state oil revenue by sacrificing the commercial shrimping industry, CPRA cedes 




In this multi-valent inhumane nature, decision-makers are both destructively acting on the 
environment and also weaponizing it against people and more-than-human species made 
and kept vulnerable by similar processes for generations. Anna Tsing seeks to identify the 
source of this weaponization in her description of refugia: “the inflection point between 
the Holocene and the Anthropocene might be the wiping out of most of the refugia from 
which diverse species assemblages (with or without people) can be reconstituted after 
major events (like desertification, or clear cutting, or, or, …)” (in Haraway 2015:159). 
Tsing’s use of refugia, forwarded in “Feral Biologies,” a paper presented at the 2015 
Anthropological Visions for a Sustainable Futures conference, is a site of potential for 
imagining climate, ecosystems, decision-makers, and communities in conversation. For 
me, the opening here is that in Tsing’s Anthropocene, refugia no longer exists. If there 
was a point at which ecosystems and communities, human and more, could stitch back 
together following gross change and harm, this ability has been disallowed them far prior 
to refugeeism’s formulation as a socio-legal category. In a sense, the period Tsing is 
calling the Anthropocene—which became a coherent global politic through border 
establishment, imperial declarations of sovereignty, and genocide—has preemptively 
foreclosed refuge for all people and more-than-human species already in the process of 
being made vulnerable to environmental sacrifice.  
 
This becomes even more specific to the experiences of Vietnamese/American refugees in 
Southeast Louisiana if we read it alongside Colten’s (2014) argument that Euro-colonial 
ecosystem management reorganized not just the landscape, but the possibilities and 
parameters of who could occupy what became Louisiana and how they could do so. In 
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this formulation, what is called refugeeism and those experiences exceeding the UN’s 
legal definition but that live firmly within refugeeism’s lifeworlds were written into a 
global settler and Euro-colonial politic of space, resource, and extraction long before the 
Great Flood of 1927; before the Gulf of Mexico was sold to international oil companies; 
before Louisiana was codified as a U.S. territory, let alone a state. As the folks with 
whom I work have shown, refugees can never find or completely occupy a space of 
refuge because while their leave-taking was, to varying degrees, deliberate, what is meant 
to come next was never a part of the calculus of extraction and accumulation—of their 
choice-full resettlement by the Catholic Church—in Southeast Louisiana.  
 
While this line of reasoning might read as my crafting a teleology of displacement and 
violence, I believe it follows prior chapters’ refusal of a totalizing state history and 
present, the occlusions of which Juliana Hu Pegues argues “reveal the designs of the 
settler state, with its attendant anxieties, limits, and ruptures” (Hu Pegues 2013:21). By 
consistently repositioning my inquiry into the violences rendered against the folks with 
whom I work under an official landscape, and with an attenuation to the heterogeneous 
nature of both ‘the official’ and ‘violence,’ I hope to unravel the density of 
Vietnamese/American environmental sacrifice and engender a productive rejection of the 
notion that they neither know about the violence of the state nor are they actively 
responding to this violence.  
 
Those who are sacrificed are well aware of the ways they are being used and harmed by 
decision-makers in powerful positions. In spite of a long history of decision-makers 
obfuscating the violence of their decisions by refusing to hear from those they harm, 
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Vietnamese/American fisherfolk are acting, are living, are imagining their way out of 




As resilient refugees, fisherfolk have learned that their family businesses effectively 
operate under the auspices of the state to which they owe the debt of their lives. This, in 
turn, taught them that to do what they need to to support their families, 
Vietnamese/American boat owners, deckhands, lenders, and on-land entrepreneurs must 
adopt a sufficiently appreciative attitude toward the state and their coast-contingent 
industry. This scrubbing of the politics of refugeeism and immigration, race and 
ethnicity, and community history from commercial shrimping strips 
Vietnamese/American fisherfolk of autonomy while emplacing and entrapping them in 
ever-more-tenuous state waters, in environmental racism-produced sacrifice, and in a 
governance-rendered Southeast Louisiana coastal future all designed for, but without, 
them.  
*** 
I met Vy Nguyen for the first time on election day 2016. Sitting down outside a coffee 
shop in Mid-City New Orleans, each with an ‘I Voted” sticker on our lapels, we talked 
about her community’s survival. After discussing the bycatch subsistence suit she helped 
usher through the court system following BP (see chapter two), Vy explained that for the 
fisherfolk in her community, labor and livelihood are the primary sites of personal and 
communal pain and advocacy. As an industry that most Louisianians have a basic 
understanding and appreciation of and given its centrality to every element of 
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Vietnamese/American economic, social, political, and environmental health, as prior 
chapters have shown, commercial shrimping has become the staging ground for decision-
makers exercising violent governance and management practices, but also, a primary site 
for Vietnamese/Americans to articulate and respond to those same violences. As Vy 
explained, when everything is calm, it is easy to assert the value of one’s labor, but 
“when someone tries to take [our labor, our livelihoods] away from us, we will stand and 
defend it. That is resistance” (Nguyen 2016). Vy’s framing of resistance as defending 
one’s livelihood and labor is significant, because, as Raquel Pinderhughes suggests, 
environmental concerns are often conceptualized as “community, labor, economic, 
health, and civil rights issues rather than as ‘environmental’ issues” (Pinderhughes 
1996:239). In the years since our meeting and living in the results of that election day, the 
linkages between addressing the above issues and ecosystem-level health have become 
more and more clear to me; small-scale state-waters-dependent Vietnamese/American 
commercial shrimpers and the community they support suffer at the intersection of poor 
environmental protections, global white nationalisms, vulnerable oceans and waterways, 
and in constant yet erratic diaspora.  
 
Without an analysis of how the environment is a part of each rights issue Pinderhughes 
listed, and in turn, how each issue intersects with the environment and one another, we 
can neither apprehend the full violence of environmental racism nor see the complexity 
of community-level responses to it. This is deliberately a part of CPRA’s 
environmentalism; by taking up the mantle of ‘fixing’ the coast, they make grassroots 
actions to do the same—actions that do not coincide with the Authority’s future 
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imaginary—opaque and as such, non-existent. This highlights how response, while 
absolutely related to resistance, mimics resilience in its imbrication with and of all things 
coastal, commercial fishing, Vietnamese/American, community-oriented, etc. Without 
this intersectional analysis that allowed response to become clear to me, I personally 
would not have appreciated the community and future-building value of the double-wide 
sized garden behind a Venice, LA shrimper’s single trailer filled with vegetables, herbs, 
and citrus trees, all free to neighbors and visitors to the community. Neither could I 
fathom the myriad positive effects of three shrimping families spending two years 
establishing their own LLC so they can sell direct to consumers.  
 
If I had decoupled environment from coastal communities and their labor, as CPRA does 
to produce its risk-free terra nullius, I would never have understood why commercial 
fisherfolk stay on their boats during hurricanes, the value of a CB radio, which allows 
captains to stay in touch in bad weather and far out in the Gulf, or the overlapping losses 
represented in a brand new boat being indefinitely stranded on the levee—completely 
visible, yet just beyond reach—as Chú Anh experienced after Katrina. I also wouldn’t 
have known to ask about the ping pong ball-sized boils across the neck, back, and chest 
of a commercial shrimper whose only way of making money after BP was to burn oil off 
the water’s surface, after which crop dusters indiscriminately sprayed Corexit, a highly 
toxic oil ‘dispersant’, down on boats, crews, and more-than-human marine communities. 
Without that analysis, I might have overlooked the fact that no part of federal and state 
ordinances about the coast, as well as master plans, annual plans, and other policy work 
that directly impacts the folks with whom I work was not translated into Vietnamese until 
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FSS shifted this precedent during my time there. Finally, I would not have known that 
redrawing the line that divides state and federal waters off Louisiana’s coast by a few 
yards drastically impacts shrimpers’ daily, weekly, and monthly trips—this particular 
knowledge was gifted me by a shrimper who pulled out a map after the 2017 changes and 
walked me through where all the sandbars, abandoned oil pipes, gates, and a myriad of 
other under- and above-water infrastructure thwarted or facilitated his job.  
*** 
While the responses outlined above might dovetail with resilience, they are critically 
distinct from it. Where resilience requires individuals to survive in spite of, in the hands 
of Vietnamese/American fisherfolk, response is, first, a highly collaborative, community-
based rejection of the state resilience model that at once massifies all 
Vietnamese/Americans as resilient and individuates them as survivors. Second, response 
is flexible and spontaneous—it does not have protocols or limits, which resilience relies 
on to ensure that vulnerable people can never live without or outside of resilience. 
Finally, and most importantly, Vietnamese/American response looks into the future and 
still sees Vietnamese/Americans and commercial shrimping. This is because it follows 
hooks’ distinction between state/structural nostalgia, or “that longing for something to be 
as it once was,” a central tenet of CPRA’s restoration ideology, and communal 
remembering, or “a struggle of memory against forgetting” (hooks 1990:17). 
 
To reorient Vietnamese/American community survival under the auspice of resilience 
through Vietnamese/American memory—which I take to mean not just ancestry, history, 
or culture, but the specific knowledges that emerge from an entanglement of all three—is 
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to reject structural nostalgia. In this formulation, memory work allows 
Vietnamese/American commercial fisherfolk, fishing-dependent small business owners, 
and the families and communities that rely on them to deploy a community-centric queer 
of color critique, which “provides a unique view from below in a common search for 
social justice” (Manalansan 2018:1287). From below and beyond state logics—rather 
than by deploying state logics, as we had during the FSS diversion meeting detailed in 
chapter three—fisherfolk might begin to reject resilience.  
 
Memory and memory work ‘from below,’ as Manalansan suggests, is not linear, but 
instead erupt as fragments: small stories, discrete moments that overlap with and bleed 
into still more, and the repetition of a practice—mending a shrimping net, feeling the tide 
and learning how they sync with the moon’s phases, praying over dead on the 100th day, 
or speaking but not reading Vietnamese or English. For Vietnamese/American fisherfolk, 
memory queers the violence of environmental sacrifice by both understanding and 
rejecting “how certain bodies matter and certain bodies are located on the wayside” 
(Manalansan 2018:1287). Each time a wife does the books, as shrimp is passed from boat 
hull to processing dock, at each Tết celebration in the Mary Queen of Việt Nam church 
parking lot, memories are invoked, honored, and stretched, allowing those who hold them 
to emplace memories’ practices and knowledges into the future. By doing this memory 
work in and with the body, Vietnamese/Americans in Southeast Louisiana emplace and 
voice themselves in spaces, contexts, futures, they have otherwise been rhetorically and 





COMMERCIAL FISHING & DOING COMMUNITY RESPONSE 
“Improvisational life-forms and experimental practices form ad hoc community networks 
and resistance movements that coalesce spontaneously and ephemerally, on the fly, on 
the run, and cobbled together from recycled and repurposed materials.”  
- Aimee Bahng, Migrant Futures (2018:165) 
 
In Immigrant Acts, Lisa Lowe offers a preliminary framework for immigrant opposition, 
which “articulates itself in forms and practices that integrate, yet move beyond, the 
political and economic spheres…[and] produce conceptions of collectivity that do not 
depend upon privileging a singular subject as the representative of the group [or] 
prescribe a singular narrative of emancipation” (Lowe 1996:170). Here, I believe that 
Lowe’s celebration of the heterogeneity within distinct Asian/American communities 
forwards the emancipatory potential of collective imagining beyond and outside of state 
structures. It also evokes Sara Ahmed’s interrogation of queer crip refusal. Starting with 
the premise that “Perhaps those who are bad for morale can join forces” (Ahmed 
2017:184), Ahmed argues that “Queer and crip are willful words that work by insisting 
on what they bring up; a charged history, a shattering history; they are shattering 
words...A queer crip politics might involve a refusal to cover over what is missing, a 
refusal to aspire to be whole” (Ahmed 2017:185, emphasis original). Like Lowe, Ahmed 
believes a rejection not just of the status quo, but of the delineating structures that 
re/produce it is imperative to maybe not liberation, but certainly survival.  
 
By encouraging folks to stop theorizing from a place of lack—as racial, political, 
economic foils whose not-whiteness, not-legible citizenness, not-upper classness 
produces a fully realized whiteness in opposition to a failed and evacuated 
Vietnamese/Americanness (Cheng 2001)—and instead organize and identify as never 
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whole, Ahmed suggests one way to exceed or partially stand outside of the structures that 
manage Vietnamese/American life. While a crip standpoint hasn’t been discretely present 
in my analysis thus far, the utility of thinking from a place of refusing dominant 
narratives produced for but not with one’s community is central to the speculation, 
visioning, and response scaffolding this chapter.  
 
Some fisherfolks’ responses I have observed are not nearly as big or far-reaching as one 
might imagine when synthesizing Lowe and Ahmed. Many are simple, everyday; almost 
quiet in their execution. The significance of their scale is not in how loud a visionary 
response is, but the depths—the memory work, the ecosystem-level knowledges, the 
community-centricity—they are assembled from and make tangible. Throughout my 
fieldwork tenure, it became clear to me that response is happening at several different 
registers of access, power, and social capital, and in many sites related to coastal land 
loss, environmental harm, immigration, governance, and so on. Throughout this 
dissertation, the two sites have emerged as most important to Vietnamese/American 
response are: among fisherfolk as community-builders, and with/in FSS and the 
organizations it brings into coalition and conversation. In both instances, temporality, 
space, and power overlap within and between each in ways that are at once similar and 
different. However, the main nexus point of each site’s modes of response is 
improvisation, which I am invoking as it is defined by Bahng above. What we and our 
clients do on the run from coastal change and official sacrifice reinforce, expand, and 
rearticulate our response networks and potential for visioning-as-response and responsive 




After conducting a survey of my fieldnotes, and with an acknowledgement that, as I 
suggested above, memory work is fragmented both in community and in the process of 
re-membering and re-assembling moments from research, I have compiled a list of 
Vietnamese/American response strategies below: 
 
• At least one a week during brown and white shrimp season, crawfish season, and 
citrus season, FSS clients would come into the office with 20 lb. coolers full of 
shrimp, crabs, crawfish, guavas, grapefruit, oranges, and satsumas “just cuz we 
appreciate you.” This care-taking was rooted in rearticulating and making visible 
kinship networks wherein FSS staff were both understood as family members and as 
helpers whose day-to-day work supporting individual families’ needs in the office 
and the needs of the industry to representatives, the CPRA, USACE, NOAA, NFWF, 
and many others fundamentally helped to secure the future of their clients.  
 
• In this same spirit, Sue called all of FSS’s clients “my fisherfolk” and referred to 
herself as their second wife, sister, or daughter. 
 
• Boat captains will take on more deckhands during peak season so they can both 
harvest more and to produce employment opportunities. These deckhands are always 
paid before anyone else (ice and gas purveyors, gear sellers, dock owners, who are 
easier to keep a running tab with), sometimes at a major loss to the boat owner’s own 
income, so that they will be both financially stable and to engender trust and establish 




• When they are waiting for the tides to change, shrimpers will tie their boats together, 
stalling all but one whose engine continues running to effectively anchor the whole. 
This allows them to not just socialize, but compare notes, discuss policy changes and 
regulation, and point friends to better shrimping spots, which they fondly refer to as 
“honeypots.”  
 
• Women handle the majority of Vietnamese/American shrimping businesses’ finances, 
and their financial and technological literacy is both celebrated and made visible 
throughout the industry. This concretizes family and communal networks, and 
ensures that 100% of businesses’ income stay not just in the family, but return to the 
community, where it is reinvested in Vietnamese/American businesses and 
community centers in New Orleans East, Gretna, and in coastal towns (Kang 2018). 
 
• As I have gestured to earlier, Vietnamese/American fisherfolk speak a language 
wholly their own. Following an all-staff meeting with NOAA representatives during 
which Sue pointed to a 20’ x 15’ map of coastal Louisiana on the organization's wall, 
a NOAA representative gifted a copy of the map to FSS. It is now prominently 
displayed in our office, where place names have been covered by post-it notes 
displaying their ‘real’ names. When clients come into the office, they examine the 
map, suggest edits, and laugh at the vulgarity of what has been written. This map has 
become a cherished object among FSS staff, who, through building it with clients, 
have effectively developed an alternative, Southeast Louisiana Vietnamese/American 




Every Vietnamese/American response strategy outlined above pivots on building, 
maintaining, and rearticulating community, as Lowe suggests. They are also deeply 
attentive to how power operates—by sharing, celebrating, and consolidating fishing and 
community knowledges, visionary responses clearly recognize that they are working 
under structures of power that erase them and work to at once refuse and respond to that 
erasure: You don’t see us in your future? We do, because we are making it in spite of you. 
 
Another element of Vietnamese/American visionary response is that it repositions human 
relationships to the ecosystems and environment fisherfolks rely on. Anna Tsing argues 
that “where human ways of life are sustained across generations, it is because they have 
aligned themselves with the dynamics of multispecies resurgence…[which] is the work 
of many organisms, negotiating across differences, to forge assemblages of multispecies 
liability in the midst of disturbance” (Tsing 2017a:51-2). As I have shown elsewhere, 
Vietnamese/American fisherfolk must be stewards of the ecosystems they rely on. Given 
their deep knowledge of and attachment to place, commercial shrimpers—among many 
other coastal stakeholders including Indigenous Elders and other community leaders—are 
natural experts in the water, land, and more-than-human communities that make up 
coastal Louisiana. This expertise emerges on boats, at processing docks, in trucks, at the 
dining table, in gardens, and at meetings.  
 
This emergent, environmental and ancestral expertise is to me one of the clearest 
examples of visionary response I observed during my engagement with commercial 
fisherfolk. While it follows the above examples in its sometimes quiet, rarely externally 
visible nature, ecosystem-level stewardship as visionary response is, to my mind, also 
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completely legible when one has the opportunity to observe it. One such instance for me 
happened during the last few weeks of my fieldwork tenure, when I took an overnight trip 
with a shrimping boat owner, his deckhand, and a colleague. After anchoring off of 
Grand Isle, habitat to an oil processing plant and little else, in the late afternoon, we 
waited for the moon to rise and bring in the tide.  
 
After dropping the first nets around 10 pm, the captain set a timer for 75 minutes (the 
legally regulated time a boat can travel, or leave their nets in the water) and began 
running his engine to push the surrounding water from aft to stern, funneling the 
surrounding shrimp into the cone-shaped nets skimming the ocean’s floor to either side of 
his boat. I sat on the cooler at the boat’s stern to observe the process and in the 
moonlight, noticed porpoises beginning to circle us. At the same time, a cacophony 
erupted at the backmost edge of the nets, where sea birds started to flock and giddily dive 
into the water, emerging with a myriad of sea life still wriggling in their hooked beaks. 
As the timer shrilled from inside the cabin, the deckhand emerged and pulled up each net, 
dropping their contents at our feet. Using our hands and flat shovels, we heaped the 
flopping mass of fish into buckets, then hiked them over our shoulders and deposited 
them onto a raised, hard plastic sorting table with drains at either end. Using what looked 
like an ice scraper modified to jut out 90 degrees from its handle, the deckhand showed 
me how to spot the still floundering shrimp among their peers, and gestured to the base of 
his middle finger to indicate the size we were looking for. Together, the four of us made 
quick work of it, throwing prized shrimp into small buckets and scraping all of the other 
more-than-human beings, who by the end had asphyxiated, into the tables drains and 
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back onto the boat’s floor. During this first pass, I vocally mourned the death of these 
other beings that the captain consistently referred to as ‘bycatch.’ All three of the men 
with me laughed as they scooped the now-dead sharks, crabs, octopus, fin fish, too-small 
shrimp, and other sea life into baskets. “Honey, this is how it goes,” the captain said, 
heaving one basket after the other off the back end of his boat.  
 
Offended but equally stuck and curious, I followed him. When the dead were let into the 
water, the same porpoises, bigger fish, and seabirds swarmed us, eating their fill: nothing 
wasted, everyone fed. As we repeated the process more and more, it became clear to me 
that this boat—and every other boat on the water that night—was an ecosystem unto 
itself. While an artificial insertion of human will into the food chain of the Gulf, 
shrimping boats were also facilitating the ongoing life of the more-than-human species 
they relied on to make the ocean robust: as fish died, they also fed and in their own way, 
returned to the ocean.  
 
As midnight came and went, two particular harvest events stood out to me. First, on the 
fourth go-around, we pulled up a sea turtle who had become tangled in one of the nets. 
Under Monterey Bay regulations, Louisiana shrimp had been flagged in 2014 as 
irresponsibly harvested because four species of endangered sea turtles live in the state’s 
waters. In response, several other Gulf states had mandated that shrimping boats begin to 
use Turtle Excluder Devices, or TEDs, on their boats. The TEDs are positioned at the 
mouth of each net and look like police blockades—hard, sturdy metal railing with bars 
positioned just close enough to keep a turtle from getting sucked in. Whereas Florida, 
Alabama, Mississippi, and Texas have legally mandated the use of TEDs in their state 
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waters, Louisiana has not. However, most small-scale, state waters-dependent shrimpers 
in the state do use them to ensure first, that they are not caught harvesting endangered 
turtles by LDWF, who would fine them heavily, and second, because it is common sense 
to ensure the ongoing livelihood of a community of beings that are close to extinction.  
 
While our boat had TEDs attached to each net, one turtle, unfortunately, snuck in. They 
measured roughly 2’ long, and the minute the deckhand noticed them, he flipped them 
over, shell marrying deck, put them in a quiet corner of the boat, and resumed sorting the 
rest of our yield. After 10 minutes, he returned to the turtle, and spoke in soothing tones 
as he checked their breath. This, I was told, was common practice: a turtle can 
comfortably survive out of water much longer than shrimp, but being caught and drawn 
up in a net was a major shock to their system. Laying on their back allowed the turtle to 
regain consciousness and adapt to their environment. Once the deckhand ensured they 
were breathing and moving regularly, he gingerly picked the turtle up, said goodbye, and 
returned them to the ocean while the engine was off to ensure they would not slip through 
the TED again.  
 
And then we pulled up the nets for the fifth time. I felt and heard a whoosh as an 
enormous stingray fell into the boat. With a wingspan of almost six feet and weighing 
over 200 pounds by my estimate, they were dense, heavy, and immediately began 
gasping for air. As we strategized about what to do, the stingray flapped its fins, flinging 
a small but potent swordfish into the deckhand’s leg. As he started to lose blood and after 
trying to physically hoist the stingray over the boat’s side, the deckhand reached for a 
large hook suspended from a rope hanging from the mast, and deftly threaded it into a 
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large gill near the stingray’s mouth. Pained by their pain, I moved to the boat’s front as 
the three men I had left behind urged the stingray into the air and down into the water. I 
heard as their ‘wings’ hit the surface, feeling enormous bodily relief as they were sent 
home healthfully. Retiring to the back of the boat, I watched as my three companions, 
now dripping in sweat from exertion, smiled, clearly as relieved as I was.  
 
It was 7 am by the time we stopped harvesting and, after traversing plant-heavy bayous 
lush with vegetation and small crabbing and shrimping boats, arrived back at the boat’s 
dock just outside of Cut Off, LA. As I set my feet back on solid land, I reeled, still feeling 
the gentle swell of coast-adjacent waters below me. My peer nodded and said, “you get 
why they love it so much now, huh?” I did.  
 
Through the process of working on a boat and observing the practices of shrimpers in 
Southeast Louisiana, it became abundantly clear to me that where institutional 
storytelling about commercial fishing positions fisherfolk as enemies of coastal 
ecosystems, they are in fact engaging in fundamentally personal relationships with them. 
Because each boat relies on the Gulf to keep producing the shrimp they, their families, 
other fishing-dependent businesses, and the entire Vietnamese/American community 
relies on, fisherfolk go above and beyond to ensure that they are in right relationship with 
it. This, I fundamentally believe, is an act of visionary response: rather than imagining a 
future without shrimping, fisherfolk work with and care for all of the coast’s more-than-
human species to ensure they remain healthful, healthy, abundant, and present long into 
the future. Where oil extraction consistently produces “disasters” that harm, limit, and 
make extinct more-than-human marine species, fisherfolk look into their own, their 
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childrens’, their place’s future, and do not just worry about, but facilitate it. Where 
shrimp continue to live, so do shrimpers.  
 
FSS RESPONSE 
For six years, FSS has been carrying out a restoration awareness protocol, which 
includes  the following elements drawn from several FSS documents and reports: 
 
1. Helping fisherfolk and coastal residents understand more about sediment diversions 
and why they are a part of the master plan.  
2. Identifying and giving resources to leaders in the fishing community who can 
address community concerns and can represent commercial fisheries at public 
meetings and in decision-making forums.  
3. Working as a community-state liaison on behalf of FSS clients, their families, and 
their larger communities to do as much as possible to create platforms where coastal 
knowledges will truly be uplifted rather than facilitating CPRA representatives’ 
longstanding practice of presenting to communities, fielding one or two questions, 
and leaving without addressing a single problem, changing one approach, or 
listening to, understanding, and/or integrating what coastal peoples are saying into 
plans and decision-making processes. 
4. Establishing one-on-one and coalitional partnerships with environmental NGOs, 
community-based nonprofits, independent and university-affiliated scholars, and 
others whose work includes building community engagement in restoration 




Significantly, FSS’s own response work is wholly reliant on the fisherfolk and 
community visionary response strategies and knowledges articulated above, which, again, 
rely on Pinderhughes’s reorienting of an environment-situated logic of resistance. In my 
over-three-year tenure at FSS, I have contributed to each of these efforts and gained an 
intimate understanding of how each operates.  
 
By now, we know that contemporary movements for the environment overwhelmingly 
leave out Indigenous and arrivant (Byrd 2011) and alien laborer (Day 2016) perspectives 
of land, water, labor, economy, health, and civil rights struggles. It is important to point 
out that while my analysis takes place in Southeast Louisiana, which is sovereign Biloxi-
Chitimacha-Choctaw, Chata, Houma, Atakapaw, Chickasaw, and United Houma land, 
the Vietnamese/American visionary responses addressed this far rarely, if ever, are 
attentive to or think in concert with the visionary response work of Native communities 
in Southeast and coastal Louisiana. Thankfully, FSS has had the opportunity to amend 
this elision through the coalition-building work articulated in protocol number four.  
 
In 2016, FSS encouraged a New Orleans-based funder to bring together 12 community-
based organizations and environmental NGOs so that each could exchange ideas, 
strategies, and inform one another of the ways diversions and other master plan projects 
impact their constituents, clients, and communities. Four of the folks who contribute to 
this coalition are tribal elders or council members for two separate Indigenous nations, 
and their voices have not just enriched, but critically informed FSS and other coalition 
members’ approaches to responding to CPRA and USACE. In the three years this 
coalition has been active, we have drafted public comments in response to the 2017 
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Master Plan for a Sustainable Coast, CPRA’s 2018, 2019, and 2020 annual plans, and the 
USACE EIS Scoping process, some of which I have addressed and replicated in prior 
chapters.  
 
By reading our clients’ experiences as fisherfolk alongside the experiences of historically 
Black coastal communities, two Native tribes, youth-centered environmental educators, a 
Vietnamese/American nonprofit based in Versailles, and several other coastal 
environmental organizations who are attentive to the commercial fishing industry and 
coastal change, FSS has refused the structural siloing of racialized, Indigenous, 
impoverished and rural communities from one another. This in many ways follows 
Ahmed’s queer crip politics—the refusal to cover over what is missing, a refusal to aspire 
to be whole—as, while our approach brings together a multiplicity of perspectives, it 
resolutely acknowledges the inevitably of misunderstandings and knowledge-contingent 
gaps while refusing to capitulate to the edict of presenting a complete and tidy response 
packaged in the language of or singularly responsive to official narratives about our 
communities’ needs and expectations for a future that includes and is attentive to them.  
 
Through this ongoing, long term process of aggregating our collective and differently-
positioned ground-knowledges, FSS has been able to bring the experiences of other 
coalition members back to the commercial fisherfolk who represent our client base, 
providing education on differing coast-reliant perspectives and producing spaces where 
organization leaders and their constituents, clients, and communities stand together not 
always harmoniously or with one voice, but with a deeper understanding of how their 
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visions for the future are inextricably linked and as such, must include all presents if they 
are to build different futures.  
*** 
While FSS’s protocols are fixed inasmuch as they are foundational to our ongoing work 
related to the master plan and diversions, they are also incredibly fluid and subject to 
change based on clients’ needs, state and federal decisions, shifts to and in response to 
new kinds of funding, and the ever-changing work of our collaborators. I have observed 
that this improvisational approach fundamentally employs a bottom-up community-
centered queer of color critique by uplifting community knowledge through storytelling. 
This has been particularly true since we began our coalitional work, wherein story has 
become the primary vehicle for other communities to position their experience in relation 
to those of Vietnamese/American fisherfolk and the day-to-day work of FSS.  
 
As many folklorists and community organizers have suggested (Baker 2005; Banks-
Wallace 2002; Bell 2010; Hurston 2008; Todd 2014, 2017; Tuck, Guess, and Sultan 
2014), storytelling is both a critical way of retaining and passing on community history, 
practice, cultural values, and knowledge, and, as such, is one of the most important 
modes of responding to official violence. Elsewhere in her outro to Octavia’s Brood, 
brown explains that “The stories we tell can either reflect the society we are a part of or 
transform it” (brown 2015:279). I believe FSS does this most clearly in its role as a 
“broker” (Ha 2014) between state officials, academics, community-based nonprofits, and 
environmental organizations, and our clients, because in this capacity, FSS staff are made 




Every time Sue is asked to speak to decision-makers about FSS’s work—which is now an 
almost weekly occurrence—she calls me before or after, debriefing me on the ways 
decision-makers spoke about restoration, the responses of non-government affiliated 
people in the room, and most importantly, her responses. More often than not, the forums 
Sue occupies are not just governmental, but host current or potential funders, community-
based collaborators, and peers. Sue always chooses her words carefully—and reminds 
me, each time, how bad I am at containing my ire in the face of similar discussions. At 
some point, it became a practice for her to tell me to “fix my face and be nice” before 
every meeting we attended with decision-makers, something I am both proud of and a bit 
chagrined by to this day—because, as Sue is quick to remind me, “the industry depends 
on it.” At the same time Sue is prone to holding court. The minute she sees an opening to 
make a case for the needs and hardships our clients experience, Sue, like any good 
politician in a debate, refuses to answer the question posed her, instead pivoting to her 
platform: the industry is suffering; yesterday my husband brought in the lowest catch in 
his 20-year history of shrimping in federal waters; our people can’t even afford to buy 
insurance because the premiums are so high and no matter how many hurricanes they can 
weather, no matter the re-arranging they might be able to accomplish in the face of an oil 
‘spill,’ MBSD will make their lives so much harder—will chase them out of the Gulf and, 
she emphasizes, further depress the already-tenuous economy of towns throughout the 
Birdfoot Delta. After these meetings, she will tell me: “I think people are starting to get 
it; I think they are hearing us.” While I am built to be skeptical, I nod from the other end 
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of the Mississippi, smile, and say: “We’re all so lucky to have you.” I always mean this. I 
always hope she is right this time.  
 
Other days, Sue calls me on her long drive from the docks back home in New Orleans 
East, saying so-and-so just upgraded his boat by adding a chill cool unit (a system that 
allows shrimpers to flash-freeze and immediately preserve their catch on the boat, leading 
to higher yields on the market); my mom’s friend told me her family just opened a corner 
store next to our offices so they can have two income sources; that guy you met at the 
diversion meeting has partnered with a local chef who wants to buy everything he 
catches—they settled on a dollar amount per pound that’s better than today’s market 
value! We have collaborated on so many grants that center ‘resilience’ and ‘adaptation’ 
that they have become a part of Sue’s vocabulary: “You know our boys know how to 
adapt—look at ‘em!” She usually goes on: “They’re listening to me—they know the 
diversion is coming and they’re adapting.” In her excitement, Sue doesn’t recognize that 
she is telling me stories from an otherwise. In spite of her acculturation into the official 
rhetoric we must deploy to bring money into the organization and by proxy, into the 
communities we serve, in these moments, Sue is telling me stories that illustrate and 
uplift our clients’ own expertise—stories centered on the knowledges they deploy in 
direct response to official storytelling that dominates the former institutional space where 





As we all have experienced, listening to a narrative is not passive; it produces sympathy 
and empathy, allows one to emplace themselves, from varying degrees of distance or 
proximity, into an experience they might never live. Listening to a narrative also makes 
the listener better at re-telling it. As I have shown throughout, FSS staff members—and 
as I did during fieldwork—spend every day listening to and holding clients’ stories, then 
weave them into acts and texts of advocacy on behalf of clients who have little access to 
an audience with or do not speak the ‘proper’ language to engage decision-makers. As 
staff are highly attuned to the needs and futures of commercial fisherfolk, they are 
masters at crafting stories in immediate and direct response to those circulated by CPRA, 
local, state, and federal representatives, and residents whose understanding of 
Vietnamese/Americanness—both from within and outside of the community—are shaped 
by the official landscape. The women I work with also use story as a site of 
transliteration, where what Sue calls “state language” or “government speak” is rendered 
legible in the language(s) of commercial fishing. By making state languages ‘plain’ in 
Vietnamese/American, as I suggested in chapter three, FSS is effectively crafting its own 
language at the interstices of state and community but that is only legible to the latter—a 
language that CPRA, USACE, parish and state decision-makers, and other decision-
makers only have access to when FSS carefully re-interprets for outsiders from its 
vantage point as community advocate. 
 
By acting as a conduit in both directions, but with vastly different approaches and politics 
of story in each case, FSS understands the governance-crafted official landscape, learns 
its language, then uses it to educate fisherfolk about how that landscape operates. This 
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allows clients to respond, helping them and FSS to co-produce ideas and strategies that, 
as visionary practices, might seed or immediately effect transformation. This is 
imperative, as brown extends the above purpose of story, saying: “If we want to bring 
new worlds into existence, then we need to challenge the narratives that uphold current 
power dynamics and patterns” (brown 2015:279). Vietnamese/American narratives 
inherently resist these structures, as they are crafted by people who have been forced out 
of or were never included in dominant stories about the coast, its people, its oil capital-
contingent existence, and its future. By understanding the productive power of 
storytelling within the community and as a way of retaining and remembering in ongoing 
refugee racialization and under refugee-predicated resilience, FSS has taken hold of the 
liberatory potential of story, honoring and deploying it as a critical element of 
Vietnamese/American visionary response. Through our insistence on listening to and 
uplifting the experiences and knowledges of our clients as our primary praxis, FSS is 
following so many speculative and visionary makers in crafting stories that center a 
violent present to produce visionary responses in a completely tangible, multi-




Earlier in this chapter, I suggested that the most liberatory element of 
Vietnamese/American response is that it looks into the future and still sees 
Vietnamese/American commercial shrimping. As I understand Vietnamese/Americans 
experts of the coast and commercial fishing, I believe that Vietnamese/American 
commercial fisherfolk and community members and FSS can and have paired our ability 
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to imagine with concrete responses that, even when ephemeral, set precedents for future 
responses. Where refugee resilience is haunted by Vietnamese/American refugeeism, 
visionary response’s ability to imagine from below, to tell stories, to come into coalition 
with other underserved communities, and to articulate itself at the level of community 
might be the present/future ancestor of a still-alive Vietnamese/American coast.  
 
As a method, then, Vietnamese/American visionary response has the ability to see these 
power imbalances, the ways top-down logics foreclose Vietnamese/American life and 
evacuate the landscape of their livelihoods, and, following Bahng and brown, imagine an 
otherwise. Response does this from a grounded viewpoint that fundamentally understands 
the impossibility of Vietnamese/Americans surviving by seeking inclusion in official, 
risk-mitigating state processes that exclude them as a given. Because of this, 
Vietnamese/American response sounds, looks, and knows in Vietnamese/American; is an 
expertise, a possibility, unto itself. To do visionary response is to reject neutrality and, I 
argue, produce a future from its own foreclosure. While resilience is hellbent on making 
live (Foucault 1990), response is focused on the collaborative project of queering a 
remembering-how-to in an unknown future, on a dying coast, and under the structural 
violence of environmental erasure. 
 
As I have shown, to remain in debt to the state and to be perceived as a roadblock to state 
oil capital accumulation is to be erased from its future. Vietnamese/American commercial 
fisherfolk and their community intervene in this foreclosure by imagining otherwise from 
within all-encompassing environmental racism and sacrifice. Most importantly, through 
the work of FSS and its coalitional peers, Vietnamese/American visionary response has 
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begun to come into relation with Indigenous, Black, other impoverished and classed, and 
other rural and urban futures, refusing the colonial logic of bifurcation, divide and 
conquer, to envision futures with and alongside the coast as a heterogeneous human and 
more-than-human imaginary. By folding stories of place, people, ecosystem, and 
stewardship together, Vietnamese/American visionary response reaches into the void of 
CPRA’s terra nullius future and populates it with possibility: we see the water and sky, 
feel the tides and wind; we know the storm is coming; we emerge on the other side 





















...and yet, while things change in community, so much stays the same at the official level. 
  
CONCLUSION: FRESHWATER DISASTER 
 
“Spatial practice, written on by climate and ideology, as well as history and geography, is 
so impressed by human bodies in relation that it is fair to say that, given the year, one 
could tell how he or she ‘felt’ about the Mississippi, either vicariously or experientially.”  
-Hortense Spillers, “Topographical topics: Faulknerian space” (2004:558)  
 
As I write this in Minneapolis, MN, just south of the Mississippi River’s headwaters, the 
Mississippi River flooding of 2019 has surpassed the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 for 
number of days at flood stage—over 150 (Grymes 2019). This is unprecedented; the river 
has been flooding since mid-March and here I am in early July, still watching what is 
happening downstream and worrying about everyone I know along the coast. At the tail 
end of the flooding, Southeast Louisiana is feeling the full effects of the Midwest’s quick 
thaw, unseasonably dense and ongoing rains, and generations of infrastructural 
management across the basin’s water networks. It has grown so bad in Louisiana that the 
45th president declared a state of emergency in the state (Lane 2019). While all residents 
are feeling the effects of this flood, it is stalling and completely foreclosing work for 
many members of Louisiana’s commercial fishing fleet, particularly the 
Vietnamese/American fisherfolk with whom I work because, as I have mentioned, their 
reliance on the 3 miles of inshore/state waters makes so much fresh water, the specter 
they have been dreading, since 2007, a death sentence for their incomes, their families’ 
futures, their community. And here it is, even without the diversion.  
 
Wanting to hear how folks were faring, I called Sue yet again. She had just arrived home 
after a full day of trying to wrestle her boat onto the water a two-hour drive south in 
Venice, LA, a fishing town on the small strip of land between the Mississippi and Gulf on 
 
237 
Louisiana’s Birdfoot Delta. Exasperated, she told me “We couldn’t get the boat [out to 
shrimp] because the water is so high right now—we had to tow it out with a few trucks.” 
The rise in the water along the coast made it hard to navigate the small bayous between 
all of the delta’s shrimp docks and open water. But the main problem is what the 
inundation of fresh water into the Gulf is doing to the coast’s brown and white shrimp, 
which I anticipated. Sue went on: “we’re lucky—we have a big boat [that can go into 
federal waters]. The small skimmer boats [who can only shrimp in state waters] don’t 
have any shrimp to catch. The [fresh] water keeps pushing the shrimp further and further 
out [into federal waters].” 
 
 
Figure 25. A map of the two primary spillways in South Louisiana; the Bonnet Carré and Morganza 
spillways. The original caption reads: “The Morganza Floodway is located at river mile 280 in central 
Louisiana. It is 186 river miles above New Orleans on the west bank of the river in Pointe Coupee Parish. It 
begins at the Mississippi River and extends southward to the East Atchafalaya River. It ultimately meets the 




In addition to the fresh water that is not organically, but is also not wholly deliberately, 
surging into the Gulf, to ensure that Baton Rouge and New Orleans are not harmed in the 
flooding, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is guiding more fresh water into the 
Mississippi and Atchafalaya, and by proxy, shrimping grounds, via water control 
structures. USACE has already opened the Bonnet Carré Spillway, which brings fresh 
water into the Gulf via Lake Pontchartrain, and is deciding whether or not to open the 
Morganza Floodway, which feeds into the Atchafalaya River (see Figure 25 above), in 
the next week.  
 
Morganza “is part of a control system to keep the Mississippi River from changing course 
down the Atchafalaya. Opening the structure allows the Mississippi to partially take that 
course in a controlled manner” (Daye 2019). If the Corps moves forward, this will only 
be the third time the spillway has been opened since it was constructed in 1954 “to 
maintain a flow of 1.5 million cubic feet per second (cfs) below the floodway...The 
structure is 3,906 feet in length with 125 bays and is capable of diverting up to 600,000 
cfs of water if necessary” (Daye 2019). This is the same rate at which the Mississippi 
discharges into the Gulf on average. That the floodway has only been opened twice in 65 
years and given that the flooding has already surpassed the timeframe and volume of 
1927, itself a decision-maker-produced event predicated on risk mitigation, as chapter 
three detailed, highlights that today’s flooding is no more “natural” than other climate-
change-induced droughts, typhoons, and diasporas. That the federal response to flooding 
is to create floods in areas designated as more ‘convenient’ to inundate—the rural and 
coastal versus the urban; the Gulf versus the river meander path; Indigenous and people 
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of color-dense spaces versus spaces of decision making in Baton Rouge—reaffirms for 
me that while flooding is the official disaster, for the folks with whom I work, disaster 
response (flood mitigation and later, structural restoration) and its refusal of coastal 
knowledges and needs, are the true disasters.  
 
In the month Bonnet Carré has been open, dolphins, sea turtles, and other marine life 
have been washing up dead in Biloxi, MS, across Louisiana’s coastline, and elsewhere 
along the Gulf coast; in addition to being asphyxiated by the density and rate of fresh 
water they are encountering along the Louisiana and Mississippi coastline, their bodies 
are covered in freshwater lesions, evidence of overwhelming exposure (Jeansonne 2019). 
One shrimping social media forum has been staying up to date on the flooding, posting 
articles and studies as they are published. In response to an article on the dolphin deaths, 
which included a photo of a dolphin who had been scarred by the fresh water, one 
member commented portentously: “poor baby…[first] them then us.” As more more-
than-human marine communities are harmed and given the potential of Morganza being 
opened, the Vietnamese/American fisherfolk I work with have made increasingly frantic 
pleas to state and federal officials with the now-common refrain: if dolphins and sea 
turtles are dying from freshwater inundation, what do you think this is doing to shrimp? 
What do you think it’s doing to us? 
*** 
At the urging of many of FSS’s clients over several months, Governor Edwards declared 
a state of emergency for Louisiana’s fisheries on June 13th, 2019.  The statistics listed in 
the governor’s letter are staggering: between 50% and 100% of oysters are dead upon 
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harvest today; statewide, brown and white shrimp landings (number of shrimp caught) 
are down 61%, and blue crab landings are down 37% (Edwards 2019; Louisiana 
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries 2019). This is because, as Edwards writes:  
 
The extreme duration of high Mississippi River levels since December 2018 
has necessitated unprecedented efforts by the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers to mitigate the threat of levee failures in Louisiana. Such efforts 
have included the opening of the Bonnet Carré Spillway twice this year; 
first in late February and again in early May. That structure continues to 
pass large volumes of river water into Lake Pontchartrain which 
subsequently flows east into Lake Borgne and Mississippi Sound. The 
extreme influx of freshwater has greatly reduced salinity levels in our 
coastal waters and disrupted estuarine productivity. Marine biologists with 
the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF) have been 
monitoring and documenting impacts to both the seafood species and 
fishing industries since early March 2019...Although the full impacts of the 
2019 flood event will not be determined for some time, especially in light 
of the continued operation of the Bonnet Carré Spillway, I respectfully 
request that [the U.S. Department of Commerce] begin the initiation of a 
federal fisheries disaster declaration. Such a declaration is consistent with 
federal law under both the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act (MSA) and the Interjurisdictional Fisheries Act 
(IJFA)...Such a declaration of a federal fisheries disaster for Louisiana may 
help in obtaining federal financial assistance for our fishers, processors, 
docks, and for the state to help rehabilitate the important fishery species 
upon which our seafood industry relies (Edwards 2019).   
 
What is most significant about Edwards’ letter is his acknowledgment of the flooding’s 
impact on commercial fishers as disaster—maybe the first time this degree of more-than-
human marine communities’ death has been directly described as a disaster for 
commercial fisheries in FSS’s clients’ memories. What is most ironic about this 
declaration is Edwards’ invocation of two federal marine protection laws, the MSA and 
IJFA, which he claimed CPRA should not be beholden to in his declaration of a State of 
Emergency for the Louisiana Coast just two years ago (Office of the Governor 2017). 
This disjuncture between Edwards’ 2017 state of emergency declaration and this 2019 
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fisheries disaster declaration shows me that, as Jonathan pointed to in the introduction, 
“The genius of Louisiana is getting someone else to pay for its problem” (Smith 2018). 
By reinforcing a narrative whereby federal and other actors cause the harm they must 
then fix, Louisiana’s decision-makers reinforce their role at the vanguard of coastal 
environmentalism. Being able to point to USACE’s poor decision-making at once 
evacuates Edwards, CPRA, and their peers of culpability in the sacrifice of coast-
dependent communities and allows them to position themselves as advocates for coastal 
communities. 
*** 
The current flooding crisis along Louisiana’s coast and the resulting official declarations 
of coastal emergency and fisheries disaster highlight, returning to Bahng and Nixon, the 
slippage between official risk-mitigation that produces an air-tight future, and the ever-
increasing effects of spectacular and ongoing slow disaster. This slippage, rather than 
being a space of liberation where sacrificed communities can claim knowledge or step 
into decision-making roles, amplifies the racism and xenophobia that underwrites their 
sacrifice under neoliberal environmentalism. Living in between a state of emergency and 
fisheries disaster declaration, Vietnamese/American and other fisherfolk, Isle de Jean 
Charles tribal members, low-income coastal residents, and more-than-human species like 
oysters once again prove their own evacuation from the state’s terra nullius future: not 
valuable on their own, fisheries are suddenly useful in disaster given their ability, as 
Louisiana Sea Grant illustrates below, to be used as a justification for Edwards to seek 




In light of Edwards’ declaration, Louisiana Sea Grant compiled the following fact sheet 
about the processes necessary to execute a fishery disaster (see Figure 26 below).  
 
Figure 26. A Factsheet compiled by Louisiana Sea Grant Law & Policy Program to help fisherfolk and 
other coastal residents understand what it means for Governor Edwards to declare a fisheries disaster 
(Louisiana Sea Grant Law & Policy Program 2019). 
 
While at the time of this writing, the declaration is still in process, the chances of all of 
these measures being executed such that commercial fisherfolk receive real-time support 
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and financial aid is quite low, even according to Louisiana Sea Grant. In this way, it 
becomes clear to me that the disaster is not the primary focus of these measures on behalf 
of Louisiana officials; rather, the value of these declarations is in their ability to bring 
emergency funds into the state while reinforcing Louisiana’s outward-facing 
environmentalism.  
*** 
Fisherfolk are rightfully claiming that the current flooding portends what is to come if 
MBSD is run as currently designed—if this much ‘natural’ fresh water entering the Gulf 
is making their work near impossible, what will a diversion that runs this time every year 
do to the future of their industry? We already know the answer: it will erase it from the 
landscape of diversion-contingent, risk-mitigating life in the Gulf. Like FSS’s clients, I 
am, fundamentally, enraged. At the same time, I understand that there is no outside of the 
subsumption—the resilience-determined sacrifice—facing the folks I work with and care 
about. So what does their best response look like? Some days, it is surviving—is doing 
what they do, loving who they love, giving where they can. Some days, like a day in 
early August 2016, it looks like 300 fisherfolk standing in front of FSS’s office holding 
and wearing signs to protest the ongoing economic strain they feel under stagnant shrimp 
prices, too-small yields, and growing shrimp imports from Southeast Asia and South 
America in the U.S. market. Still other days, it looks like upgrading boats, convening to 
discuss the state of the industry; looks like getting out of bed and going to the docks no 
matter what happens because children need to go to school and parents need medical 
care. It turns out, when people are being erased, there is no single way for them to make 
their pain, their fear, their response, legible to those who have already erased them. And 
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yet, and always, they keep on doing from a place of knowledge, by seeing the official and 
community-based landscapes they straddle for what they are, and by doing. This is not a 
tidy life, nor is it anywhere near easy; it is knowingly tenuous, unstable, physically and 
communally demanding.  
 
Today, the future of Southeast Louisiana’s Vietnamese/American community remains 
murky at best. At worst, it is, as diversion proponents would have it, already over. And 
yet, because they are equally in love with and trapped in and on the Gulf, 
Vietnamese/American fisherfolk have no choice but to respond; are given few options but 
to keep surviving. I do not mean to imply here that this is a positive state to be in—rather, 
it is the state they occupy no matter what the governor or CPRA claim to do on their 
behalf. While this worries me, I know fundamentally that the folks I work with will keep 
on keeping on because, as Happy reminds me, shrimping is “what we do. It’s all we 
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